

# VIETNAM WAR

## Organized Crime?

Part 2: Political Turmoil



By William P. Litynski

# Coup d'etat or Organized Crime?

The Assassinations of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem and American President John F. Kennedy in November 1963



Diem refused to promise the Americans that he would not negotiate with communist-led insurgents. Six weeks after his meeting with McNamara and Lodge, he was overthrown and killed.

South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in Saigon, South Vietnam on **November 2, 1963**. Ngo Dinh Diem was a Roman Catholic.



American President John F. Kennedy and his wife Jackie Kennedy ride in a motorcade in Dallas, Texas, United States of America on **November 22, 1963**, moments before President Kennedy was assassinated. President John F. Kennedy was a Roman Catholic.





President of France Charles de Gaulle (center) and Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie salute as foreign dignitaries render a final tribute to the late President John F. Kennedy at the Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A. on November 26, 1963. **Charles de Gaulle, who was born in Lille, France on November 22, 1890, celebrated his 73rd birthday on November 22, 1963.** Charles de Gaulle served as the President of France from January 8, 1959 until April 28, 1969. The 1963 Bilderberg Meetings (a private European political and business conference) was held in Cannes, France from 29-31 March 1963. President de Gaulle himself rejected the Warren Commission's version of the Kennedy Assassination.



Lyndon Baines Johnson

“They started on me with [Ngo Dinh] Diem, you remember. He was corrupt and he ought to be killed. **So we killed him. We all got together and got a goddamn bunch of thugs and we went in and assassinated him.** Now, we've really had no political stability since then.”

– U.S. President Lyndon Baines Johnson,  
in a tape-recorded conversation (Source: [Youtube](#))



**“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” – Mao Tse-tung**



## Vietnam War, Part 1: Lyndon Baines Johnson & Escalation



Left to right: U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball meet privately on November 23, 1963, the day after President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. (Photo: [Cecil Stoughton/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



*After a trip to Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara briefs President Lyndon B. Johnson and his senior advisors Averill Harriman, John McCone, Roger Hilsman and McGeorge Bundy visible, with Colby backing up McCone—the Oval Office, December 1963*

Left to right: Averell Harriman (left), the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, President Lyndon B. Johnson, CIA Director John McCone, CIA agent William E. Colby (sitting behind McCone), National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy (second from right in the rear), and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara meet in the Oval Office in December 1963.

## **Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 27, 1964, 11:24 a.m.**

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Source: U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68*, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia: Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 53

Original Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a telephone conversation between the President and McGeorge Bundy, Tape 64.28 PNO 111. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

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[Here follows discussion of the Seaborn mission to Hanoi and plans for Ambassador Stevenson to meet with the President.]

**Johnson: I will tell you the more, I just stayed awake last night thinking of this thing, and the more that I think of it I don't know what in the hell, it looks like to me that we're getting into another Korea. It just worries the hell out of me. I don't see what we can ever hope to get out of there with once we're committed. I believe the Chinese Communists are coming into it. I don't think that we can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and ever get anywhere in that area. I don't think it's worth fighting for and I don't think we can get out. And it's just the biggest damn mess that I ever saw.**

Bundy: It is an awful mess.

Johnson: And we just got to think about it. I'm looking at this Sergeant of mine this morning and he's got 6 little old kids over there, and he's getting out my things, and bringing me in my night reading, and all that kind of stuff, and I just thought about ordering all those kids in there. **And what in the hell am I ordering them out there for? What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me? What is Laos worth to me? What is it worth to this country? We've got a treaty but hell, everybody else has got a treaty out there, and they're not doing a thing about it.**

Bundy: Yeah, yeah.

**Johnson: Of course, if you start running from the Communists, they may just chase you right into your own kitchen.**

Bundy: Yeah, that's the trouble. And that is what the rest of that half of the world is going to think if this thing comes apart on us. That's the dilemma, that's exactly the dilemma.

Johnson: But everybody that I talk to that's got any sense now they just says Oh, my God, please give us thought. Of course I was reading Mansfield's stuff this morning, and it is just Milquetoast as it can be. He's got no spine at all.

Bundy: Yeah.

Johnson: But this is a terrible thing that we're getting ready to do.

Bundy: Mr. President, I just think it figure it is really the only big decision in one sense, this is the one that we have to either reach up and get it, or we let it go by. And I'm not telling you today what I'd do in your position. I just think that the most that we have to do with it is pray with it for another while.

Johnson: Anybody else that we got that can advise with, that might have any judgement on this question, that might be fresh, that might have some new approach. Would Bradley be any good? Would Clay be any good?

Bundy: No, Bradley would be no good. I do not think Clay would add. I think you're constantly searching, if I understand you correctly, for some means of stiffening this thing that does not have this escalating aspect to it, and I've been up and down this with Bob McNamara, and I have up and down it again with Mike Forrestal. And I think that there are some marginal things that we can do, . . . but I think, also, Mr. President, you can do, what I think Kennedy did at least once which is to make the threat without having made your own internal decision that you would actually carry it through. Now I think that the risk in that is that we have, at least, it seemed to do it about once or twice before. And there's another dilemma in here, which is the difficulty your own people have in. I'm not talking about Dean Rusk or Bob McNamara or me, but people who are at second removed, who just find it very hard to be firm, if they're not absolutely clear what your decision is. And yet you must safeguard that decision and keep your . . .

Johnson: What does Bill think that we ought to do?



Bundy: He's in favor of touching things up, but you ought to talk to him about it. I've got an extremely good memorandum from Forrestal that I'm just getting ready for you that shows what he thinks about it. [2]

Johnson: What does he think?

Bundy: He thinks that we ought to be ready to move a little bit, a little bit. And mainly the Vietnamese. On the other hand, a readiness to do more. He believes really that's the best way of galvanizing the South, that if they feel that we are prepared to take a little action against the center of this infection, that that's the best way . . .

Johnson: What action do we take, though?

Bundy: Well, I think that we really do need to do some target fodder work, Mr. President, that shows precisely what we do and don't mean here. The main object is to kill as few people as possible, while creating an environment in which the incentive to react is as low as possible. But I can't say to you that this is a small matter. There's one other thing that I've thought about, I've only just thought overnight, and it's on this same matter of saying to a guy, you go to Korea, or you go to Vietnam, and you fight in the rice paddies. I would love to know what happened if we were to say in this same speech, and from now on, nobody goes on this task who doesn't volunteer. I think that we might turn around the atmosphere of our own people out there, if it were a volunteer enterprise. I suspect that the Joints Chiefs won't agree to that, but I'd like to know what would happen. If we really dramatized this as Americans against terror and Americans keeping their commitment, and Americans who have only peace as their object, and only Americans who want to go have to go, you might change the temper of it some.

Johnson: Well, you wouldn't have a Corporals' Guard would you?

Bundy: I just don't know, I just don't know. If that's true, then I'm not sure that we're the country to do this job.

Johnson: I don't think that it's just Morse and Russell, and Gruening, I think it's . . .

Bundy: I know it isn't. I know it Mr. President, it is 90% of the people that don't want any part of it.

Johnson: Did you see the poll this morning? 65% of them don't know anything about it, and of those that do, the majority think that we're mishandling it. But they don't know what to do, that Gallup.

Bundy: Yeah, yeah.

**Johnson: It's damn easy to get into a war, but if it's going to be awful hard to ever extricate yourself if you get in.**

Bundy: Very easy. I'm very sensitive to the fact that the people who are having trouble with the intransigent problem find it very easy to come and say to the President of the United States, go and be tough.

Johnson: What does Lippmann think that you ought to do?

Bundy: Well, I'm going to talk with him at greater length, but what he really thinks is that you should provide a diplomatic structure within which the thing can go under the control of Hanoi, and walk away from it. I don't think that's an unfair statement, but I will ask him.

Johnson: You mean that he thinks that Hanoi ought to take South Vietnam?

Bundy: Yes sir, diplomatically.

Johnson: Uh, huh.

Bundy: Maybe by calling it a neutralization and removing American force and letting it slip away the way that Laos did, would if we didn't do anything, and will if we don't do anything. We would guarantee the neutrality in some sort of a treaty that we would write. I think, I'm sorry, I'm not sure that I'm the best person to describe Lippmann's views, because I don't agree with them.

Johnson: Who, who, who, who has he been talking to besides you? Has he talked to Rusk on any of this? Has he talked to McNamara?

Bundy: He's talked to George Ball. And he's talked to, I don't think that he's talked to Rusk, and I don't think he's talked to McNamara.

Johnson: Wouldn't it be good for he and McNamara to sit down?

Bundy: I think that it would be very good, but I don't think, I think, I had planned to have lunch with Walter on Monday, because I couldn't find a workable time before for that, but I can do it sooner, if you'd like me to.

Johnson: I wish you would.

Bundy: I will.

Johnson: I'd try to get his ideas a little more concrete before I leave here. And I'd like to have him talk to McNamara. I might, I might just have the three of you in this afternoon sometime.

Bundy: All right.

Johnson: Walter, McNamara and him [Ball?]. I'd like to hear Walter and McNamara debate.

Bundy: Debate it? [3]

Johnson: Yeah.

[Here follows discussion of a possible time that afternoon for the President to meet with McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Ball, and Walter Lippmann.]

*[2] Apparent reference to a memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy, May 26, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 178.*

*[3] According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Ball, and Lippmann from 4:30 p.m. to approximately 5 p.m. (Johnson Library) Ball wrote Rusk an account of the meeting, noting that Lippmann "made his usual argument for neutralization." Ball reported that when he pressed, Lippmann admitted that he assumed Southeast Asia was "destined inevitably to become a zone of Chinese Communist control" and the best U.S. course was to slow that expansionism and "make it less brutal." Ball did not think the President "bought Lippmann's thesis," but Johnson was impressed with Lippmann's view that the United States was losing the battle of international public relations. After the President left, the group debated Southeast Asia and Vietnam for another hour. (Letter from Ball to Rusk, May 31; Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Ball's Memos))*

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Source: <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/lbjbundy.htm>



Lyndon Baines Johnson  
Address at Johns Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest  
April 7, 1965

Mr. Garland, Senator Brewster, Senator Tydings, Members of the congressional delegation, members of the faculty of Johns Hopkins, student body, my fellow Americans:

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change.

This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Vietnam.

Vietnam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Vietnam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road?

Why must this nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace.

We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam. Its object is total conquest.

Of course, some of the people of South Vietnam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

**The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.**

**Over this war -- and all Asia -- is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.**

**Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Vietnam?**

**We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.**

**And I intend to keep that promise.**

**To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.**

**We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.**

**We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in southeast Asia -- as we did in Europe -- in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."**

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile -- that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

**Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam, and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves -- only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.**

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

**And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam -- and all who seek to share their conquest -- of a very simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired.**

**We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.**

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to any challenge. Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

**Such peace demands an independent South Vietnam -- securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others -- free from outside interference -- tied to no alliance -- a military base for no other country.**

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.



We have stated this position over and over again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready, with this purpose, for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle -- Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Vietnam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command. But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Vietnam want? They want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle existence from the soil. They are often wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the work of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works. Now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Vietnam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area. As far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Vietnam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office, and his deep knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway.

And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and the existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA.

The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care.

Schools can be established to train people in the skills that are needed to manage the process of development.

And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn, rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

In areas that are still ripped by conflict, of course development will not be easy. Peace will be necessary for final success. But we cannot and must not wait for peace to begin this job.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change -- as we see in our own country now -- does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful; or because we have made some mistakes; or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Vietnam and South Vietnam -- of China and India -- of Russia and America -- are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge -- always before denied -- to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside -- yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These -- not mighty arms -- are the achievements which the American Nation believes to be impressive.

And, if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes -- and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we could? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand.

We can do all these things on a scale never dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. In so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.



To Dr. Eisenhower and Mr. Garland, and this great institution, Johns Hopkins, I thank you for this opportunity to convey my thoughts to you and to the American people. Good night.

Source: [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/honor/filmmore/ps\\_peace.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/honor/filmmore/ps_peace.html)



South Vietnam's President Gen. Van Minh Duong (left) greets U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (right) in Saigon, South Vietnam in December 1963. (Photo: Larry Burrows/Time Life)

Ambassador Taylor with General "Big" Minh and his family, Saigon.



U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (third from right) poses for a group portrait with South Vietnam's strongman Gen. Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh", second from right) and his family in Saigon.

(Photo: *Swords and Plowshares* by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (1972))



South Vietnam's President Gen. Van Minh Duong (second from left), Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (third from left), U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (third from right), and CIA Director John Alex McCone (right) appear at a press conference in Saigon, South Vietnam in December 1963. (Photo: Larry Burrows/Time Life)

**Presidents of the Republic of Vietnam, (South Vietnam)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Took Office</b>	<b>Left Office</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Note</b>
<b>Ngô Đình Diệm</b>	<b>26 October 1955</b>	<b>2 November 1963</b>	<b>Can Lao Party</b>	<b>Died in coup d'état</b>
Dương Văn Minh	2 November 1963	30 January 1964	Military	chairman, Military Revolutionary Council
Nguyễn Khánh	30 January 1964	8 February 1964	Military	None
Dương Văn Minh	8 February 1964	16 March 1964	Military	None
Nguyễn Khánh	16 March 1964	27 August 1964	Military	None
<b>Provisional Leadership Committee</b>	27 August 1964	8 September 1964	Military	Committee: Duong Van Minh, Nguyen Khanh and Tran Thien Khiem
Dương Văn Minh	8 September 1964	26 October 1964	Military	chairman, Provisional Leadership Committee
Phan Khắc Sửu	26 October 1964	14 June 1965	Civilian appointed by military	None
<b>Nguyễn Văn Thiệu</b>	<b>14 June 1965</b>	<b>21 April 1975</b>	<b>Military; National Social Democratic Front (1968- )</b>	<b>Election: 1967 and 1971.</b>
Trần Văn Hương	21 April 1975	28 April 1975	?	acting
Dương Văn Minh	28 April 1975	30 April 1975	Appointed by National Assembly	acting

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDA  
NSAM 273: South Vietnam

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 26, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Director of Central Intelligence  
              The Administrator, AID  
              The Director, USIA

The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:

1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all U. S. decisions and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public support. All U. S. officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.
4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U. S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

(page 1 of 3 pages)

Authority NSC memo 5/23/78  
By MJE/LAS, NARS, Date 9/16/83



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

November 26, 1963

5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only the control of hamlets but the productivity of this area, especially where the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.

(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)

6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are possible as between MAP and other U. S. defense resources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of the import, distribution, and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.

(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate.)

7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:

- A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
- B. The plausibility of denial;
- C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
- D. Other international reaction.

Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.  
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should

~~TOP SECRET~~

(page 2 of 3 pages)

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-3-

November 26, 1963

pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined method of political guidance for such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.

(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular a plan should be developed using all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the Cambodians that the recent charges against us are groundless.

(Action: State.)

10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jordan Report, as powerful and complete as possible.

(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)

*h.p. Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy  
Mr. Forrestal  
Mr. Johnson  
NSC Files  
(page 3 of 3 pages)

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDA  
NSAM 313: Re SEA stories (ref: NSAM 308)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 31, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 313

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The President has noticed this week a number of stories on Southeast Asia with Washington datelines which give the impression that some members of the Government are giving conflicting and mutually inconsistent documents to reporters, and that there may be some unauthorized use of information drawn from classified cables. The President requests that each Department and Agency head take further appropriate measures to impress upon all personnel with access to reporters that public comment on this subject should be most carefully handled as set forth in NSAM 308.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Distribution:

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Dispatched: 7/31/64

NSC memo 8-31-64  
12-144



U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (center) listen as South Vietnam's President General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") chats with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor at Gia Long Palace in Saigon, Vietnam in May 1964. (Photo: Larry Burrows/Time Life)



General Khanh, who overthrew General Minh in January 1964, quickly received support from the United States. He is seen here with (left to right) Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor, who were visiting Vietnam in February 1964, and Ambassador Lodge.



Left to right: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, General Maxwell D. Taylor, General Nguyen Khanh, and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. in Saigon. (Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)






March 1964: Before Max and I left for Vietnam, President Johnson said he wanted to see a thousand photographs of me boosting Khanh, to demonstrate to the South Vietnamese people that the U.S. stood behind him every step of the way. To my everlasting embarrassment, LBJ got his wish. (Photo courtesy Life Magazine)

U.S. Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (left), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, South Vietnam's President Gen. Nguyen Khanh (center), and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (right) celebrate at a press conference in Saigon, South Vietnam in March 1964. (Source: *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* by Robert S. McNamara)



Left to right: CIA Director John Alex McCone, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk laugh together during a meeting at the State Department in Washington, D.C. in May 1964. (Photo: Francis Miller/Time Life)



Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (left) talks with U.S. Army General William Westmoreland (right), and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (center) in Saigon, South Vietnam in May 1964. (Larry Burrows/Time Life)





General Nguyen Khanh, the new South Vietnamese leader (27), began calling for attacks on North Vietnam in the summer of 1964. On the night of August 4, after incidents—both real and imagined—in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson announced to the nation the first American air strike on the North (28).

(Photo: *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* by David Kaiser)





Swearing-in ceremony as Ambassador to South Vietnam in the Rose Garden,  
July 2, 1964. (O. J. Rapp)

(Photo: *Swords and Plowshares* by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (1972))



Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. partners (from left to right) E. Roland Harriman, former U.S. Senator Prescott Bush, Knight Woolley, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett meet privately at the Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. office on July 28, 1964. The staged Gulf of Tonkin incident took place during the first week of August 1964. All four men were members of Skull & Bones, a secret society located at Yale University.

Photo # NH 95611 North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats attacking USS Maddox, 2 Aug. 1964



Photograph taken from *USS Maddox* (DD-731) during her staged engagement with three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, 2 August 1964. The view shows all three of the boats speeding towards the *Maddox*. (Source: [Official U.S. Navy Photograph, from the collections of the Naval Historical Center](#))



# McNamara asks Giap: What happened in Tonkin Gulf?

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[\(c\) 1995 Associated Press](#)

□ [While McNamara visits Hanoi, old soldiers attack his stewardship](#)

HANOI, Vietnam (Nov 9, 1995 - 16:06 EST) -- When former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara met the enemy's leading strategist Thursday, he raised a question he'd saved for 30 years: What really happened in the Tonkin Gulf on Aug. 4, 1964? "Absolutely nothing," replied retired Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap.

Both sides agree that North Vietnam attacked a U.S. Navy ship in the gulf on Aug. 2 as it cruised close to shore. But it was an alleged second attack two days later that led to the first U.S. bombing raid on the North and propelled America deep into war. Many U.S. historians have long believed the Johnson administration fabricated the second attack to win congressional support for widening the war. But for McNamara, Giap's word was the clincher. "It's a pretty damned good source," he said after the meeting.

As defense secretary from 1961-68 under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, McNamara was one of the leading proponents of U.S. support for South Vietnam against the Communist North. But he left office convinced the war was doomed to failure, he says, revealing his change of heart in memoirs published this year.

The 85-year-old Giap, wearing his olive green uniform with four gold stars on his shoulder, greeted him with an understatement: "I heard about you long ago." McNamara laughed. "I heard about YOU long ago," he rejoined.

Then they talked for more than an hour, with McNamara frequently leaning forward and jabbing his finger for emphasis as he talked about the lessons of history. McNamara, 79, emerged from the meeting describing it as extraordinary and saying he was struck by the lack of hostility.

McNamara came to Hanoi for the first time to ask the Vietnamese to take part in a conference of top Vietnam War decision-makers. **The New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, which is organizing the gathering, says it would be an opportunity to share archival materials and correct the historical record.**

"You lost ... 3,200,000 people," McNamara told Giap. "We lost 58,000." He said the conference would help "ensure that our nations and other nations learn how to avoid such conflicts in the future."

He elaborated to reporters afterward: "The major questions are: Could we have avoided a tragedy -- a tragedy for them and a tragedy for us -- or could we have minimized it?" Giap and Vietnamese officials have said they will give the conference serious consideration. McNamara wasted little time in raising a question that clearly had nagged him for decades.

"To this day I don't know what happened on August 2 and August 4, 1964, in the Tonkin Gulf," he said to Giap. "I think we may have made two serious misjudgments. ... Did what we thought was an attack on August 4, 1964, the so-called second attack -- did it occur?" Giap replied, "On the fourth of August, there was absolutely nothing."

Reporters were ushered from the room soon after, but McNamara later quoted Giap as saying he believed U.S. surveillance ships were trying to provoke an attack so President Johnson would have an excuse to step up U.S. involvement. McNamara, speaking later to reporters, disputed that interpretation: "That point that Giap made is absolutely without foundation."

Johnson quickly won congressional approval of the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution" authorizing him to "take all necessary measures" to repel attacks on U.S. forces. The first U.S. combat troops landed in South Vietnam seven months later. McNamara said the administration believed the second attack had taken place and that it had to respond forcefully.

**McNamara and the rest of the delegation from the Council on Foreign Relations also met Thursday with Deputy Premier Phan Van Khai and Deputy Vice President Nguyen Thi Binh, former foreign minister in South Vietnam's pro-Communist "provisional revolutionary government" during the war.**

Source: [http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/world198\\_4.html](http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/world198_4.html)

# George W. Ball on the Vietnam War: In His Own Words



George W. Ball, Under U.S. Secretary of State (1961-1966)

“On October 1, 1961, Premier Diem called on the United States for a bilateral defense treaty; on October 13, he asked for United States combat troops and a substantial amount of equipment. President Kennedy responded by sending a fact-finding mission to Vietnam headed by General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow, both White House advisers. The inclusion of Rostow worried me. A friend of mine since the Second World War, he was an articulate amateur tactician. **I thought him unduly fascinated by the then faddish theories about counter-insurgency and that intriguing new invention of the professors, “nation building.”** Still, Maxwell Taylor's presence was reassuring. Though I then knew him only slightly, I had a favorable impression of his judgment. He talked with an elegance unexpected in a soldier, and he looked exactly as a general should: clean-cut, scholarly, handsome, and resolute. In the past he had, at least ambiguously, expressed aversion to the involvement of American forces on the Asian mainland, so I hoped he might be another Matthew Ridgway. Yet, as I knew from experience with my French friends, **there was something about Vietnam that seduced the toughest military minds into fantasy.** At this time, the United States maintained in South Vietnam an advisory group of about seven hundred men (roughly the limit provided by the 1954 Geneva Accords). Now General Taylor cabled from Saigon in early November 1961 that we should introduce a military force into South Vietnam to raise national morale, perform logistical tasks "in support of military and flood relief operations," conduct combat operations necessary for self-defense and for security of the area in which it was stationed, provide emergency reserves to back up the Vietnamese armed forces "in the case of a heightened military crisis," and "act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be introduced." Such United States troops, the general noted, might "be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves, their working parties, and *the* area in which they live. As a general reserve, they might be thrown into action (with U.S. agreement) against large, formed guerrilla bands which have abandoned the forests for attacks on major targets." Contrary to the later experience of thousands of young Americans, Taylor also asserted that, “as an area for the operations of U.S. troops, SVN (South Vietnam) is not an excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate.””

– *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* by George W. Ball (1982), p. 365

“On Saturday morning, November 4, 1961, I attended a meeting with General Taylor in Secretary Rusk's conference room. Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and a few others were also present. McNamara and Gilpatric, who were invariably prompt, arrived in advance of the general, and I talked with them about the Taylor proposals. I was, I said, appalled at the report's recommendations; **we must not commit forces to South Vietnam or we would find ourselves in a protracted conflict far more serious than Korea. The Viet Cong were mean and tough, as the French had learned to their sorrow, and there was always danger of provoking Chinese intervention as we had in Korea. Moreover, I said, unlike Korea, the Vietnam problem was not one of repelling overt invasion but of mixing ourselves up in a revolutionary situation with strong anticolonialist overtones.** To my dismay, I found no sympathy for these views. Both McNamara and Gilpatric seemed preoccupied with the single question, **How can the United States stop South Vietnam from a Viet Cong takeover?** How did I propose to avoid it? The “falling domino” theory was a brooding omnipresence. I was depressed by the direction affairs were taking, so at the end of a meeting on another subject the following Tuesday, November 7, I raised the question with President Kennedy. I told him that I strongly opposed the recommendations of the Rostow mission. **To commit American forces to South Vietnam would, in my view, be a tragic error. Once that process started, I said, there would be no end to it. “Within five years we'll have three hundred thousand men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again. That was the French experience. Vietnam is the worst possible terrain both from a physical and political point of view.”** To my surprise, the President seemed quite unwilling to discuss the matter, responding with an overtone of asperity: “George, you're just crazier than hell. That just isn't going to happen.””

– *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* by George W. Ball (1982), p. 366



“Although I dislike trite metaphors, I felt as though an accelerating current were propelling us faster and faster toward a gigantic waterfall. Yet no one was questioning the navigation, only how to rev up the engines to make the ship run faster. “How?” was the obsessive question. **How could we apply the vast power at our command to impose our will on the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong?** I recalled the story of a small boy at the zoo whose father had pointed out a large caged animal and announced: “See, that’s a giraffe” – to which the boy had very sensibly answered: “Why?” To ask the “giraffe” question, now that we were getting into increasingly deep trouble, was regarded as almost subversive. No one was prepared to discuss why we persisted in a war that, in my view, we could not win, in pursuit of an objective that seemed every day to have less reality. Men with minds trained to be critical within the four walls of their own disciplines – to accept no proposition without adequate proof – shed their critical habits and abjured the hard question “why.” Once they caught hold of the levers of power in Washington, they all too frequently subordinated objectivity to the exhilaration of working those levers and watching things happen. The lessons of history, to my surprise, were disdained. It was useless for me to point out the meaning of the French experience; they thought that experience without relevance. **Unlike the French, we were not pursuing colonialist objectives but nobly waging war to support a beleaguered people. Besides, we were not a second-class nation trying to hang on in Southeast Asia from sheer nostalgic inertia; we were a superpower-with all that that implied.** Disparate frames of reference beclouded understanding. **For Hanoi’s leaders, control of the whole of Vietnam was a fanatical, almost religious, objective they had relentlessly pursued for twenty years; for America, the war was a marginal affair not worth a head-on clash with Peking or Moscow, a struggle to be waged with a limited commitment of manpower and weaponry. Thus President Johnson ruled out such provocative acts as mining Haiphong Harbor, or blowing up the dikes, or bombing the city center of Hanoi, or mounting a land invasion of North Vietnam; nor did anyone even consider the use of nuclear weapons. The conflict was a limited war for limited objectives – a type of warfare for which a democracy is organically badly suited.** For me, that built-in disparity of commitment raised fundamental questions. Not only did we suffer the implicit disadvantage of waging limited war against an adversary committed to total war, there was also the question whether America, as a democratic state, could fight a limited war that lasted more than a year or so and still keep it limited. A free people would accept sustained sacrifices only if persuaded that the cause justified their deprivations. If the answer were No, we ought to withdraw; if Yes, were we not then obligated to use our full military might? That problem haunted me.”

– *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* by George W. Ball (1982), p. 376-377

“**At the beginning of June 1964, while considering moves that would intensify the American involvement, the President asked me to discuss Vietnam with President de Gaulle. My selection for that mission was no accident; in Lyndon Johnson's mind, the very fact that I opposed the war made me the best advocate of the Administration's position.** He knew that, as long as I remained in the government, I would defend government policies, whatever they might be. The President understood and respected my commitment to that position though he liked to tease me about it. “George,” he once told me, “you’re like the school teacher looking for a job with a small school district in Texas. When asked by the school board whether he believed that the world was flat or round, he replied: ‘Oh, I can teach it either way.’” “That’s you,” said the President. “You can argue like hell with me against a position, but I know outside this room you’re going to support me. You can teach it flat or round.” President de Gaulle received me in the splendor of the Elysee Palace with his customary friendly greeting. I told the French President that, although both our governments wanted a viable South Vietnam, the government of Saigon seemed unable to stop the North Vietnamese and Vietcong invasion. Within a reasonable time, the United States might itself have to take action against the North, even though that might, at some point, engage the Chinese forces. **Naturally we wanted a diplomatic solution, but the South was so fragile that even talk of negotiations might lead to its collapse and a quick Vietcong victory. We, however, did not believe in negotiating until our position on the battlefield was so strong that our adversaries might make the requisite concessions. Thus before serious talks, we would have to teach the Vietnamese a lesson and, in the process, persuade the Chinese also of our strength.** China, as we saw it, was not unlike the Soviet Union in 1917: primitive and aggressive toward its neighbors. De Gaulle, as I had anticipated, rejected my analysis categorically. China, he told me, was nothing like the Soviet Union in 1917; it lacked the military, industrial, and intellectual resources that Russia had even at that time. Thus, it would not become aggressive until after it had consolidated its power, which would require a long period. **We were pursuing the same illusions about Vietnam that had gotten France into such trouble. It would, of course, be nice if we were right, but he knew something about Vietnam: it was a hopeless place to fight. He, therefore, felt obliged to tell me that the United States could not win, even though we commanded vastly more resources than France had been able to mobilize. The more power we committed, the more the population would turn against us. We would never succeed by force, only by negotiation. I riposted with the established Administration line that South Vietnam would never understand a negotiating move at this time, but interpret it as a sign of American weakness. But de Gaulle did not let me get far down that course, interrupting to say that our position in Vietnam was hopeless and France would not involve itself in any way in the escalation of the fighting. We would have to go it alone. Vietnam, he said – and I shall never forget the phrase – is “rotten country.” France had learned that to its sorrow.** Since de Gaulle’s views supported what I had been arguing to my colleagues, I hoped they would reinforce my position, but when I returned from Europe, I found Lyndon Johnson unimpressed, or at least unwilling to listen, as he was then preoccupied with strengthening his domestic flanks. As a seasoned politician, he had concluded that if there were to be a major escalation of the war, he must make sure of having Congress behind him. Thus he would seize the earliest opportunity to obtain a Congressional mandate for a greater involvement. That opportunity came very promptly.”

– *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* by George W. Ball (1982), p. 377-379

**“During this period, I was aware that we were conducting covert military operations under the code name Operation Plan 34A.** They were part of a strategy of mounting "progressively escalating pressure" on Hanoi by what President Johnson liked to call “noncommitting measures,” and they included the dispatching of PT boats to bombard North Vietnamese coastal installations. During this same period (February and March 1964), the navy had begun an exercise under the code name of De Soto Patrol, which consisted of sending destroyers up the Gulf of Tonkin with the ostensible mission of collecting intelligence on such matters as radars and coastal defenses. **On August 2, 1964, while the destroyer Maddox was heading south after completing such a mission, North Vietnamese PT boats made a run at her.** Though some of the President's advisers urged an immediate retaliatory move, the President wished for an even stronger record. So, rather than keeping our ships out of this now established danger zone, **the President approved sending both the Maddox and the destroyer C. Turner Joy back into the Gulf.** I was upset by this decision; the argument that we had to “show the flag” and demonstrate that we did not “intend to back down” seemed to me a hollow bravado. Thus I was disturbed but not surprised on August 4, 1964, when word came that both destroyers had been attacked. The North Vietnamese may well have thought that the De Soto Patrols were part of the 34A raids and were merely trying to defend the coast by attacking the destroyers. Moreover, there was some evidence that the commanders might have misread the radar blips; if the destroyers were in danger, it could have been because they were firing at one another. Within the next two or three days, even President Johnson began to doubt the occurrence of a second attack. With disgust he said to me at one point, "Hell, those dumb, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish!" I thought we would now stop risking our destroyers, but immediately following the presumed second attack, Secretary McNamara proposed a further De Soto Patrol to show the flag and prove to Hanoi and the world that we were not intimidated. The project was briefly discussed; there was general agreement around the table; the President indicated his approval to go forward. I had said little during the discussion, but I now spoke up, "Mr. President, I urge you not to make that decision. Suppose one of those destroyers is sunk with several hundred men aboard. Inevitably, there'll be a Congressional investigation. What would your defense be? Everyone knows the De Soto Patrols have no intelligence mission that couldn't be accomplished just as well by planes or small boats at far less risk. The evidence will strongly suggest that you sent those ships up the Gulf only to provoke attack so we could retaliate. Just think what Congress and the press would do with that! They'd say you deliberately used American boys as decoy clucks and that you threw away lives just so you'd have an excuse to bomb. Mr. President, you couldn't live with that."... The Tonkin Gulf attack-- or attacks, however many there may have been – provided the President with enough leverage to extract from Congress almost unlimited authority to escalate our involvement. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (a terrifyingly open-ended grant of power) disappointed me; I had counted on Congress to insert qualifying language, but Congress had abdicated. I did not know where we were headed, but it was clear the war was getting out of hand.”

– *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* by George W. Ball (1982), p. 379-380

“Because we failed to adjust our war aims to what was now tacitly regarded as our true objective--to save our reputation--doctrine decreed that we must never agree to a cease-fire in place, which would leave North Vietnamese forces in the South. Our avowed war aim was to restore the Saigon government's sovereignty over the whole of South Vietnam and our failure to achieve it would impair our reputation as a guarantor. Nor should we agree to a coalition government that would permit the North Vietnamese apparatchiks a beachhead from which they could quickly subvert and overwhelm the softer South Vietnamese elements – a prediction that implied a vote of no confidence in the Saigon hierarchy. **Since we had now reduced our reasons for continuing to struggle in Vietnam to the simple objective of saving ourselves from humiliation – in other words, preserving our reputation** – we should have concentrated on a simple question: **How can we withdraw from Vietnam with the least loss of face?** The indispensable first step was to free ourselves from subservience to whatever regime might at the time be in power in South Vietnam. **We could never achieve terms that would satisfy the Saigon government; its war aims were rigidly defined by the desire of those in power to keep their jobs.** We were constantly on the verge, as I kept pointing out, of becoming a "puppet of our puppet." Our first problem was to reposition ourselves so we could negotiate bilaterally with North Vietnam to secure the return of our prisoners and the peaceful withdrawal of our forces. That required that we demonstrate what was every day more obvious: the South Vietnamese were not fulfilling their part of the bargain. **The Saigon government was corrupt and without firm national roots.”**

– *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* by George W. Ball (1982), p. 387

#### ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

William P. Litynski served in the U.S. Army from September 2001-November 2004, primarily in the First Armored Division in Germany (Apache Troop, 1-1 CAV, Budingon); he was deployed to Iraq (near Baghdad) from April 2003 until July 2004. He attended Crestview High School in Crestview, Florida from 1996-2000 and graduated in 2000. He lived at Yokota Air Base, Japan (U.S. Air Force base near Tokyo) from 1987-1993. (His mother is from Japan, and his grandfather was drafted twice by the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II.) William P. Litynski has traveled extensively and has visited Tokyo, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, Brussels, Luxembourg City, Munich, Frankfurt am Main, New York City, Washington D.C., Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Seattle, and Dallas. (E-mail: wpl314@yahoo.com)



Maj. Gen. Thien Khiem (L), President Gen. Duong Van Minh (2L), and Premier Gen. Nguyen Khanh (R) walk together in Saigon, South Vietnam in September 1964. (Photo: Larry Burrows/Time Life)



South Vietnam's President General Nguyen Khanh (2L) visits a pagoda with Buddhist Monk Thich Tam Chau in September 1964. (Photo: Time Life)



President Lyndon B. Johnson (third from right) appear at his ranch in Texas on December 1, 1963 with (left to right) unidentified, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David M. Shoup, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. David McDonald, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor, and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. (Photo: Stan Wayman/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)



President Lyndon B. Johnson meets with the Joint Chiefs and senior Pentagon officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Ranch near Stonewall, Texas on December 22, 1964. Clockwise from the President: Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; Military Aide Major General Chester Clifton; Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler; Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson; Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral David McDonald; Marine Corps General Wallace M. Greene Jr. Two days later, on December 24, 1964, the Viet Cong blew up the Brinks Hotel, which was serving as an American barracks, and Ambassador Taylor asked that bombing of the North begin. (Photo: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Photo by Yoichi R. Okamoto)





**Viet Cong Terrorism or False-Flag Covert Operation?** At 5:55 p.m. on December 24, 1964, Viet Cong terrorists exploded a bomb in the garage area underneath the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, South Vietnam. The hotel, housing 125 military and civilian guests, was being used as officers' billets for U.S. Armed Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Two Americans were killed, and 107 Americans, Vietnamese, and Australians were injured. Small buildings at the rear of the Brinks Hotel were completely destroyed by the force of the blast. (Photo: U.S. Air Force)

<http://narademo.umiacs.umd.edu/cgi-bin/isadg/viewobject.pl?object=79084>





*On Christmas Eve 1964, Vietcong terrorists bombed a hotel in Saigon housing American officers. President Johnson refrained from taking reprisals so as not to jar the U.S. public during the holiday season.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)

#### Prime Ministers of the Republic of Vietnam

Name	Took Office	Left Office	Party	Note
Nguyen Ngoc Tho	4 November 1963	30 January 1964	Civilian in military junta	None
Nguyen Khanh, 1st time	8 February 1964	29 August 1964	Military	None
Nguyen Xuan Oanh, 1st time	29 August 1964	3 September 1964	Civilian in military junta	acting
Nguyen Khanh, 2nd time	3 September 1964	4 November 1964	Military	None
Tran Van Huong, 1st time	4 November 1964	28 January 1965	Civilian in military junta	None
Nguyen Xuan Oanh, 2nd time	28 January 1965	15 February 1965	Civilian in military junta	acting
Phan Huy Quat	16 February 1965	8 June 1965	Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang, civilian in military junta	None
<b>Nguyen Cao Ky</b>	<b>19 June 1965</b>	<b>31 October 1967</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>None</b>
Nguyen Van Loc	31 October 1967	17 May 1968		None
Tran Van Huong, 2nd time	28 May 1968	1 September 1969	???	None
Tran Thien Khiem	1 September 1969	4 April 1975		None
Nguyen Ba Can	4 April 1975	24 April 1975	Dan Chu Party (Democracy Party)	None
Vu Van Mau	28 April 1975	30 April 1975	Forces for National Reconciliation	None



*On February 7, 1965, when the Vietcong attacked the American base near Pleiku in the central highlands of South Vietnam, Johnson responded with American air raids against North Vietnam.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



American National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy (left) and South Vietnam's President General Nguyen Khanh walk across the runway at Camp Holloway in Pleiku, South Vietnam on February 7, 1965, after the American military base was attacked by the Viet Cong in a surprise raid which took seven American lives. Bundy was on his way back to Washington in the wake of American and South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese military installations in retaliation for the Vietcong raid. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)





U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor watches Gen. William C. Westmoreland shake hands with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy in Saigon, South Vietnam on February 4, 1965. (Photo: UPI/Bettmann)  
 (Source: *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* by James T. Patterson)



Standing on a sandbag revetment to get a better view of the air base in Pleiku, South Vietnam, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy (center) and U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), are informed on the Pleiku attack by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hughes (left), Commander of the 52nd US Army Aviation Battalion, on February 10, 1965. The Viet Congs attacked the air base at Pleiku on the night of February 7, 1965. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



President Lyndon B. Johnson discusses policy with U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright on July 28, 1965.  
(Photo by Yoichi Okamoto/[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



Prime Minister of South Vietnam Nguyen Cao Ky (left), U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson (foreground, back of head shown), and President of South Vietnam Nguyen Van Thieu (second from right) meet in Honolulu, Hawaii, in February 1966. CIA agent Edward G. Lansdale is seated in the background, second from right. (Photo: Yoichi Robert Okamoto)




Dean Rusk (left) and Robert McNamara (right) listen as Gen. William C. Westmoreland talks to President Lyndon B. Johnson at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Honolulu on February 6, 1966. (Photo: [Yoichi R. Okamoto, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk (left), South Vietnamese Ambassador Vu Van Thai, U.S. Senator Hiram Fong, and U. Alexis Johnson (leaning on table) have a conversation aboard Air Force One on February 5, 1966 en route from Washington, D.C., U.S.A. to Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. to attend the Honolulu Conference on the Vietnam War. (Photo: [Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))





South Vietnamese paratrooper General Do Cao Tri (left, red beret) walks with U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. in South Vietnam. (Photo: Time Life)



Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (left) rides in an airplane with an unidentified South Vietnamese army officer. (Photo: [Time Life](#))



President Lyndon B. Johnson speaks with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu in Honolulu at their last meeting on July 19, 1968. (Photo by Yoichi R. Okamoto/National Archives)





Clockwise, left to right: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu, President Lyndon B. Johnson, South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, unidentified South Vietnamese diplomat, Jack Valenti, U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara meet behind closed doors.  
(Photo: [Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



Clockwise, left to right: Walt Rostow, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Nicholas Katzenbach, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Cyrus Vance, and Gen. Earle Wheeler meet together to discuss the Vietnam War at the White House.  
(Photo: [Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))





U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson (left) visits South Vietnam on October 26, 1966, with U.S. Army General William Westmoreland, South Vietnam's President Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, and South Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky. (National Archives/ Lyndon B. Johnson Library photo by Yoichi Okamoto)



American President Lyndon Baines Johnson addresses American troops stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam on October 26, 1966. With President Johnson on the speaker's platform are (left to right): Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam; Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam's Chief of State; South Vietnamese Premier Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky; U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk; unidentified; and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS)





Heads of states meet together at the SEATO convention on October 24, 1966. Left to right: Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky (South Vietnam), Prime Minister Harold Holt (Australia), President Park Chung Hee (Korea), President Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), Prime Minister Keith Holyoake (New Zealand), Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu (South Vietnam), Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn (Thailand), President Lyndon B. Johnson (United States). (Photo: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)



Photo shows leaders signing the Manila summit agreement at Malacanang Palace in Manila, Philippines on October 25, 1966. Left to right: Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt, South Korean President Park Chung Hee, New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, Philippine Foreign Minister Marciso Ramos (standing), Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Thailand's Prime Minister Thamon Kittikachorn, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, South Vietnamese Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu, and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)



Manila Conference of SEATO nations on the Vietnam War: American and South Vietnamese diplomats participate in a private meeting at Manila Hotel in Manila, Philippines on October 23, 1966. From left to right: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., unidentified, Robert Komer, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, South Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, Walt Rostow, and South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu. (Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library photo by Yoichi Okamoto)






President Lyndon B. Johnson (left) stands beside Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos at the Manila Airport in Manila, Philippines on October 27, 1966. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



President and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson pose with King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit before the start of a formal dinner in the Chakri Throne Hall of the Royal Palace in Bangkok, Thailand on October 28, 1966. They are shown formally dressed in 3/4 length shot. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



**Lyndon dances while America is burning:** President Lyndon B. Johnson dances with Imelda Marcos, the wife of Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, in Manila, Philippines in October 1966. (Larry Burrows/Time Life)





U.S. Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland (left), Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (right) greet U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg at an airport in Saigon, South Vietnam on March 1, 1967. All three men were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Standing at attention during the playing of the national anthems are (left to right) in front row; South Vietnamese Chief of State, Nguyen Van Thieu (wearing dark suit); President Lyndon Johnson; and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. At attention in second row are (left to right); Rear Adm. Horace Bird, Commander of U.S. naval forces in the Marianas Islands (wearing short sleeved uniform); Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during arrival ceremonies at Guam International Airport in Agana, Guam, USA on March 19, 1967. (Frank Johnston/Bettmann/CORBIS)



Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the US Forces in Vietnam wears the Boy Scout Silver Buffalo Award for distinguished service as he stands with Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C. on April 28, 1967. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (left), U.S. Army General William Westmoreland, Commander of U. S. Forces in Vietnam, and U.S. Army General Earl Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, stand together at the White House on July 13, 1967, where they met with President Lyndon B. Johnson. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





President Ferdinand Marcos (r) and his wife Imelda Marcos (second from left), greet South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky (l) and his wife (second from right) in Manila, Philippines as they arrive for a state visit on August 10, 1966. (Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS)



President Lyndon B. Johnson meets with Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky (left) of the Republic of Vietnam on February 8, 1966 during the Honolulu Conference at Camp Smith near Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (left) meets with President Nguyen Van Thieu (right) of the Republic of Vietnam in the foreground. (Photo by Yoichi R. Okamoto)



Prime Minister of South Vietnam Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (left) chats with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Honolulu, Hawaii on February 8, 1966. (White House Photograph Office)





National Security Advisor Walt Rostow shows President Lyndon B. Johnson a model of the Khe Sanh area in the White House Situation Room on February 15, 1968. (White House photo)



Secretary of State Dean Rusk (left), U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland (center), and President Lyndon B. Johnson appear at a press conference in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 1968. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



President Lyndon B. Johnson is joined by several of his top advisors to discuss the Vietnam War at Camp David on April 9, 1968. It is believed by some that the meeting was held so as to excuse the president from attending Martin Luther King, Jr.'s funeral. The men depicted are (from left to right): U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Averell Harriman, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler. (Wally McNamee/CORBIS)



South Vietnam's President Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu (left) listens as America's President Lyndon Baines Johnson delivers a statement at the close of the conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. on July 20, 1968. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)





President Lyndon B. Johnson (foreground, back of head) meets with Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, George W. Ball (third from right), National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and two unidentified U.S. Army generals. Goldberg, Rusk, Ball, and Bundy were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Photo: [Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



From left to right: Former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk discuss Vietnam War with President Lyndon B. Johnson on July 24, 1968. (Photo: [Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



## Vietnam War, Part 2: Tet Offensive, My Lai Massacre & “Police Action”



South Vietnam's General Nguyen Ngoc Loan (left), South Vietnam's Chief of National Police, executes Viet Cong terrorist and suspected child-killer Captain Nguyen Van Lem (right) in Saigon during the Tet Offensive on February 1, 1968. General Loan would later move to Virginia after the Vietnam War; General Loan died of cancer in Virginia in 1998. (Eddie Adams, Associated Press/Wide World Photos)

**“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” – Mao Tse-tung**



Victims of the My Lai Massacre. The My Lai Massacre took place in My Lai, South Vietnam on March 16, 1968, killing 504 Vietnamese men, women, and children. According to Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair in their book *Whiteout*, the My Lai Massacre was part of a CIA covert operation called Operation Phoenix. (Photo by Ronald L. Haeberle)



U.S. Army Military Policemen (MP) return fire from inside the besieged American Embassy in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam on January 31, 1968 during the beginning of the Tet Offensive. Two American soldiers were killed during the surprise Viet Cong Tet attack on the embassy that day.

(Wide World Photo) (Source: Grauer, *NBC News Picture Book of 1968*, p. 46)






A Viet Cong rebel lies dead at the American Embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968. (Photo: Ray Cranbourne/Black Star) (Source: *The Vietnam Experience: Images of War*, p. 37)





A photograph of Viet Cong terrorists that were killed during an attempted breakthrough of the perimeter at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive on February 1, 1968.

(Photo by: First Lieutenant E.B. Herr, Neckar Pictorial, A.V. Plt. 69th Sig. Bn. (A))



A Scene after Tet Offensive in Saigon, South Vietnam in February 1968.  
(Photo: William Eggleston/Bettmann/CORBIS)



The grounds of the 8th Division (8eme) in the Cholón district of Saigon takes a hit from two 750 pound bombs during the 1968 Tet offensive. Cholón, or Chinatown, was a market area inhabited by Vietnamese of predominately Chinese origin. (Image by © Tim Page/CORBIS)





Houses burn during fierce fighting on the north side of Saigon, South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive on May 6, 1968. Cholon, Saigon's Chinese district, was the scene of stepped up enemy terrorism on May 8, with troops scurrying from block to block firing at police stations and military vehicles and hoisting Viet Cong flags up light poles. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)



Troops on foot and in personnel carriers trek along a street in northern Saigon on May 6, 1968, which was engulfed in smoke from fierce fighting during the Tet Offensive. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)





Aerial View of Army Tanks in Cholon (Chinese) District in Saigon, South Vietnam on May 9, 1968. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



South Vietnamese soldiers barricade the streets of the Cholon District (the Chinese District) in Saigon, South Vietnam during the second Tet Offensive on May 10, 1968. (Image: © Christian Simonpietri/Sygma/Corbis)





Refugees flee Viet Cong terrorists in Saigon, South Vietnam on May 7, 1968. (Photo: © Kent Potter/Bettmann/CORBIS)



A tank sits amidst the rubble and wreckage on a street in the Phu Lam district of Saigon on early May 31, 1968 as smoke rises from burning houses in the background. The tank was advancing towards an area from which small arms fire was coming. Enemy forces hurled 40 rockets into Saigon and its suburbs on early June 4 as small bands of infiltrators doggedly held on in two small sections of the city. (Image: © Bettmann/CORBIS)





Members of the South Vietnamese Airborne Division, accompanied by two Americans, search a village on the outskirts of Saigon during the Communist offensive in May 1968. Later, the U.S. command received orders from Washington to prevent further attacks on the cities and to protect pacification. (U.S. Army)







Residents of Cholon, the Chinese section of Saigon, retrieve the remains of their household goods after their homes were destroyed in fierce street fighting. (Photo: [http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html))



Vietnamese children run past and look at the charred and dismembered bodies as civilians lie dead and a South Vietnamese soldier still sits in his jeep after being shot in the head by a team of hit-and-run Vietcong terrorists during an ambush in Da Nang, South Vietnam on January 30, 1968. (Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS)





Ten weeks after the Tet Offensive fighting, business and black market continue in the streets or bombed-out buildings in Hue, South Vietnam on April 14, 1968. This sidewalk black market has for sale everything from canned milk to American cigarettes and liquor. (Photo: © Kyoichi Sawada/Bettmann/CORBIS)



South Vietnamese military police officers observe a group of Vietnamese ladies in the streets of Hue, South Vietnam on April 14, 1968, ten weeks after the Tet Offensive fighting. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)





An American tank of the 9th Division appear among the ruins of a street in Saigon, South Vietnam near the Y-bridge after retaking the area following the Mini-Tet Offensive in 1968. (Image by © Tim Page/CORBIS)



U.S. Marines crawl out of range after being pinned down by enemy fire during house-to-house combat in Hue, South Vietnam on February 16, 1968. Leathernecks in foreground await medical attention. (Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS)





Captured Communist made rockets and rifles are piled in the foreground as a soldier (left) begins to question bounded and blindfolded Viet Cong terrorists following raid in the Cholon (Chinese) district of Saigon on February 9, 1968. (Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS)



Rows of coffins of victims of the 1968 Tet Viet Cong offensive: Bereaved relatives mourn their dead in Hue, South Vietnam on October 15, 1969 during mass funeral of 250 persons killed by Viet Cong terrorists during the Tet Offensive. The funeral was held on October 15, 1969 as bodies of victims were only recently discovered. (Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS)





South Vietnamese Army soldiers carry a wounded woman on a stretcher during the Tet Offensive in 1968. (Photo: Time Life)



A South Vietnamese Army soldier examines an injured Vietnamese boy who was attacked by Viet Cong terrorists during the Tet Offensive in 1968. (Photo: Time Life)



**Vietcong Terror**  
Closeup of Nguyen Van Sam, master terrorist  
for the Viet Cong, enprisoned by the Saigon  
police after numerous terrorist bombings  
around the city.


**LIFE**





Thi Anh Huynh, nicknamed "Dragon Lady", who shot four people and was captured by S. Vietnamese police.

A photo of Vietcong Terrorist Thi Anh Huynh (Photo: [Time Life](#))



Captured plans for an aborting assault on Korean Army Billet.

A photo of captured plans for an attempted attack on Korean army billet (barracks). (Photo: [Time Life](#))



Viet Cong terrorist Van Tam Nguyen, captured by Saigon police and confessed he was deputy leader to Van Sam Nguyen.

A photo of Vietcong Terrorist Van Tam Nguyen (Photo: [Time Life](#))



Viet Cong woman, captured by S. Vietnamese, being interrogated by Capt. Quant Tan Pham.



A South Vietnamese police officer interrogates a Viet Cong terrorist. (Photo: [Time Life](#))



Watches used in bombs by Viet Cong terrorists.

LIFE

Stopwatches used in bombs by Viet Cong terrorists (Photo: [Time Life](#))





Unidentified bodies near burning house in My Lai, Vietnam on March 16, 1968 (Photo by Ronald Haeberle)  
[http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html)



Soldiers burn a Vietnamese dwelling in My Lai during the My Lai incident on March 16, 1968. (Photo: Ronald L. Haeberle)  
(Source: "Report of Army review into My Lai incident") [http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html)





Two U.S. Army soldier carries their comrade who shot himself in the foot during the My Lai massacre on March 16, 1968.  
(Source: "Report of the Department of Army review" The preliminary investigations into the My Lai incident. From the Library of Congress, Military Legal Resources; Author Ronald L. Haeberle)  
[http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html)





U.S. Marines advance past an M48 Patton tank during the battle for Hue in 1968.

(Photo: [http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html))



A South Vietnamese paratrooper disarms a North Vietnamese soldier who emerged from a bunker underneath the smoldering ruins of a farmhouse on the Thai Dong rubber plantation, southwest of Tay Ninh, on September 14, 1968. The paratroopers fought a battalion of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong who had infiltrated Tay Ninh earlier in the week.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page21](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page21))





Vietnamese sailors of the Republic of Vietnam Navy patrol the Mekong River.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page4](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page4))



An American Navy tango boat on the Sang Haam Luong River, also known as the Lower Mekong River, in 1968. South Vietnam's rivers and waterways were a vital part of the military mechanism. The Navy was responsible for keeping the rivers open and provided patrols, reconnaissance and escorts to many missions. (Photo: <http://www.vietnampix.com/mach4.htm>)





3,500 rifles and submachineguns were among the thousands of weapons of advanced design captured at Vung Ro

Captured Viet Cong weapons acquired by the South Vietnamese Navy

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))





(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))



Smoke billows from a North Vietnamese trawler run aground by the Market Time patrol forces.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))






*ANTI-TANK ROCKETS manufactured in Communist China following Soviet design were among military supplies shipped by Hanoi to the Viet Cong and captured by Vietnamese forces.*

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))



Sister ship to the Viet Cong infiltration vessel that was attacked and captured [1 March 1968]

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))



An enemy ship, one of five intercepted by Market Time forces during early 1968, was later sunk near Nha Trang

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))



North Vietnamese trawler was intercepted then ran aground by the Market Time patrol forces (US Navy).

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page50](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page50))





Tonle Bet, Cambodia - South Vietnamese troops march through the almost completely destroyed town of Tonle Bet after helping Cambodian government troops recapture it from the Viet Cong.

[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))



South Vietnamese soldiers man their weapons in a sandbag bunker built in the middle of the street in Kontum city

[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))





South Vietnamese army soldiers engage in combat against Viet Cong guerillas during the Vietnam War.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page22](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page22))




American Army medic provides first aid and intravenous fluid to a wounded South Vietnamese army soldier.





An unidentified soldier looks for Viet Cong terrorists while a village house is set on fire.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page22](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page22))



Left photo: A Viet Cong suspect is led from the village of Ben Suc by an American soldier during its evacuation.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page27](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page27))



Right photo: A South Vietnamese army soldier detains a Viet Cong terrorist in the rice paddies.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page22](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page22))



An ARVN tries to extricate wounded civilians from debris after truck loaded with refugees struck a mine four miles south of Quang Tri.  
[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))



An ARVN soldier dives for safety as mortar round fired by communist guerrillas explodes, blowing up truck loaded with ammunition. In the action some 45 miles southwest of Saigon  
[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))





Wearing conical straw hats and peasant garb, 43 Vietnamese men and women suspected of belonging to the Viet Cong are marched out of this village to be taken in for questioning.

[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))



A South Vietnamese soldier, his bandaged head and face blood-stained, is questioned by another South Vietnamese trooper.

[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)/page2&s=40486e8dca99b8f107a83c1b94ff4817](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam)/page2&s=40486e8dca99b8f107a83c1b94ff4817)





(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page75](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page75))



(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page75](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page75))





A Viet Cong terrorist dressed in black "pajama" uniform is flanked by two South Vietnamese Army Military Police officers.  
(Photo: [Time Life](#))



*American aircraft bombed North Vietnam just as Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin (left) was meeting with Ho Chi Minh. The bombing undercut Kosygin's attempts to persuade Ho to negotiate with the United States.*

Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin (left) meets with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. (Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



*Ho Chi Minh (left) died at the age of seventy-nine in September 1969. He had earlier retired from the day-to-day management of North Vietnam's affairs, ceding authority to a collective leadership headed by Le Duan, senior member of the Communist party politburo, and Pham Van Dong (right), prime minister of North Vietnam.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)





North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh (left) meets with North Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in November 1968.  
(Photo: Marc Riboud/*The Vietnam Experience: Images of War*, p. 84)





A map of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand during the Vietnam War



Vietnamese sailors of the Republic of Vietnam Navy (South Vietnam) march in formation.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page4](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page4))






Traffic on the streets of Saigon in February 1965 (Photo: Robert W. Kelley/Time Life)


Photo # USN 1120428 USS Franklin D. Roosevelt underway in the Gulf of Tonkin, October 1966







Left: A map of the various Ho Chi Minh trails



Right: Two Vietnamese ladies work on their farm that is located next to a South Vietnamese army watchtower.  
(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page22](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page22))



Bombs in place, the giant B-52 bombers are lined up on a runway in Guam on March 31, 1967 ready for the voyage to South Vietnam and a bombing mission. It was announced recently that some of the Guam based B-52s would be sent to Thailand. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



A Vietnamese man gets into an air raid shelter while three other men in the background sit on the pavement looking up as the American Air Force bombers drop bombs on Hanoi, North (Communist) Vietnam on June 5, 1967. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS)






Viet Cong rebels haul supplies on bicycle on the informal Ho Chi Minh Trail.

(Photo: The American (Vietnam) War Remnants Museum) Source: [http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html)





Viet Cong terrorists mobilize their weapons on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

(Source: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091772587187072978>)



American Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52D 'Stratofortress' bomber drop a payload of bombs onto Viet Cong positions during the Vietnam War in March 1968. (Photo: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/34092130@N07/3179300292/>)





American U.S. Air Force pilots and South Vietnamese air force pilots are seen working together at an air base in South Vietnam. (Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page62](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page62))



A Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bomber takes off. (Photo: [United States Government](http://www.uss.gov))





*The biggest dilemma for American soldiers in Vietnam was distinguishing friendly from hostile peasants. Here they conduct an operation in a village suspected of harboring Vietcong sympathizers, even probing a haystack for the enemy, as a peasant goes about her business.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



Wearing matching flight suits and scarves, South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky strolls hand-in-hand with his wife as they make an inspection tour of the battlefield near Bong Son, South Vietnam on February 4, 1966. Ky visited the area where American and South Vietnamese troops killed a reported 700 Communist guerillas in recent battles. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)





Vietnamese peasants in South Vietnam suspected of being communists wear a tag on their clothes in circa 1966.  
(Source: Library of Congress 'Country Studies Series'; Author U.S. Army Photograph)  
(Photo: [http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html))





The “strategic hamlets” in South Vietnam (Source: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



Members of U.S. Navy SEAL Team One ride in a SEAL Team Assault Boat (STAB) on a river south of Saigon in November 1967. (Source National Archives (NARA); Author J.D. Randal, JO1; Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval Photographic Center) [http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009\\_07\\_01\\_archive.html](http://rompedas.blogspot.com/2009_07_01_archive.html)



Americans, whatever their attitude toward the war, were stunned in 1969 by the revelation of a massacre of South Vietnamese peasants by U.S. troops at the village of Mylai.

The Phoenix program, an effort to uproot the Viet-cong structure in the South Vietnamese countryside, was conducted under CIA auspices. Many thousands of Vietnamese were killed, yet the program was ineffective in many respects. Vietnamese Communists later acknowledged that it had weakened the Viet-cong.



The Phoenix program was a CIA mind control and interrogation program designed to extract vital information from suspected Viet Cong terrorists. (Source: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



South Vietnamese soldiers, with weapons ready, take cover behind trees in this village about 20 miles northeast of Saigon.  
[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))





American and South Vietnamese special forces unit

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page64](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page64))



American Special Forces soldiers (Green Berets) and Hmong guerilla fighters appear for an informal portrait.






An American Green Beret soldier instructs a South Vietnamese Army soldier in 1969 during the Vietnam War.  
(Larry Burrows/Time Life)



The national flags of the Republic of Korea, Republic of Vietnam, and United States of America fly side by side at Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam in 1968.



A Korean army general of the South Korean army walks with a group of Vietnamese children in South Vietnam during the Korean War.  
(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page44](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page44))





Korean army doctors provide free medical treatment to South Vietnamese farmers during the Vietnam War.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page44](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page44))



Korean soldiers from the Republic of Korea's White Horse Division 2nd Corps search for Viet Cong guerrillas during an attack on a Catholic Church building in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page27](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page27))






General Lee Sae Ho, commander of the Korean forces in Vietnam, bids farewell to cheering Vietnamese spectators waving South Vietnamese and Korean flags during a farewell ceremony at Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon, South Vietnam on March 14, 1973, shortly before South Korean troops departed for home. At right is General Cao Van Vien, Commander of the South Vietnamese Army. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



South Korean army soldiers greet South Vietnamese ladies during farewell ceremonies at Phu Cat, South Vietnam prior to returning to South Korea on February 3, 1973. Lt. Gen. Lee Sae Ho, commander of Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam, delivered speech at ceremonies at Phu Cat Base, some 260 miles north of Saigon. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)









South Vietnamese Air Force C-47s at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, South Vietnam in 1966.



The front gate of Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, South Vietnam





South Vietnamese soldiers ride in a motor scooter outside the front gate of Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, South Vietnam.




A U.S. Air Force airplane flies over Tan Son Nhut Air Base in 1969.





Base Operations sign at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, South Vietnam in 1967  
(Source: United States Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama)



A reconnaissance photo of Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, South Vietnam in 1968





Cholon District (Chinese District) in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam in 1971  
 (Photo: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/13476480@N07/6498046331/in/photostream>)




Saigon, Republic of Vietnam in 1970 (Photo: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/13476480@N07/6479827015/in/photostream>)



## The Strongmen of South Vietnam




Left to right: General Nguyen Cao Ky, General Nguyen Van Thieu, General Duong Van Minh, and General Nguyen Khanh



General Dinh speaks at a press conference (Source: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)





General Cao Van Vien (with sunglass) watches General Nguyen Van Thieu (left) examine a machine gun.  
[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page63](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page63)



Nguyen Van Thieu, the President of South Vietnam, stand in front of a world map while meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. on July 19, 1968. Photo: Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum)



General Nguyen Cao Ky (second from left) and South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu (second from right) salute to their soldiers during a military parade held in South Vietnam.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page22](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page22))



## Vietnam War, Part 3: Richard Nixon, Vietnamization & Withdrawal



23. Richard Nixon on an unofficial visit to Saigon talking with Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, Minister for Pacification, and Lansdale.

Richard Nixon (left) visits Major General Nguyen Duc Thang (center), South Vietnam's Minister for Pacification, and CIA agent and retired U.S. Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale (right) in Saigon, South Vietnam. Richard Nixon and Edward Lansdale were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Source: *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* by Cecil B. Currey)



Honors for President Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam in 1969

South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu visits Republic of China's President Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei, Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1969.



Surrounded by flag-waving crowd, President Richard Nixon (L) and Philippines President Ferdinand E. Marcos wave from car during motorcade to Malacanang Palace in Manila, Philippines on July 26, 1969 following Nixon's arrival. The Philippines was the first stop on a nine-day trip that will take Nixon and his wife, Pat, to Indonesia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Romania, and Britain. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



President Richard Nixon makes speech in front of a palace in Saigon, South Vietnam upon his arrival on July 30, 1969. Back of him are (left to right): Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Advisor (half hidden, glasses); South Vietnamese Vice president Cao KY; and U.S. Ambassador to S. Vietnamese Ellsworth Bunker. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





American President Richard Nixon (center right) and South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu (center left) review South Vietnamese Navy personnel during Nixon's visit to South Vietnam in 1969. (Photo: Arthur Schatz/[Time Life](#))






Standing behind the bar aboard Air Force One, President Richard Nixon speaks with military and civilian leaders in 1969 while flying from Bangkok to Saigon for a short visit with commanders and troops stationed in Vietnam. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, is seated on the far left, and Henry Kissinger is seated second from right. (Wally McNamee/CORBIS)



President Nguyen Van Thieu speaks at a press conference in Saigon in 1971. (Photo: Time Life)





Picture dated April 30, 1970 shows President Richard Nixon gesturing during a press conference announcing the entry of American soldiers in Cambodia. Despite pledges to protect South Vietnam, former U.S. President Richard Nixon privately vowed to “cut off the head” of its leader unless he backed peace with the communist North, tapes released on June 23, 2009 showed. (Getty Images)



President Nixon confers at the Western White House in San Clemente, California on May 31, 1970. The President received a briefing on Southeast Asia from (left to right, clockwise): Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, incoming chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard; General Creighton W. Abrams, U.S. Commander in Vietnam; Dr. Henry Kissinger, Asst to the President for National Security Affairs; Adm. John H. McCain, Jr., commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific; Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird; President Nixon; and General Earle Wheeler, retiring chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



President Richard Nixon meets at the White House with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 18, 1970 to discuss military budget matters. Left to right are: Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Leonard F. Chapman; Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. John Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff; Laird; Nixon; Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. William Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff; and Packard. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



President Richard Nixon meets with Nguyen Phu Duc, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's special emissary, at the White House on November 29, 1972 to put his seal of approval on the Vietnam cease-fire agreement Henry Kissinger has negotiated despite criticism from Saigon. Nguyen Phu Duc, left, who is Thieu's chief foreign policy advisor, brought Nixon a personal letter from Thieu. At right is Kissinger. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



## Council on Foreign Relations & South Vietnam under Nguyen Van Thieu



Council on Foreign Relations members National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (left) and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker (right) visit South Vietnam's Vice Premier Nguyen Cao Ky in Saigon some time in 1969. (Photo: [University of California at Los Angeles Library, Department of Special Collections](#))



South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu (left) and Nixon speak to the press at Midway Island on June 8, 1969. Richard Nixon was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1961 to 1964. ([Nixon Presidential Library](#))





President Lyndon B. Johnson and his Cabinet secretaries meet with South Vietnamese government officials at a summit in Honolulu. Seated at the table on the back side from left to right: unknown, unknown, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., unknown, Cyrus Vance, Dean Rusk, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, unknown, unknown, McGeorge Bundy, unknown. Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky are seated on the opposite side of President Johnson. (Photo: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)



Left to right: U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam-designate Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Nguyen Van Thieu, the South Vietnamese Chief of State, and South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky meet in Saigon, South Vietnam on July 16, 1965. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





Henry Cabot Lodge (left), U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, greets South Vietnam's Prime Minister, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. Lodge was on a fact finding trip for President Johnson in July 1965. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador-Designate to South Vietnam (left), greeted by Major General Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of Vietnamese Directory, in Saigon in 1965. Lodge was on a fact finding trip, surveying economic, political, and military situations. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, tours the country with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu (pointing) and South Vietnamese General Nguyen Cao Ky (wearing a purple scarf) during the Vietnam War in 1969. (Photo: Larry Burrows/Time Life)



U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (left) and Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy (right) meet with South Vietnam's Premier Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky in Saigon, South Vietnam in March 1967.






President Richard M. Nixon, South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu, and General Nguyen Cao Ky along with other dignitaries including National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker standing at microphones during visit to South Vietnam in 1969. Nguyen Van Thieu resigned as President of South Vietnam and flew to the Republic of China on Taiwan on April 25, 1975; Nguyen Van Thieu lived in England in exile for several years and later in Boston. Nguyen Van Thieu was born on April 5, 1923; Nguyen Van Thieu died in Boston on September 29, 2001. (Photo: Arthur Schatz /Time Life)



U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey (L) appears with South Vietnam's Prime Minister Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (R) in Saigon, South Vietnam in 1966. Hubert Humphrey was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Photo: Larry Burrows/Time Life)



National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger shakes hands with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon on August 17, 1972. The U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker is standing behind.





South Vietnam Army Lieutenant General Hoàng Xuân Lãm (left, I Corps commander), General Cao Văn Viên (second from left, ARVN general staff), and Major General Ngo Quang Truong (right, Lam's replacement) appear with U.S. Army Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell. Stilwell was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

(Photo: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ARHQ.jpg>)



## Paris Peace Conference (1968-1973)



US Ambassador-at large Averell Harriman (I) and Cyrus Vance arriving to the International Conference Center of the Avenue Kleber here to attend the opening of official first conference on Vietnam in Paris, France on May 13, 1968. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



American "peace" delegates Gen. Andrew Goodpaster (left), Averell Harriman (center) and Cyrus R. Vance (second from right) attend the U.S.-North Vietnamese peace talks in Paris, France in 1968. (Photo: Terence Spencer/Time Life)






South Vietnamese Ambassador Pham Dang Lam (center) watches American envoy Averell Harriman shake hands with an unidentified guest at the Paris Peace Conference in Paris, France in 1968. (Time Life photo)



President Lyndon Baines Johnson (center) meets with United States Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker (left) and Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman at Camp David, Maryland on April 10, 1968. (UPI Photo)





(NY26-May 10)DIPLOMAT IN PARIS--Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, right, chief of the U.S. delegation for preliminary peace talks in Paris, and Lt. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Vietnam deputy to Gen. Creighton Abrams, walk arm-in-arm after leaving U.S. Embassy in Paris tonight. (AP Wirephoto by cable from Paris)(rb61951pw)'68

Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman (right), the chief Vietnam War negotiator in Paris, appears with U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster outside the U.S. Embassy in Paris, France on May 10, 1968. (AP Wirephoto)

5/10/68-Paris: Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman(L), head of the U.S. peace team in Paris, confers with South Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S., Bui Diem, at the American Embassy here 5/10 following the latter's arrival to observe the American-North Vietnamese preliminary peace negotiations. Diem told newsmen he will not participate in the talks, but will be briefed by U.S. officials. UPI CABLEPHOTO PR213 *7-23* jm *7-23*

1968



Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman (left) meets with South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem at the American Embassy in Paris, France on May 10, 1968. (UPI Photo)



PRP051306-5/13/68-PARIS: Averell Harriman (center, back to camera) walks past Hanoi's chief negotiator Xuan Thuy (4th from L) as the US and N. Vietnamese delegations are shown to their seats at conference table prior to start of peace talks 5/13. At right is Cyrus Vance. UPI TELEPHOTO



Vietnam War negotiators Cyrus Vance and Averell Harriman prepare for a meeting with North Vietnamese diplomats in Paris, France on May 13, 1968. (UPI Photo)



American envoys for Vietnam War peace talks meet with North Vietnamese diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference held at the Majestic Hotel in Paris, France on May 13, 1968. From left to right: William J. Jorden, Lt. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Averell Harriman, Cyrus Vance, Philip Habib, Harold Kaplan, and John Negroponte. All seven men seated at the table are (or were) members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (UPI Photo)



(PAR-25) Paris, 17 May (AP) - At a reception given by U.S. Ambassador to France Sargent Shriver in his Paris residence today are, left to right: Vuong Van Bae of the South Vietnam mission, head of U.S. delegation Averall Harriman, Dr. Jose M. Alejandrino who is Philippine ambassador in Paris, head of the South Vietnam mission Ambassador Bui Dien, deputy U.S. delegation chief Cyrus Vance and South Vietnamese Senator Tran Van Lam. (AP Wirephoto/ mn 17.5.68.stf/mar)



Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman (second from left) and Cyrus Vance (second from right) appear with South Vietnamese and Filipino envoys in Paris, France on May 17, 1968. (AP Wirephoto)

(NY23-Oct.17) A U.S.-SOUTH VIETNAM CHAT IN PARIS--Ambassador Averell Harriman, right, chief of the U.S. peace delegation to the Paris peace talks, gestures as he converses with Pham Dang Lam of South Vietnam, at U.S. Embassy in Paris today prior to their formal talks at the embassy. At left is Harriman's deputy, Cyrus Vance. Lam is head of South Vietnam's liaison and observation mission at the peace talks in the French capital. (AP Wirephoto via cable from Paris) (pr51507stf-lipchitz) 1968



American Vietnam War negotiators Cyrus Vance (left) and Averell Harriman (right) meet with South Vietnamese envoy Pham Dang Lam at the American Embassy in Paris, France on October 17, 1968. (AP Wirephoto)





Heads of the American delegation Averell Harriman (center), Cyrus R. Vance (left) and others leave the Vietnam peace talks in Paris on October 24, 1968. (Photo: Pierre Boulat/Time Life)



Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman celebrates his 77<sup>th</sup> birthday in Paris, France on November 15, 1968 during the ongoing Paris peace talks with North Vietnamese diplomats. From left to right: Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to France Sargent Shriver, Cyrus Vance, and William J. Jorden. Harriman, Shriver, Vance, and Jorden were Yale graduates, and all four men were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (AP Wirephoto)





U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman (left) meets with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (right) and Premier of South Vietnam Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (center) in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam on January 15, 1966. (AP Wirephoto)



Ambassador-at-Large and Vietnam War negotiator Averell Harriman (left) greets South Vietnam's Vice President Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky in Paris, France on December 8, 1968. Averell Harriman was a member of Skull & Bones, a secret society at Yale University, and a longtime member of the Council on Foreign Relations. (AP Wirephoto)



"People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one – Hitler. **I admire Hitler because he has pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early thirties.** But the situation here is so desperate now that one man would not be enough. **We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam.**"

– General Nguyen Cao Ky, Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, in an interview with the *London Sunday Mirror*, July 13, 1965



NXP/CPRI616596-12/12/68-PARIS: Chief U.S. peace negotiator Averell Harriman (L), his deputy Cyrus Vance (C) and South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky (R) are all grinning widely as they meet the press following a conference here 12/12. After the meeting, Harriman announced an agreement with South Vietnam that could lead to an early opening session of the long-delayed peace talks on Vietnam. Exact nature of the agreement is not known. UPI CABLE



American Vietnam War negotiators Averell Harriman (left), and Cyrus Vance (center) and South Vietnam's Vice President Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky speak to journalists following another Vietnam War conference in Paris, France on December 12, 1968. ([UPI Photo](#))



American delegation participates at the Vietnam Peace talks in Paris on January 25, 1969 as the first plenary session opens. At left is Henry Cabot Lodge and seated next to him is Cyrus Vance. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger (R) and Hanoi's Le Duc Tho are all smiles as they shake hands for the press upon leaving the International Conferences Center in Paris on January 23, 1973 after a three hour and forty-five minute meeting on Vietnam peace agreement. They are flanked by Minister Xuan Thuy, chief of DRV delegation. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





An interpreter stands between America's German-born National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (left) and North Vietnam's senior representative Le Duc Tho (right) as they converse in the garden of a villa in Gif-Sur-Yvette, France on November 23, 1972.  
(Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger greets Red Vietnam's negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris in 1972.



Negotiations between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho at a home on the Golf of Saint Nom la Breteche near Paris in January 1973. At farthest left are Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, Kissinger, and Winston Lord of National Security Council staff. At right is Le (glasses on table in front of him), flanked by Minister Xuan Thuy, chief of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks, and Nguyen Co Thach, vice minister for foreign affairs. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



*During the Christmas season of 1972, Nixon ordered the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong to force the North Vietnamese to agree to a settlement. Though the tonnage of bombs dropped was heavy, it was aimed at military targets, and civilian casualties were lighter than reported at the time.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)






Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (background, center) initials the cease fire agreement on Paris January 23, 1973. In the foreground, Le Duc Tho affixes his signature. On Kissinger's right is Ambassador William H. Sullivan. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Ambassador William H. Sullivan (lower right) and Xuan Thuy (upper right) watch as Dr. Henry Kissinger (lower center) and Le Duc Tho (second from upper right) initial the Paris Peace Accords in Paris on January 23, 1973. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



*Initialing of the Vietnam agreement, January 23, 1973. From left: Heyward Isham, Sullivan, HAK, George Aldrich (standing), Winston Lord. BELOW:*

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signs the Paris "peace" agreement that allowed the Vietnamese Communists in Hanoi to invade and occupy South Vietnam. From left to right: Heyward Isham, William H. Sullivan, Henry Kissinger, George Aldrich, and Winston Lord. Everyone except for Isham is or was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.



Henry Kissinger (right), America's Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, shakes hands with Pham Van Dong (left) in Hanoi, Red Vietnam in February 1973. Le Duc Tho is in the middle.





The White House released this photo taken during Henry Kissinger's trip to Hanoi, North Vietnam on February 10, 1973. Shown here, Kissinger (third from left), and Pham Van Dong, North Vietnamese prime minister (second from right). View looking down the table with the delegations on either side. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



The White House released this photo on February 15, 1973 taken during Henry Kissinger's trip to Hanoi, North Vietnam on February 10, 1973. Shown here from left to right: Kissinger; Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam prime minister; and Nguyen Dinh Phuong, interpreter. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





Representatives from the four factions of the Vietnam War meet in Paris to sign a peace agreement on June 13, 1973. On the left are representatives from South Vietnam led by Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu Vien. On the right are representatives from the Vietcong led by General Nguyen Van Hieu. In the foreground are representatives from North Vietnam led by Le Duc Tho. In the background are representatives from the United States led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State and National Security Affairs assistant to President Richard Nixon, leaves a villa in Gif-sur-Yvette, France on June 10, 1973 after another round of talks with Le Duc Tho (Democratic Republic of Vietnam), Nguyen Co Thach, North Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister (R) and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Sullivan (back view) to discuss Vietnamese peace negotiations. (James Andanson/Sygma/Corbis)



# Letter from President Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam (Released Apr. 30, 1975)

January 5, 1973

Dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 20, 1972.

There is nothing substantial that I can add to my many previous messages, including my December 17 letter, which clearly stated my opinions and intentions. With respect to the question of North Vietnamese troops, we will again present your views to the Communists as we have done vigorously at every other opportunity in the negotiations. The result is certain to be once more the rejection of our position. We have explained to you repeatedly why we believe the problem of North Vietnamese troops is manageable under the agreement, and I see no reason to repeat all the arguments.

We will proceed next week in Paris along the lines that General Haig explained to you. Accordingly, if the North Vietnamese meet our concerns on the two outstanding substantive issues in the agreement, concerning the DMZ and type method of signing and if we can arrange acceptable supervisory machinery, we will proceed to conclude the settlement. The gravest consequence would then ensue if your government chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States. As I said in my December 17 letter, "I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster-to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative."

As we enter this new round of talks, I hope that our countries will now show a united front. It is imperative for our common objectives that your government take no further actions that complicate our task and would make more difficult the acceptance of the settlement by all parties. We will keep you informed of the negotiations in Paris through daily briefings of Ambassador [Pham Dang] Lam.

I can only repeat what I have so often said: The best guarantee for the survival of South Vietnam is the unity of our two countries which would be gravely jeopardized if you persist in your present course. The actions of our Congress since its return have clearly borne out the many warnings we have made.

Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam. So once more I conclude with an appeal to you to close ranks with us.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

Source: [http://ngotheinh.150m.com/letter\\_from\\_nixon\\_to\\_thieu.html](http://ngotheinh.150m.com/letter_from_nixon_to_thieu.html)

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## WILLIAM E. COLBY ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW I (PREFERRED CITATION)

Transcript, William E. Colby Oral History Interview I, 6/2/81, by Ted Gittinger, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.

### INTERVIEW I

DATE: June 2, 1981

INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM E. COLBY

INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger

PLACE: Mr. Colby's office, Washington, D.C.



G: Mr. Colby, when you arrived in Saigon in 1959, how efficient were our intelligence-gathering efforts concerning the insurgency?

C: Not very, I would say. We primarily depended upon the Vietnamese authorities and worked with them in collecting information about the insurgency. There wasn't very much insurgency at that particular stage. The 1954 collapse of the French had been followed by a period of internal turmoil wherein [Ngo Dinh] Diem finally took over. He consolidated his position by about 1956 and was engaged in a very vigorous economic and social development program at that point, which was proving quite successful. The communists basically had gone into a holding pattern in 1954, believing that Diem was going to collapse. So did most of the rest of the world. The communists had withdrawn some fifty thousand of their people back to the north. They had put their networks into a state of stay-behind--suspension--and there really wasn't much problem. The government had become a little heavy-handed in some of its political activities. I've forgotten what they called the Democratic Front or something that they had, the National Revolutionary Movement.

G: Denunciation of communism or communist forces?

C: That was about 1956, 1957 really, and that had kind of dropped down by the time I got there and there wasn't much evidence of it. It was more a propagandistic effort, not so much in deliberate intelligence targeting. So quite frankly our intelligence effort at the time was focused on an appreciation of the political situation in Vietnam and the relationship of Diem to the various opposition political elements, a limited interest in the old sect problem, and all this was unilateral American attention. For any coverage of the communists we basically worked with the Vietnamese authorities, who really hadn't developed much capability by that time. In the summer of 1959 there was an attack on an American installation in Bien Hoa, in which I think one American was killed. This brought attention to the fact that there still was an insurgency. It came as a bolt out of the blue. It was hard to identify too clearly where it came from and who started it. But this alerted things and began to stir things up. Then the really critical thing was that in the fall of 1959 and during 1960 there was a clear increase in communist activity, marked by a series of terrorist events, by the beginnings of infiltration, primarily of southerners back from North Vietnam, not northern forces or anything like that. And [there was] a gradual increase of the insurgency level, which culminated in November or December, 1960 with the announcement of the establishment of the National Liberation Front and what amounted to a declaration of war by the North against the Diem regime or the American Diemists, as they called it, trying to identify their cause with the cause of nationalism, and trying to stress a continuity between that effort and the previous effort against the French. This then led to an increase in our attention to the insurgency problem, primarily reflected in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese intelligence services: training programs, assistance to them in their operational activities, liaison with them, some financial assistance to some particular projects, things of that nature, development of the central intelligence organization to centralize the information of the variety of Vietnamese police and military and other intelligence services.

G: Was our relationship more or less harmonious?

C: Oh, yes. We had good relationships with the Vietnamese. They were aware of our fooling around on our own, I'm sure.



G: Is this what you would call the unilateral--?

C: Yes. They were reasonably understanding of the fact that we were going to do it. But they dealt with us on the subject of operations against the communist problem and the beginnings of attention to the North and to try to get some assets in that area. They worked with us very straightforward, very decently, and they then did some things on their own, of course, which is not to be unexpected. The government intelligence services were interested in the opposition movements and what their activities were and so forth, and they penetrated them and to some extent controlled them at some times.

G: Was [Ngo Dinh] Nhu heavily involved in these activities?

C: Oh, yes. He was the President's counselor, by name, but with a kind of a general charter in the political area. He had been interested in the so-called Can Lao party. He was impressed with the concept of a secret control party, an application of the Leninist doctrine of the role of the party within the structure of the state, as a centralized feature. He rejected the communist approach in the sense of the totalitarian, but he was interested in the French Catholic philosophy of personalism as an attempt to find a rallying ideology for South Vietnam to contrast with the ideological appeal of the communists and their call for revolution. He wanted to revolutionize Vietnamese society, which he considered as a corrupt inheritance from the French. He wanted to establish an authentic Vietnamese ideological base for a new society and the rejection of the old, primarily Catholic elite, replacing it with this new dedication. His line of thinking changed while I was there. I don't know, I might have had something to do with it in the last couple of years. Because he had primarily thought of this Can Lao party as this control element and it being what Lenin would call the vanguard of the revolution, with the ideological fervor and control of the machinery. By the time he got well into the strategic hamlet program he had pretty well abandoned that approach in favor of the more theoretical elements of the strategic hamlet program, which was an attempt to re-establish a Vietnamese community from the smallest population grouping, the hamlet, and develop the leadership and the sense of cohesion in that community and then build the rest of it up from there. Now you see that is different from the Can Lao concept.

G: Are you saying then that instead of creating a political elite from the top down, he was building from the hamlet up?

C: He changed, yes, and was thinking in those terms. Now of course he couldn't explain it all that well. A lot of the old people--he railed against the old bureaucrats all the time and complained about them because they really had been indoctrinated in the French technique of the elite running the place in a kind of a colonial way. Trying to get across to them that they should stimulate the growth of a force which would replace them was swimming upstream, obviously. They could adopt the philosophy of personalism, the earlier approach, a lot easier than they could the concept of building a whole new elite from the bottom, from the rural masses particularly, whom they really rejected as unlettered peasantry, which a great deal of them were. But Nhu saw that they had to establish this as a real basis for a new Vietnamese society and that was what preoccupied him. His exhortations went over the heads of most of the colonels and generals and civil servants that he talked to, but he was convinced if he just kept pounding at it he would be able to get this thing moving and it would develop a momentum of its own. He secured Diem's support and interest in the idea. Diem was always a much more pragmatic fellow--he had great faith in road-building and practical physical things as bringing about change. Schools, aid stations, provincial hospitals, things of that nature, industrialization, a change of some of the agricultural patterns, this is what Diem thought was the basis for the modernization of Vietnam. So there was a dichotomy between the two brothers, Diem being the pragmatist and Nhu being the theoretical fellow. I thought both of them had something to offer, frankly, without having to choose one or the other.

G: Let me ask you about another personality who is a little shadowy, but he crops up in important places sometimes. He is, if I have the pronunciation right, Mai Huu Xuan. Did you have any dealing with him?

C: A bit, yes. Mai Huu Xuan was a general as I remember and took over as head of the police at sometime during that period, I can't name exactly when. I don't have a very strong picture of him. I was not all that enthusiastic about him. I had the impression that he was playing a double or so game. Not with the communists, but sort of a personal interest, aggrandizement financially and otherwise. In that way he was really out of tune with what was being worked on.

G: I have heard it asserted that once when Xuan was recommended to Diem by an American adviser for some post or other, Diem said he didn't trust Xuan because Xuan had once been in the Sûreté, and he said once in the Sûreté always in the Sûreté. Have you heard anything [about that]?

C: I don't know. Both Diem and particularly Nhu were very hypersensitive to French influence. After all, they had fought their way to position against the French, when the French thought that they could dismiss them and get rid of them. So they kept seeing French influences here and there, you know, some one is a French agent, this sort of thing you'd hear all the time. I'm sure some of it may have been true and I'm sure some of it was a kind of exaggerated McCarthyism, finding the conspiratorial hand of the French in what otherwise was explainable by self interest by individuals, by independent action by French planters and things of this nature, businessmen, without any great guiding hand of the French government in that sense. The French as a cultural phenomenon in Vietnam, yes, that was what they were concerned about. They would refer to it as the French, and they were always very suspicious of that involvement.

G: Did we have any notion or any evidence that there were any sort of French intelligence activities to speak of?

C: There were French intelligence activities, but I don't think they were any more complex than our own, I mean a few contacts with various friends that would give you an independent reading of what's going on, that sort of thing. But as the French stage-managing the development of Vietnam, no, I didn't have that sense at all. Actually, of course, the key to Vietnam was that the French had really

supported opponents of Diem during the struggle for power in the mid-fifties. And he defeated them. They first supported the chief of the army, and one of Diem's first moves was to fire him, and that caused quite a tremor at the time. But once he got a hold of the army and his own men in charge of the army, then he moved against the police, which was the corrupt Binh Xuyen. When he got those under control, he moved against the various sects, and the French had connections with all of these, of course, for years. Their technique of running the colony of Vietnam, which it was, was the usual kind of relationship with all the different forces in the game, and not having it unify as a Vietnamese nation because that would get out of their control. So Diem was correct in being suspicious of the French. I think he found their hand in places it probably didn't exist. Nonetheless, his problem was right. He had to establish a Vietnamese nation. The really key element of the Diem role was his feeling that he had to establish a Vietnamese nation. Otherwise he was always subordinate to Ho Chi Minh, because Ho Chi Minh had captured nationalism in the struggle against the French. Then they had been so impossible to their non-communist allies, including killing some at various times, that Diem said that there is a role for the non-communist nationalist. He then wanted to represent non-communist Vietnamese nationalism. This was frequently the problem of dealing with Diem, because sometimes he had to assert his independence even to convince himself that he was independent. Not so much to convince anybody else sometimes, but to show that he, by golly, was the leader of an independent Vietnam, dependent upon American support, appreciative of American support, all that sort of thing, but not subject to puppetry. Of course the communists, the Vietnamese words they used always were that they were struggling against the My Diemists, the American Diemists, which to them was all one word. They were trying to assert that this was just puppetry and that they really did represent nationalism. This was what the major struggle was about between those two groups.

G: I want to come back to that issue of Diem's asserting his independence, because I think it enters the picture a little bit later on in this series of questions I have here. I think you may have answered almost directly a question I have about the nature of the insurgency when it became apparent that there was something more than isolated terrorism going on. There is an issue involved concerning the origins of insurgency. One school of thought has it that Hanoi is primarily the engine behind this. Another school says no, it's southern-inspired, southern-directed, and Hanoi-supported. Is it necessary to take a position on these?

C: I would say all of the above quite frankly. The point is that obviously there was a feeling of resistance, of insurgency, rebellion in the countryside against the French elite who held power in the country, the French-trained, French-developed, French-culturally attached elite. There was a resistance against them, and there were abuses by them. There was corruption and things of that nature by them. So that you say, well, there was a base of rebellion, yes. Would it have gone anywhere without North Vietnamese assistance? No. It really would have stuck where it was, as a low level of problems here and there, localized problems and so forth. It really would not have gotten anywhere. The key development was the 1960 determination to infiltrate the people who had been taken to the north. You see, in 1954 a provision of the Geneva Agreement said that you had three months in which a Vietnamese could choose whether he wanted to go to the North or the South. Some nine hundred thousand came from North Vietnam to the South, primarily but not exclusively Catholics. Very little noticed at the time, some fifty thousand, roughly, went to the North, primarily young men, taken out of the various networks that had struggled against the French. They went to North Vietnam. They remained in training camps preparing for the day to go back to liberate the rest of the country from the My Diemists now, or the French toadies and puppets, to continue the war.

G: Was this in the nature of a contingency plan, because didn't the North expect the South to fall like a rotten apple?

C: Yes, and then these people would have moved back to assume the positions of authority and administration for the country. They would have been southerners who could relate to the southerners and move back in as the leadership element of the effort, of the combined nation, of the unified nation.

G: Let me propose a thesis to you. Diem's anti-communist programs between, say, 1954 and 1958, were so effective, it has been said, that the southern stay-behind communists went to the North and said, "If you don't support an armed insurgency, we're dead, and we're going to do it whether you're going to support us or not, because we don't have any choice anymore if we want to survive. It's that simple." Does that sound at all plausible to you?

C: It could have happened. I'm not sure that the program of the government was all that efficient, but certainly the communists weren't going anywhere. They may have gone up to the North and said, "If you don't do something, we are dead." Because what was really happening was the total social and economic regeneration of South Vietnam. That's what happened between 1956 and 1959. I went to little schools out in the country being dedicated down in the swamps of Ca Mau. This one, I remember going to it, it was way out along the canal and they were dedicating this new school and it was one of those ceremonies that there are too many of. I've been through them forever. But the interesting thing about it was I asked about this little village where the school was. Well, the village had been evacuated during the period of the war and in about 1952 or 1953 had been just evacuated and everybody gone. About 1957 or 1958 they had re-established the village and people had moved back to it. Then with the government program of assistance to schools and training of teachers, they were re-establishing this school in this little village. It was way out, ten miles, fifteen miles something, from the provincial capital. I went to the provincial capital, to the office of education there, after having been there and looked at their map. You know, they had a comparative map of the number of schools they had in 1954, which was about two or three, all in the capital or the district capitals, and the number of schools they had in 1959--this was in the spring of 1959--which was in the order of thirty or forty in the province. Now, that had happened.

G: Did you verify that?

C: Yes. There's no question about it, that that had happened. In other words, there was a revival of the economic life. You saw it in the



rice production, for instance, totals, the increase of rice being sold and so forth. A variety of things of that nature were going on. The land reform that's been criticized, the land reform did take the land away from the French owners, and very substantial quantities of it. The program of industrialization, building up a little industrial zone around Saigon, the program of moving some of the refugees from the North up into the Highlands and giving them areas to develop and so forth, I think several hundred thousand actually moved, which had its double effect because some of the Montagnards didn't like their moving in and that sort of thing. But nonetheless, the country had an enormous amount of momentum. I thought that one of the critical things was the election which occurred in I think about August of 1959 for the National Assembly. This was the second election. And the question was, what would this election represent? Would it represent a step toward participation, or would it be a facade operation, just by rote. It wasn't going to be an American election no matter what, I mean there's no question about that. You didn't have two parties, couldn't have the and so forth. But the rather interesting--we got a report one time--I don't know where we got it, haven't any idea--that the communists were putting out the line that there are various candidates for these electoral posts. Now let's select the more liberal of the candidates and throw our support behind him or her as a step toward getting some influence in the electoral bodies. Not that they would put their own candidates up under their own names. They wouldn't have been allowed to, quite frankly. But the question really was whether the communists were thinking that they had an alternative to move toward an influence on the political decision-making. Well, the result of the election was that the government party won 100 per cent of the seats or 99.9 or whatever it was, and it was just the worst form of manipulated facade. Now, Diem would have won the election by at least 80 per cent. There's no question about it in my mind at that time. But particularly his minions all wanted to show that their province turned in the highest possible percentage, and so they just went out and went through the motions and so forth. And of course the communists' conclusion out of this was, no chance. No chance of playing a role, and we're being crushed by the momentum of the government, by this positive momentum of the economic and social development that was in the process. And I think that led them to the decision, we've got to go back to the war. Otherwise we've lost it, and we've not only lost it in South Vietnam, we may lose it in North Vietnam as well. Because it was going through its terrible problems of land reform and not getting anywhere and stagnation and all the rest of it. I think that's really--now, some people say they were compelled to undertake the fight. Well, they were compelled if they wanted to take South Vietnam, and that they had no hope of taking South Vietnam if they let the natural processes go.

G: How were relations between Diem and the American Mission at the time you arrived?

C: Well, moderate. I go back to my point about his nationalism. He felt that he had to be the president. He felt that he had to resist the American tendency to dot every i and cross every t, and that he had to make decisions himself. His government as a whole was not very efficient, because it was full of the bureaucrats. Nhu was absolutely right on that. There were some pretty impossible people there. But nonetheless, it was a typical underdeveloped country trying to get itself going and trying to develop a new generation of leaders for the future, and so forth. The Americans are pretty overpowering when they get there in large numbers and have a major role. I think there was a feeling of the Vietnamese that they had to somehow distance themselves from the Americans.

G: How many Americans were in country about that time would you say? Have you got any estimate?

C: I'd say there were--well, they were mostly in Saigon. Let's see, there were about three or four hundred military, something of that nature. I would say there were a good two or three hundred in the embassy and probably another five hundred or more in the AID. So I'd say a good thousand or more, all at a reasonably high economic level, and occupying essentially the role of the French governor general and his staff in the earlier days. In other words, to a Vietnamese the transition was between French and American to some extent, depending on how we behaved and what our role was. I think this led the government sometimes to resist us, you know, and struggle against too much dictation. And of course the American idea would be the only way to solve a problem, and when the Vietnamese weren't smart enough to do it our way, why there was something either venal or stupid about the Vietnamese, rather than searching into why they take the position and helping them to come around to the right decision, why don't you just see that this is the smart way to do it?

G: A sort of a knack or technique of dealing with people, which is what's involved?

C: Yes, well, you know, it was written up as the ugly American syndrome. It's a misnomer of the novel, but nonetheless, it's what it's all about.

G: Was there a difference between Diem's relationship with, let's say, the ambassador on one hand, and the chief of MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] on the other?

C: Well, now you get into personalities. The MAAG people normally are quite supportive of authority and take their orders very straight. Military do; that's their tradition. And their effort was to strengthen the army, which was necessary to Diem's survival, and he was very sympathetic. He also saw the value of having a very supportive American military in their influence in Washington, and therefore he made particular gestures to the military. The way we set up our governmental machinery, the CINCPAC command line was independent of the State Department command line through the ambassador. I happened to disagree with this, but it's a fact of life. The United States military had a somewhat autonomous position vis-a-vis government policy and government authority. This is what changed when Ellsworth Bunker got there later. He made it very clear that there was only one line of command, and so did [Creighton] Abrams, and so did [William] Westmoreland. There was no doubt about it in their minds. But in the earlier days this concept of the separate chain of command did exist and it created problems. It allowed the Vietnamese to play one off against the other a bit. Secondly, the civilian approach was focused on economic improvement, the military on the military, and very few people [were] interested in the political development. The ambassador's role was to react to the pressures he got from Washington to try to generate

more liberal governmental procedures. The press began to talk about the corruption and the abuses and so forth, and the ambassador's role would have to be to try to move the government towards better imagery in that respect. This then put him in conflict frequently with Diem's concept that you've got to hold a strong line of authority here, or your whole thing will come apart. And yes, we're building a new structure and base for our government, but we're not going to do it next week, and we're not going to do it by giving it away to some of these liberal opposition groups in the Saigon area who have no base in the countryside, none, and who are just a pain in the neck and have no real political force and really don't understand what we're trying to do in this country in terms of building it and strengthening it. They're talking about loosening when it needs to be tightened and aimed toward a very significant objective. This was the philosophical difference between particularly our political and State Department approach and the Diem and Nhu concepts.

G: With the benefit of hindsight, would you say that one of the problems that Diem created for himself in this context was the failure for some kind of loyal opposition to achieve viability, to sort of defuse dissent?

C: Not really. I think the real problem was that he allowed the negative images to grow without adequately presenting what his philosophical effort was and what he was actually accomplishing in the country. Because a more vigorous program of telling the world, telling lots of the world, what that was about, he didn't do very well, frankly. It wasn't our role to do for him unfortunately because then we get in the position of trying to influence our own opinion. That was not our function and we can't do it and shouldn't do it, but it certainly was a function that he failed to do very well. Therefore he let the issue grow as to whether Vietnam was democratic enough, rather than the issue grow as to whether Vietnam was progressing. Because if the latter had become the main issue, then I think he would have had support. But there was no way, no way in the world in which he could retain the necessary authority and go through the liberalization technique. There are a number of interesting parallels between the fall of Diem and the fall of the Shah. In both cases the really critical thing is not the absence of an opposition within the country, it's letting the issue become one of whether there should be a democratic society there or whether it is making major progress at the cost of a democratic society. Now this year is the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Ataturk. Ataturk is generally conceived of [as] having had a very positive impact on the history of Turkey and the Turks themselves. He modernized the schools, he took the veils off the women, he took the fezes off the men, made them wear western clothes, tried to force them. Exactly what the Japanese did in the Meiji restoration, a total modernization, forced draft, with some roughness around the edges. Well, that's exactly what the Shah was doing and did. In fact, the Shah's positive accomplishments in this field probably outweigh those of Ataturk, in terms of education and social change, modernization, technological investment and all that sort of thing. And Diem was engaged in the same program of modernization, in that sense. You really have the three models. Whether you do it with that kind of semi-authoritarianism, which was the Shah, Diem, Ataturk, Meiji. Another one is Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, successfully. The South Koreans, the Japanese, so forth. The second model is the concept of totally programmed disciplined development. China, North Vietnam, North Korea and so forth, a little bit Burma, things of that nature. A total disaster. In the range of history it hadn't worked. And the third is the Indian model of as much democratic relationship as possible, with the retention of some kind of a development program, rather dramatized and so forth. They have succeeded in it, and they're one of the few that has, frankly.

G: What do you ascribe that to?

C: In India?

G: Yes.

C: British background.

G: That's interesting.

C: The British heritage. The heritage of each of the European and Western nations in Asia is fascinating. In the British colonies you find a good police force, a concept of law and order, and a concept of--and I mean law as well as order--and a concept of development in neatness and so forth, a degree of momentum, and an acceptance of some sharing of power. In the American colony, ex-colony, the Philippines, you find an enormous success of mass education, a total focus on a chaotic political structure--which almost brought the country down before [Ferdinand] Marcos took it over; now the agony of how they're going to go is very much upon them--and the kind of politic that we have, the politics of the western states you might say in the 1880s, which are kind of noisy and there's corruption and violence and all the rest of it, which characterized the Philippines. And [there is] some good engineering and private investment and so forth. The Dutch left almost nothing. They took everything they had. The Belgians in the Congo left three native doctors when they moved out of that huge country. And the French left some good engineering, a terrible bureaucracy and good cooks. (Laughter)

G: What about the education system the French left behind?

C: Not much. It was mainly elite-oriented, which is the way French education is in France. It's heavily elitist-oriented. If you make it, fine, but if you don't you're down there in the blue collars. And the French educational system was heavily carried by the Catholic church, and that had its own implication, because after fifty years of that it was obvious that a high proportion of the educated elite were Catholic. Even though the Catholics hadn't insisted that you become a Catholic in order to be trained, there was a natural effect in that direction. (Interruption)

G: We've discussed Diem's reform, progress-minded activities. How good were our estimates on such reforms as land reform, the agrovilles and so on?



C: Well, the land reform worked according to the way most of the successful land reform programs had worked in the past--the one in Japan, the one in Taiwan, various others--in which the government took the land from the larger landowners, and particularly the French, and then loaned the peasant the money, which he then repaid over the next few years. Now the communists very intelligently focused on that as just a way of insisting on further payment of taxes. Because during the intervening years, the years of the war, there were no taxes collected because the back country was in a turmoil and in an uproar, and so the peasants weren't paying any taxes. So that the interpretation successfully put forward by the communists, which was in a sense accurate, was that this legal mumbo jumbo meant that the peasants would be required to pay taxes today that they hadn't been required to pay before. Now, we hadn't come through the thought process that led to the later land reform program under [Nguyen Van] Thieu, in which the individual was given the land without a requirement to repay. In other words, we were still thinking in terms of the Taiwan, the Japanese, and some other models, which had been successful and certainly were successful in those areas, but hadn't had a local competition the way the Vietnamese one had.

G: Weren't there charges--perhaps not at the time but later--that the land reform was really too much of a facade? That landlordism was still very prevalent?

C: The point there is that whatever the maximum size of holding was set at--I don't know, let's say a hundred hectares or something like that, I think that's what it was, which is two hundred and fifty acres, which is quite a lot--too large. And we went to Diem at one point saying, "Well, you know, you've really got to cut this down and make it smaller, because there were still landlords and you still had landlordism." His response was very interesting, as again, the politics is the art of the possible. He said, "You don't understand, I cannot eliminate my middle class." When you think of his position at that particular time, what he was saying was the same decision he made in 1954 to 1956: I'm going to use the apparatus of social order that exists in order to conduct this longer-term transition. And I'm not going to dispense with it and try to create a new one in a hurry. Now the interesting comparison is with Ho Chi Minh, who moved into Hanoi in 1954 and eliminated every other apparatus of power: the land reform program, which killed a certain number of the landlords; the bureaucratic apparatus he threw out and sent down to the South and so forth, but at least he started with something new. Now he wasn't under attack for the next few years so he had the period of respite in order to build this new structure of control, party control. Diem at the time was controlling the precincts of his palace and not much more when he first started. His problem was how can I get control of some of these forces that are anarchic and going in all directions? He needed allies to do it, and he picked up the allies as he went along, including the bureaucracy and the army and various other things, and put them under his control. Now by putting them under his control--Nhu explained this very clearly, he knew exactly what happened--he became a captive of it. Then his policies then had to be transmitted through these mechanisms, which were not very good. That's why Nhu used to always be railing about them, but I don't think even Nhu thought that there was a real alternative. He didn't have the opportunity to create a new structure ab initio under pressure. Now whether he should have done more of it in the period of 1956 to 1959, something of that nature, yes, I think probably they should have. He had his heart set on the National Institute of Administration, the idea of building--which was advised by our Michigan people and so forth--a new cadre, an Americanized cadre of governmental bureaucratic civil servant category, as the French did after World War II when people like [Valery] Giscard D'Estaing went to the Institute there to become inspectors of finance, and gradually worked their way up. That's what Diem was in the process of doing and it just was too slow for the pressures that came on him. So the answer [is], yes, he should have had a different base of power.

G: But what was there?

C: That's the point. What was there? There wasn't any at that time. He didn't really have that much alternative, because if he had not reached for those allies he would have gone down, there's no question about it.

G: Now the communists in the North and in the South always claimed that their base of power was the peasantry, particularly the landless peasantry, and I think with a good deal of truth. How did Diem's agrovillage program affect the attitude of the peasantry?

C: Well, the agrovillage--I'm glad you separate the agrovillage from the strategic hamlet, because they're two different things. The agrovillage program was one of these theoretical programs which might have worked in a different circumstance. It came about because of the nature of South Vietnam and the Delta area, which is a whole series of canals and the people live sort of one-by-one along the canals and stretch out for miles. In 1958 and 1959 when Diem was in this program of developing schools, aid and marketplaces, just the general social and economic structure for the country, it was obvious that this was really a tough thing to handle. How do you handle a school, and particularly a high school, if people are scattered all over the place? So he had a thought that if he could move people closer together to make them into agrovillages, still agriculturally based but in a kind of a city rather than a village or hamlet structure, that that would give population base for a hospital, a decent administration, a school system, not only primary but high school system and so forth. And this looked fine. Move the people together and then give them these amenities, these steps toward modernization and organizing and so forth. Now of course you couldn't separate--they depended mainly on their rice growing for their livelihood. That they could go out to, no great problem. It's only a couple of miles, no great concern. But they needed something as a plot for vegetables, things local, a pig or something like that, something they could have for their family development, aside from the main cash crop out here. So, the consequent design was--I've forgotten how much, but let's say a hundred square meters or something like that, which the house was this much and the rest was this garden patch that they could use. Well, that meant, in other words, that [there were] ten families a kilometer square. It spreads kind of far. There is still accumulated enough so that they can support these various economic things. And in a world in which no opposition had occurred, this would have worked, at least it might have worked. Let's give it a half and half. It's worth the experiment and certainly might have brought about these things. The problem was that this launched in about mid-1959, just about the time the communists were deciding it was time to resume the rebellion. Well, when you

spread this ten families per kilometer you obviously don't have a defensible center and so an enemy patrol can walk right through the whole thing and there's no way to put up a perimeter that will defend that entire area. This was the Achilles heel of the program, that it came in, would have gotten going about 1960 at exactly the time that the insurgency was arising and making it fruitless. All this stuff about moving graves and all the rest of it, sure, that's a part of the problem, but if it had developed some economic momentum, I suspect it would have overcome that. But what it couldn't overcome was the deliberate effort to destroy it by the enemy and the inability to defend it.

G: Was it particularly vulnerable to enemy propaganda as well as attack?

C: Oh sure, I mean, being moved and so forth. But that sort of thing I think is something you take as the first stages, and then you demonstrate that there's something there and you can turn them around. In a later period we went through the same problem. But by sticking to your program and making it appear that it's working, people do look and say, "Yes, it does make sense."

G: I'm anticipating here, but it seems to me that are you saying in fact that you took basically the same idea later in CORDS [Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Staff] and made it work?

C: Not the agrovillage, no, no. Because the agrovillage thing was indefensible. It was a little too much the political scientist at work, with a single idea. That's why I can't say that it would have worked, and I can't say that it would not have. I just don't know. What the changes were I have no idea. But the fact is obviously it didn't work and the reason it didn't was its vulnerability. Not because the other things failed, it was because it was just too vulnerable at a time when the insurgency began to rise. I don't think it contributed in any major degree to the rise of the insurgency. I think it had other bases and other reasons and that it might have worked if it had had a chance. What I am saying is that we essentially took on the strategic hamlet program later and made it work, and of course it's my contention that the strategic hamlet program basically worked the first time. And I know I'm a little contentious about this, and I know the stories about the fake barbed wire and all that sort of thing, and sure, so did Diem. We had some internal reports given to him by some inspectors that he sent out, which were reporting to him the fact that some provinces were cheating on the figures and that there was abuse of the peasantry and all the rest of it. This wasn't a surprise to him, that his machinery was keeping secrets from him, because he had those reports, we know of it. Those are the problems you have when you take on a major program and try to make it work. In some places it doesn't work and you go out and tinker with it and fix it. That's the purpose of having that kind of independent inspection and reporting and so forth about the vulnerabilities and the abuses and the wrong things that happened, so that you can correct them. That's the whole idea of the thing. And the fact that you get these reports doesn't mean that the program is no good. If you just let it go, yes, then the program is no good. But if you then fix it, and fire somebody or change the program in some area to match the problem or whatever, which he was gradually doing.

G: Were we getting those same independent reports?

C: Sure. Yes.

G: Well, why were we accused later of swallowing a lot of Vietnamese false statistics on such programs?

C: Well, because we love statistics. You know, if we want statistics, they'll give us statistics. If that's what you want, fine, we'll give them to you. Nhu was never very much interested in the statistics. He was all lost in the theory up here, and I thought he made a certain amount of sense in that, in trying to put the thrust on that. He would have an all-day meeting of all the province chiefs. I remember being there one time, dragging them in from all over Vietnam and giving them a long talk for three or four hours. And a lot of them came out kind of mystified as to what it was all about, which I think had less to do with his not having a clear idea of what he was doing than their inability to translate it into the kind of staccato, one, two, three, I put ten strands of barbed wire and it's all right; if I only put eight it's no good. Because he was stressing that what you were interested in here was a political movement, a political action to generate a sense of community on the part of these people, not to wrap barbed wire around them, but to get them to take a role and a pride in what they're doing and in participating. I think he was right, and it was essentially that philosophy that we returned to later, there's no question about it. We translated from the hamlet to the village. I think that was a mistake in the Diem-Nhu time, of stressing the hamlet. Because the hamlet was not a traditional organ of administration. Nhu had that as part of the philosophy. He didn't want the traditional power apparatus of the village to be running it. He was forming this new base of power for the whole nation.

G: Do you think that was a mistake?

C: Probably, that he took on more than he needed to at that point. In other words, he could have left the apparatus of power in the village pretty much alone so long as he gave it some power, because it has the ability to change and to refresh itself in a variety of ways. But once you get up to the national level it's very difficult to do.

G: A lot of critics, I'm sure you're aware, find very great fault with Diem for removing the local elected village chief.

C: Yes. And I think there--that's why I do think they probably did make a mistake in that respect.

G: I think Edward Lansdale in his book says that it was done while he was in country and for one reason or another he was never told or never found out and says that "you're going to find that incredible and hard to believe, but it's the simple truth."

C: Yes, well, I wouldn't be surprised. I mean Nhu felt no obligation to get Lansdale's approval on anything. I mean, sure, he talked to



him and so forth, but he'd make his own decision on a thing like that. As I say, it's this philosophical reason I think to change the old elite and generate a new leadership. There was a theoretical idea. It may have been just a little more than the traffic bore at the time.

G: This is jumping ahead a little bit but I think is a good follow-up to that. You mentioned Ataturk and several other models. Other commentators--I think Walt Rostow is one who says this is a very typical pattern, where you get an old traditional style of leader in the first generation of a revolutionary movement, and then the young technocrats take over in one way or another, Ataturk being the young technocrat. If what Nhu and Diem were trying to do was create a new elite, is it fair to say that the elite they were trying to create then turned on them in the form of the army?

C: Well, the army eventually turned on them, but that's another feature. I mean, we caused that, let's face it. No, I think the weakness was that Diem first started thinking in terms of creating a new trained elite out of the National Institute of Administration and so forth. Nhu later turned to this new idea of a new popular elite coming out of the villages. There's a contradiction between the two obviously. The beneficiaries of Diem's effort were the elites in the cities who were able to still be there and not be eliminated as they were in the North. They certainly turned on Diem, and they turned on him because of an idealistic feeling that he hadn't made things good enough and that certainly he had changed the old systems to their detriment, and yet had not solved the problems by his changes. Then they got intoxicated, some of them, by the idea that if we just have more democracy everything will be all right. I just don't think that would have been the case anymore than it was in Chang Myon's Korea in 1960 when the country started to come apart after Syngman Rhee. It was only rescued by Pak Chung Hee putting it together. I think the same come-apart phenomenon would have occurred if Diem had been assassinated in 1960. In fact, he had that revolt against him, parachute attack, and he put it down. He had enough loyal troops to put it down. It wasn't the army that turned on him; those were a few excited paratroopers and a few local politicians. I think that he could control that problem. What he couldn't control later were two things: one, the forerunner of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Buddhist bonzes that burned themselves. Because I think that's an exact forerunner, total rejection of the changes going on, modernization, an idealistic return to some religious base which, if you ever talk to any of these people you really see that it's all words and no content. I mean, very, very strange. Then the effect, however, of the Buddhist thing--again, I'm a little contentious about this because I believe that the Buddhist revolt, which blew up in June of 1963, had its major impact not in Vietnam but in the United States. When that picture of the burning bonze appeared on Life magazine, the party was almost over in terms of the imagery that was affecting the American opinion. That put enormous pressure on President Kennedy. "How can you possibly support a government that has people doing this against it?" [It] led to his vacillation, which is what I have to say it was in terms of what we should do about this problem, and then led to Diem's forceful suppression of the Buddhist revolt in the August raids. Frankly, I think he suppressed them in the same way that he suppressed the sects in 1955. Now, the problem he couldn't control was the United States reaction. But the Buddhists were not a factor in September and October. The factor was the difference between the Americans and the government. It wasn't a matter of the Buddhists being a major problem in the countryside. They were not a major problem, and he had not lost the authority of his state. Sure, there were unhappy people, but he hadn't lost authority and he had been through tough challenges like that before. The thing that really led to the revolt, of course, was the American signal, given by President Kennedy, that new personalities would be necessary. Our fight with them [was whether] to send Nhu and Madame Nhu--who didn't help at all over here, that's for sure, she had a terrible impact on American opinion--out of the country and Diem's refusal to knuckle under, as he would have said it, to American domination on that issue, and to demonstrate in part his independence and his belief that the Americans were wrong. [Diem had] the genuine feeling that the Americans were making a mistake and it was up to him to struggle hard enough against them to prevent them from doing so. Then that led to the big fight in Washington that occurred all that summer as to whether we'd go with President Diem or think of replacing him--you know as much about that as I do--and eventually ended up with a few signals by the administration, a statement by President Kennedy, suspension of our commercial import program, the assurances to the generals that we would be prepared to resume it if they moved against the government.

G: What was the generals' original complaint against Diem?

C: That he was creating such confusion in his programs and in his policies that he was risking American support of Vietnam against the communists. That was their fundamental feeling, that he was going to lose the war because the Americans were going to back away.

G: I see. It's been contended that they were saying he was botching the effort against the communists, rather than alienating the Americans.

C: Right. Those are the two arguments. I mean, you can pay your money and take your choice. But the one argument was that his policies, particularly vis-a-vis the Buddhists and the authoritarian nature of the regime, was antagonizing the people, therefore giving encouragement to the communists to develop more support among the people and therefore threatening the future of Vietnam, and that we could never hope to win the war against the communist attack with Diem. A lot of very sincere people believed that. The other argument was that the countryside was essentially unaffected by the whole Buddhist struggle and that in fact the programs of the countryside were going along. I happen to think that that is a little exaggerated because I think the really critical thing that happened was the outburst of the Buddhist revolt, which turned the attention of the palace away from the strategic hamlet program, which until that time had been quite successful, but required an enormous amount of palace attention and stimulus and drive. When the Buddhist thing blew up and then the fight with the Americans developed, all of that stimulus and drive had to be diverted onto the other problems. The program was let lag at exactly the time when the communists had identified it as a major threat, in the spring of 1963, and had instructed their people that they were to destroy this program at all costs, because it really did threaten them strategically. So they began to attack it in about June or July, and you can see the terrorist incidents grow at that time against it. One interpretation is

that this was a reflection of the disenchantment with Diem. The other is that it was an expression of communist strategic focus on a dangerous program. I take the communist direction as the key element. I know these are arguable, and I don't mind. But the fact was that they wouldn't have had a revolt if the United States had not encouraged it. There was no doubt about that whatsoever. I think it's the greatest mistake we made. I know Mr. Johnson also thought it was a terrible mistake, but vice presidents don't have much power.

G: This is speculative, of course, but do you think in the face of the opposition Diem was experiencing from the Buddhists and the unrest in the army and so forth, could he have been sustained through that crisis?

C: Oh, yes. Yes. If the Americans had maintained their commitment, their support, no doubt about it. But when the Americans indicated a change, then bang, it was gone, it went.

G: Where does this put Roger Hilsman?

C: Well, I think Roger and some of the others, and [Averell] Harriman I disagreed with on various [things] at times--I just think their assessment of the problem, of the nature of the problem, and the policies that we followed were mistaken. Now I must admit that they weren't entirely free in that because they had a lot of pressure behind them from the American people and the American press. That's why I say, when that picture appeared in Life magazine, the game was almost over. Because we do have a government which has to reflect strong attitudes by the American people. That certainly had a strong element, a strong impact on the situation. Now I'm not one of those who believes that you can ignore the American people. You cannot. You've got to listen to them. You've got hopefully to educate them as to what the reality of the problem is, but they are the ultimate repositories of power, and when they decide something it's done. And it was done with Diem on that image, and it was done with Vietnam on the Tet image.

G: A case in point perhaps--

C: It's a bad way to make decisions maybe, but nonetheless, it's part of our government system.

G: That's going to lead us into an interesting discussion on the role of the media, I think. I don't know whether we'll get to it. An interesting, I think, case in point, and I'd be interested in your evaluation of it, was the raid on the Xa Loi pagoda in August, which brought a lot of things to a head.

C: Sure.

G: Nhu, or Diem, whoever was operating, apparently used Vietnamese special forces to suppress a focus of Buddhist discontent, and the press made a great deal out of this, because it was well known that they were CIA-supported, advised, whatever.

C: --supported, yes.

G: Did we know about this in advance?

C: No. No.

G: How was a person like--or why, I should say, was a person like David Halberstam supposedly informed ahead of time and we didn't know? That's raised a bone of contention.

C: I didn't realize he says he was informed ahead of time.

G: Well, not much ahead of time, I think a day or so ahead of time.

C: I never heard that statement either. Oh, frequently newspapermen get a tip on things that the government doesn't get. The fact that we have an adviser with a unit doesn't mean that we're privy to every order they get. I mean, when Pak Chung Hee moved into Seoul in 1961, some of the American advisers almost were with the unit, not realizing what they were involved in. You know, you're a foreigner and the orders come down that chain. We didn't have resident advisers with every battalion or whatever structure. It wasn't a very large force anyway, it was a small force. They could have easily used them and told them to go do something without telling us, and probably would have, because they knew we would have objected. You see, in the raid on the pagodas, Diem I think came to the conclusion that he had to suppress the Buddhists. As I said earlier, I think he succeeded. But he came to the conclusion that they were not just a religious force, but a political force that was attacking the authority of his state, and he had no choice but to suppress them. He used the special forces, because he happened to have them, they were handy and easy and he didn't have to explain them to a whole general staff or anything, just reach out and tell them to do it.

G: Didn't he make an effort, or someone make an effort, to pin this on the ARVN rather than on the special forces?

C: Well, that was the fuss that we got into afterwards. I think, as I remember it, the question was whether the army had participated in it. They had army uniforms on. And then the army had always been unhappy about the special forces having a separate line of command to Nhu's structure. That's why they eventually shot Colonel [Le Quang] Tung in the most outrageous murder of all, frankly. A very mild, straightforward, decent guy. But the army then, with the reaction, you see, of the Americans to this, the army insisted this wasn't army. [Henry Cabot] Lodge took this point up and made something of it, and at a time when we were building our contacts with the army and wanted to maintain that option of the army, then that became important. You see, quite obviously Diem and Nhu took the interregnum between [Frederick] Nolting, that they did respect and realized that he was losing the battle of supporting them and had been kicked out obviously and replaced by Lodge, who was a very unknown quality at that point. They didn't know which way he'd



go. They thought they'd take the interregnum between those two ambassadors and just eliminate the Buddhist thing and present Lodge with a fait accompli, that it had been eliminated, wasn't there anymore. Well, Lodge is not one that takes that kind of a gesture lightly and this affected his entire attitude towards him.

G: Did Lodge interpret that as a challenge, an insult perhaps?

C: No, it--well, that they deliberately had acted before he got there in order to just do away with the Buddhist problem before they had the problems of dealing with him.

G: That brings up an interesting point concerning the-- (Interruption) There is an interesting series of blank spots and conjectures concerning their relationship right before the coup, between Lodge and General [Paul] Harkins, the MAAG chief, and Mr. [John] Richardson, the station chief of CIA. Can you sort that out?

C: Well, Lodge came out to Vietnam having been chosen, as the former vice presidential candidate for the Republicans in 1960, by President Kennedy, in order to de-politicize our problems in Vietnam and get the Republicans on the hook as well as the Democrats. As I said, this challenge to his authority by Diem and Nhu affected Lodge's entire approach. Harkins, in the MAAG position, was convinced that the war was going relatively well, not perfectly, but moving along. The programs actually working of improving the armed forces and the strategic hamlet program seemed to be in the right direction and so forth, and that the Buddhist problems were some political thing that were off in a corner and shouldn't affect our main interest in the support of the South Vietnamese and the war effort. Richardson, by direction and by tradition, was in direct touch with Nhu, had talked to Nhu over the, what, year and a half since I'd left, and had a frank relationship with him, understood what he was talking about and trying to do, and basically sympathized with the concept of a political, hamlet-based solution to the insurgency problem. That we also shouldn't be diverted by the urban, religious problems from our main interest in the major challenge to our interests there, which was from the North. Lodge came in with much more of a sense of the American reaction to the Buddhist problems and the intensity of feeling in the United States, much more aware of the sharp difference of opinion within the administration as to what ought to be done, and probably a little better informed about President Kennedy's basic thinking, that something had to be done about Diem and Nhu. So he came in after the raid on the pagodas, determined to distance himself from and distance the United States from total identification with Diem and Nhu. This, of course, conflicted with Richardson and Harkins' view of what was important and what was the significant element of the problem, which was the countryside problem. This led eventually to his dismissing Richardson in order symbolically to indicate the end of the relationship with Nhu. Because Diem was not yielding to Lodge's demands, and they were demands. Diem was not yielding to those demands. The chemistry between the two didn't work at all. One of the more wry aspects was one of Lodge's first cables when he got there, and he went to some ceremony at the palace. Diem had appeared in a traditional Vietnamese mandarin's coat, and I guess the other people there, too. Diem, for a long time, had adopted the sort of French white sharkskin suits that all the bureaucrats did, and then increasingly he turned to putting on a traditional Vietnamese costume. Lodge's cable is rather amusing because it talks about the medieval court with all its connotations. Of course, the really fascinating thing was that when Lodge finally left Vietnam about a year and a half later, he put on a Vietnamese costume for the final ceremony--

G: Lodge did? That's interesting.

C: --at which he was given the National Order. The contradiction between the two has never really been explained. I mean, Lodge was a very strong-minded, a very forceful fellow, but. . . . As I say, the chemistry was never going to work in the circumstances unfortunately. The other thing is that Lodge did not conceive his role as being the manager of the American effort. He conceived his role as being an individual sent out to make his observations and make his contribution. As a result he did not try to manage the American team in that sense and assert his authority--it sort of went its different ways.

G: Was there a manager below?

C: Well, Truehart was there, but if the ambassador isn't going to insist on authority nobody else really can successfully do so.

G: That brings up a story that I have encountered in another context, and that is that following the Diem coup--I think it's in December--Secretary McNamara went to Saigon on one of many visits and came back and reported that in fact there had not been leadership of the country team, as it were, but that he had great hopes for a young man named David Nes, who was going to act as a coordinator at the second echelon level. And about a month later David Nes got the sack. Do you know anything about that story?

C: I don't remember, but I think it was a question of whether Nes was posing some threat to Lodge's basic authority. I don't know the story, but I think that was the guesswork.

G: I've heard the same thing. That's as far as it goes.

C: See, the history of the American effort in Vietnam was a continuing agonizing effort to get the Americans organized for the nature of the war we were in. We went through all these awful problems of the struggle between the military and the civilians, and the different civilian agencies and all the rest of it. We actually put the strategic hamlet program under pretty good management when we sent a fellow named Phillips--

G: Rufus Phillips?

C: Ruf Phillips, Ruf Phillips there to run the American support of the program. While we didn't unify the military side of it, it really

wasn't all that relevant at the time and it wasn't a major problem. Then, of course, we got into the total confusion of the whole coup and the post-coup. That was just anarchy. Then we tried a series of experiments to at least get the civilian Americans organized. Bill Porter went out there and various other people. That sort of moved it a little bit. It wasn't until President Johnson put Bob Komer in to "damn it, get this civilian side of the thing organized," that he came up with the answer. Secondly, they sent Ellsworth Bunker out there to be the commander--Ellsworth took charge, no doubt of it. Komer had the brilliant solution of unifying the civilian and military countryside effort under a military command. That solved all the problems. That the military had a unity of command, but the civilians had their own role in it and the joint organization and all the rest of it. It worked. But it wasn't until President Johnson finally made that [decision and] put a guy with Bob's enthusiasm and drive into the role that it eventually worked.

G: I've seen two schools of thought also on the effect of the coup on the communists, not just the communists, the NLF, which is the more inclusive term, I think. One view is that militarily the Viet Cong made great strides taking advantage of the confusion and the falling apart of the strategic hamlet program and so on. Another view is that politically the NLF lost its focus for a while because it no longer had Diem as a symbol of everything that was wrong. It was no longer the only anti-government game in town; there were lots of anti-government games you could join if you wanted to play.

C: That's interesting.

G: And that about a third of the members of the NLF went inactive or simply quit in the aftermath of the--not in the aftermath, in the summer during the Buddhist troubles, and for sometime thereafter the NLF lost considerable numbers, not necessarily fighters.

C: I have heard that interpretation. I would say that the effect on the NLF and the communists generally--well, one communist diplomat, I think he was a North Vietnamese, but he was part of the whole business or NLF, one or the other, said they just looked with absolute amazement at the fact that the Americans threw Diem out, couldn't understand it. Secondly, there was a surge of attacks to destroy the strategic hamlet program, which of course the new government couldn't identify with anyway. So they did take advantage of that period of confusion, and period of very weak leadership under the junta, Duong Van Minh particularly. His only decisive act was to decide to kill Diem and Nhu.

G: Do you think that was Minh's decision?

C: Oh, personally, yes, without any doubt. In fact, the other generals I think were shaken by it.

G: Who do you think pulled the trigger, or is that important?

C: That fellow that was killed later.

G: Xuan?

C: Yes. Yes, whatever his name was. Because when [Nguyen] Khanh got in he just took him out and shot him. I think--there's no doubt about it, Xuan killed him. There's no doubt about that he was Minh's aide and that he acted on Minh's orders, no question about it. The other generals then were faced with a fait accompli. They couldn't put Humpty Dumpty back together again unfortunately. But then they floundered around for three months and the place was coming to pieces and Khanh moved and took over. But the communists were not, interestingly enough, equipped to exploit the confusion to the degree that they should have been. In other words, they did not have the structure, the size force, either political or military, which would enable them to move into that period of vacuum. And so after a surge to get rid of the strategic hamlets and this great new world that's opening up, then the rather grinding business of the day resumed and the military in the countryside just sort of toughened up and said, "well, we've got to fight these guys, keep on fighting them." The communists, NLF, continued their effort. And it did take them a little while to rejigger their political line, but it didn't take long. I don't recall that as being any great problem.

G: I noticed in researching documents that--the ones that I have at least--show a focus on political matters of the CIA cables coming out of Saigon immediately after the coup. And it has been speculated that this was because the CIA's jurisdiction, if you will, in military matters had been taken away. Or was this simply a question of priorities?

C: This was priorities. The main problem was the political thing of whether they could put something together. The countryside reporting had been taken over in great effect by the military. I mean, they had the province teams by then, I don't know, maybe not. They had theater teams. And a lot of the statistical stuff of numbers of incidents and stuff like that, that flowed in through the mission and was available to CIA, but they didn't report it as something they discovered or found. I'm sure that the CIA cables said something about the war and how it was going at that time. But you're right, it did focus very heavily on the problems of the politics of the junta and then Khanh and then the Buddhists and all the other actions that were going on there. Because that was the name of the game.

G: What responsibility did the CIA retain after I think it's called Operation Switchback, for reporting on things like order of battle and so forth?

C: Well, it wasn't Operation Switchback that did that. You always had a military intelligence component to MAAG. They got the statistics from the Vietnamese military. The CIA would get some statistics from the police, but the military were more comprehensive on the military actions and fighting problems and so forth. The Switchback merely got CIA out of an action responsibility with respect to the CIDGs [Civilian Irregular Defense Groups] and the northern operations and things like that.



G: Operational programs?

C: Yes, the operations. They didn't change their function. But CIA never felt that it was its job to provide comprehensive statistical reporting. That was the Mission's. Its job was to try to develop some useful sources in both the government, the opposition elements, and to the extent feasible using the police and the intelligence structures, civilian intelligence structures, to get into the communist side. And then of course after Switchback we in theory got out of the whole action area and then, oh, six months or a year later it was obvious that the place was coming apart and that we needed local forces and local political counter-insurgency kinds of forces. CIA began to come up with some of those and got the approvals to support them and get them going. That was the RD [Revolutionary Development] cadre and some of the other programs.

.....  
Then, of course, the really important mission, though, was the Taylor-Rostow one, in October or something like that. It came over for about three or four days. Unfortunately I was not there. I had been called over to Manila to meet John McCone, our new director of CIA. I had just come back and had about a half-hour talk with Rostow, and that's all. I've always kind of regretted that, because I had the feeling that the Taylor-Rostow mission, in its report that eventually showed up, did not put an adequate stress on the importance of the strategic hamlet, the village level of the war, the whole counterinsurgency role, but instead really started us off on what I thought was the wrong foot, of focusing particularly on the military and the strengthening of the military.

G: And pressures against the North for a possible--

C: Well, and all that stuff about the North, which was kind of incidental. We'd already been doing a little of that, but I was in the process of becoming disenchanted with it as not being very feasible.

G: These were what, black operations?

C: Yes. Dropping people in and so forth. I guess we ran our first ones in 1960, so it was before that. But--

G: Hadn't Lansdale trained some teams way back in the middle fifties?

C: Oh, some of his people had theoretically left some capabilities up in Hanoi when they went away, but no, it played no role at that time. Lansdale was more symbolic. He was looking for the symbolism and the political effect of this, and not unreasonably. Some of his ideas are a little fey once in a while, but he did understand the basic political quality that was necessary to any continuing struggle. But the Taylor-Rostow thing I thought really missed the point at the time. I really was always sorry that I hadn't had more of a chance to get to them on it. I don't know why. I don't know whether it would have made any difference, but I didn't. They kind of dismissed the CIA as, well, you get off and do a little of that intelligence work, and that's all. I thought that the CIA at that particular point had figured out some of the things about what the nature of the war was all about. Particularly a few of the experiments in the villages where we'd armed some of the local tribesmen or local citizens in the Delta or up the coast or up in the mountains or some place.

G: How did Diem feel about arming the population as opposed to arming something like the self-defense force?

C: He was a little suspicious of it, but Nhu convinced him that it was a good thing. And they didn't just wander through the back countryside and throw the guns out the back of the trucks. I mean--Diem of course had no hesitation in arming a Catholic community because he had confidence that they would fight, and they did. There's no question about it. But he went along with the effort up in the tribal areas and he went along with some of the other programs, which were more experimental than anything. We deliberately conducted them as experiments, and then tried to demonstrate to Nhu the things that had worked and the things that hadn't about them, and that the key to it was the local leadership and the local sense of responsibility. I think he got a lot of the strategic hamlet out of some of those experiments. Then he broadened it and applied it, and then he put the philosophical gloss on top of it. We certainly made mistakes in some parts of it. I don't have any doubt about that. But as an identification of the correct strategy for that kind of a war, I think that the CIA people were on the right track at that time, and that the Taylor-Rostow mission went in the wrong direction.

G: That, of course, nearly confirms a question I think I had asked on the handout, which was, is it too much to say that you think the CIA had the secret to winning the war and didn't get a chance to apply it?

C: Well, I covered this in my book a little bit, that there is an inherent problem here, that CIA is an agency whose machinery works through secret channels. And you can't really win a war secretly. So somehow we had to figure out--and it took us a long time to do so--how to organize a proper political counterinsurgency effort outside of CIA, with CIA playing a role. Now eventually we came to it with CORDS, but it took us about five years to figure out the structure. In the five years we went through all sorts of noise and confusion unfortunately. But as a strategy, yes, I think there's no question about it, that the strategy of focusing on the village level of the war, encouraging the participation and activating the local population to play a role, was the key to the nature of the war that they were facing. And the strategic hamlet program--I don't care about little variations in the programs, I mean, village, hamlet, things like that are minor variations against the basic philosophy--did work in 1962. Wilford Burchett said it did, and he's no friend.

G: That's quite a compliment.

C: And it did work in 1969, 1970 and 1971 once we got at it again. And when we chased around in other areas it didn't work.

Source: [http://ngotheinh.tripod.com/Colby\\_DiemCoup.htm](http://ngotheinh.tripod.com/Colby_DiemCoup.htm)





# The Decline of South Vietnam & The Fall of Saigon



Cuba's Communist despot Fidel Castro carries a Viet Cong flag and poses for a photograph with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in Quang Tri, South Vietnam in 1973.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))



Cuba's Communist despot Fidel Castro appears with a group of Viet Cong terrorists in South Vietnam in 1973.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))



Cuba's Communist despot Fidel Castro examines souvenirs acquired by Viet Cong terrorists.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))





Female soldiers of the North Vietnamese army stand at attention.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page35](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page35))



Army of the Republic of Vietnam [South Vietnam] (ARVN) troops guard a shrinking perimeter

[http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-\(Army-Republic-Vietnam\)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?139308-South-Vietnamese-Soldiers-(Army-Republic-Vietnam))





(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page75](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page75))



(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page75](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page75))





South Vietnamese marines line beaches and swim out to ships, fleeing from the northern port city of Da Nang on March 29, 1975 before its fall to the Viet Cong and north Vietnamese. This picture was taken as some marines successfully fled, abandoning scores of weapons, vehicles and even a helicopter. In the foreground, men on LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) prepare to throw rope to marines coming up on inner tubes. Only a fraction of the city's 100,000 defenders were evacuated before its fall. (AP Photo)



A refugee clutches her baby as a government helicopter gunship carries them away near Tuy Hoa, 235 miles northeast of Saigon on March 22, 1975. They were among thousands fleeing from recent Communist advances. (AP Photo/ Nick Ut)



*Thousands of refugees flee southward in late April 1975. Refugees entering Saigon were checked to prevent Vietcong infiltration, but such precautions proved futile.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



South Vietnamese soldiers and military police officers (foreground) barricade the streets during the fall of South Vietnam.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page75](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page75))





Viet Cong guerilla fighters ride in a tank in Da Nang, South Vietnam in 1975.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))



North Vietnamese troops run across the tarmac of Tan Son Nhat air base in Saigon as smoke billows behind abandoned U.S. Air Force transport planes April 30, 1975. The taking of Saigon marked the fall of the U.S.-backed south and the end to a decade of fighting. (Vietnam News Agency/REUTERS)





An American official punches a man in the face who was trying to get on an airplane already overloaded with fleeing Vietnamese refugees seeking to flee Nha Trang, South Vietnam on April 2, 1975 as Communist troops prepared to enter Nha Trang, ([Reuters/Bettmann/Corbis](#))



Vietnamese refugees run toward helicopters in Xuan Loc, South Vietnam in 1975. (Image: © Nik Wheeler/CORBIS)





Soldiers and civilians are jammed together on a Navy boat that evacuated them from the old imperial capital of Hue, South Vietnam on March 26, 1975. (Image: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



A CIA employee (probably O.B. Harnage) helps Vietnamese evacuees onto an Air America helicopter from the top of 22 Gia Long Street, a half mile from the U.S. Embassy, in Saigon, South Vietnam, on April 29, 1975. The evacuees were flown to a nearby aircraft carrier stationed near the coast of South Vietnam. (Image: © Bettmann/CORBIS)





Secretary of State Henry Kissinger makes a suggestion for Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and President Gerald Ford during the American evacuation of Saigon, South Vietnam on April 28, 1975. (Photo: Gerald R. Ford Library)



White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld (left), President Gerald Ford (center), and Dick Cheney are seen laughing on April 28, 1975. (Photo: Gerald R. Ford Library)





North Vietnamese Communist terrorists prepare to invade South Vietnam.  
(Photo: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091772303719231234>)



North Vietnamese Communist terrorists prepare to march into Saigon.  
(Photo: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091772277949427442>)





A North Vietnamese tank rolls into a compound in Saigon, South Vietnam during the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975.  
(Image by © Francoise de Mulder/CORBIS)



North Vietnamese Communist terrorists enter Saigon on tanks and trucks on April 30, 1975, ending the Vietnam War.  
(Image by © Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma/CORBIS)





二つの不安、二つの安堵——トゥードー通りの解放勢力戦車 小川卓 (1975年4月30日 サイゴン)

Vietnamese residents in Saigon watch Viet Cong terrorists drive their tanks at an intersection on April 30, 1975.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))



South Vietnamese army soldiers desert their uniforms and boots in South Vietnam in April 1975.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))





Viet Cong guerillas in tanks and armored personnel carrier surround the presidential palace in Saigon on April 30, 1975.


(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page38](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page38))



North Vietnamese troops seize the presidential palace in Saigon, South Vietnam on April 30, 1975.

(Image: © Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma/CORBIS)





General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh"), the last president (for 3 days) of South Vietnam, is arrested by North Vietnamese troops outside the presidential palace in Saigon during the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. (Image: © Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma/CORBIS)



South Vietnam Army soldiers are detained by Viet Cong guerillas at the "Independence Palace" (Presidential Palace) in Saigon on April 30, 1975.





Viet Cong guerilla fighters relax in front of the former presidential palace in Saigon in 1975 shortly after conquering South Vietnam. (Corbis)



陥落を知った老警官の自殺 岡本俊郎 (1975年4月30日正午 サイゴンの下院前)

309

Residents of Saigon examine the body of a South Vietnamese army officer, who chose suicide instead of surrendering to the Viet Cong, on April 30, 1975.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page48](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page48))





*A "re-education" camp in southern Vietnam for former Saigon government officers arrested after the war. More than 50,000 political prisoners remain in such camps, many of them suffering from mistreatment and hunger.*



*Peasants at a "cooperative," the government euphemism for a collective farm, in southern Vietnam. The Communist authorities were compelled to reverse the collectivization programs in the years after the war, when peasant opposition reduced food production.*

Communists in Hanoi impose communism on the Vietnamese people in former South Vietnam.  
 (Source: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)





35 Vietnamese refugees wait to be taken aboard the amphibious command ship USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) on 15 May 1984. They are being rescued from a 35 foot fishing boat 350 miles northeast of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, after spending eight days at sea.

<http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html#a=search&s=vietnamese&n=90&guid=a45d0e57024cd2956364804b61f4e30a02c8042e>



# Fall of Cambodia & Rise of the Khmer Rouge



United States Army Chief of Staff Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (left) toasts King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in 1955. Maxwell D. Taylor was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.



Lon Nol (left), the leader of Cambodia, stands beside National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on October 22, 1972.



*American forces in Cambodia in May 1970. Even though they were soon withdrawn, their incursion triggered enormous antiwar demonstrations in the United States. Four students were killed by national guardsmen at Kent State University in Ohio.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



Prince Norodom Sihanouk waves his hand during his arrival in Hanoi, North Vietnam on May 25, 1970. At his right is North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong. Also seen is Premier Penn Nouth and North Vietnam's Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap (wearing helmet).  
(Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)





*A major test of "Vietnamization" took place in February 1971, when South Vietnamese forces invaded Laos without American advisers. They performed poorly. Larry Burrows, the Life photographer who had been covering Vietnam for a decade, was killed during the operation.*

*Prince Sihanouk (left), head of the Cambodian government in exile from 1970 to 1975, is seen on a visit to Hanoi in 1973 with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong (center) and Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap.*



Special Presidential Envoy General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., talks with U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, on his arrival in Bangkok, Thailand on April 9, 1973 to start four days of consultations on the tense military situation in Cambodia. On his 12th tour of Indochina in three years, General Haig will visit South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the new U.S. military headquarters for the region at Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Special Presidential Envoy, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (2<sup>nd</sup> left) meets with President of Cambodia Lon Nol in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on April 12, 1973 before departing for Washington, D.C. to deliver report to U.S. President Richard Nixon on the military situation in Southeast Asia where Communist forces have threatened the Cambodian capital. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





*Phnompenh, capital of Cambodia, came under heavy shelling in early 1975 as Communist forces closed in. Here the dead lie sprawled in a marketplace directly hit by a bomb.*

(Photo: *Vietnam: A History* by Stanley Karnow)



Khmer Rouge terrorists terrorize the people of Cambodia after invading and occupying the capital city of Phnom Penh in April 1975.  
(Photo: <http://www.icmpa.umd.edu/salzburgacademy/terrorism/index.php/category/stateterrorism/casestudies/cambodia/whathappened/>)




Khmer Rouge fighters, members of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, an extremist Marxist faction led by Pol Pot, celebrate 17 April 1975 as they enter the capital of Cambodia, the city of Phnom Penh. During the brutal Khmer Rouge rule of the country the called Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), perhaps as many as 1.5 million Cambodians - or one in six - died from starvation, disease, overwork, and execution. (CLAUDE JUVENAL/AFP/Getty Images)



Cambodian Communist rebels captured the Mayaguez, an American merchant ship, in May 1975, a month after the fall of Saigon. The hostages were released, but not before a failed rescue operation resulted in the deaths of 41 American servicemen. (United States Navy Photograph) [http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2006/12/30/weekinreview/20061231\\_FORD\\_SLIDESHOW\\_8.html](http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2006/12/30/weekinreview/20061231_FORD_SLIDESHOW_8.html)





Mao Tse-tung (left), Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia (second from right), and Le Duc Tho of Red Vietnam (right) meet in Peking during the Vietnam War. (Photo: Joel D. Meyerson, *United States Army in Vietnam: Images of a Lengthy War*. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1986. Official U.S. Army Photograph)



North Vietnam's Defense Minister and Vice Premier Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap (right) welcomes Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's Chief of State, as the latter arrives recently to attend the state funeral for North Vietnam's Commissar Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, North Vietnam on September 25, 1969. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





President of the United States Ronald Reagan (left) greets pro-Communist King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia at the White House in Washington, D.C. in 1988.



Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia appears with Nicolae Ceausescu (left), the President of Communist Romania, during his visit to Communist Romania in 1972.





Cambodians greet the Red Vietnamese army after Red Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 following three years of genocide committed by Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page3](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page3))



Vietnamese soldiers appear with a group of Cambodian farmers in the 1980s.

(Photo: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-\(updated-on-regular-basis\)/page3](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?130407-Vietnamese-Military-Thread-(updated-on-regular-basis)/page3))





Cambodian children observe a pile of human bones in Cambodia shortly after Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge terrorists were deposed in 1979. An estimated 3 million Cambodians died of exhaustion in the rice paddies or died during “interrogation” in a torture chamber at the hands of Pot and his Khmer Rouge. (Phillip Jones Griffiths/Magnum/Time)





Three of the water-based tortures employed by the Khmer Rouge at Tuol Sleng prison, Phnom Penh Cambodia. According to the Khmer Rouge, waterboarding is an act of torture. (Photo: [Flickr](#))



Khmer Rouge terrorists in Cambodia torture Cambodians through waterboarding at Cambodia's Tuol Sleng Prison in a painting done by former Cambodian prisoner Vann Nath. (Photo: [http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the\\_daily\\_dish/2007/week20/index.html](http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2007/week20/index.html))





A third water-based torture employed by the Khmer Rouge. Prisoners were restrained face-down, arms were shackled to the sides of the tub and ankles shackled inside the tub. The face was easily dunked into the water. (Photo: [Flickr](#))



The Vietnamese army occupied Phnom Penh, Cambodia during the 1980s during Vietnam's war with the Khmer Rouge.






Photographs taken by the Khmer Rouge of the children of the prisoners incarcerated at Tuol Sleng. Prisoners' children were frequently killed in front of their parents to add to the prisoners' suffering. (Photo: [Flickr](#))





Prisoners and genocide victims from the late stages of Tuol Sleng's operation at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime. The Museum building was used by the Khmer Rouge as a torture facility. (Note the professional number cards.) (Photo: [Flickr](#))



A Cambodian worker prays before the famous skull map from Tuol Sleng museum. ([AFP Photo](#))



## Order Out Of Chaos: Détente & Red China



Chou Enlai (center) watches Chairman Mao chat with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the evening of February 17, 1973.



President Richard Nixon greets Red China's Commissar Mao Tse-tung in Peking on February 21, 1972.



President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger meet with Red China's Premier Chou En-lai during Nixon's historic visit to Communist-occupied mainland China on February 23, 1972. Winston Lord is seated on the far left. Henry Kissinger and Winston Lord are members of the Council on Foreign Relations and members of the Trilateral Commission. (Bettmann/CORBIS)




President Richard Nixon (left) toasts Red China's Premier Chou En-lai.





George H.W. Bush, the U.S. Liaison Officer to Red China, and his wife Barbara Bush stand in front of a portrait of Chairman Mao. George H.W. Bush was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1971 to 1979.



David Rockefeller, the Chairman and CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank, visits Red China's Premier Chou Enlai in Peking, Red China in 1973. (Photo: *Memoirs* by David Rockefeller)



President Lyndon B. Johnson watches Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman shake hands with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin on June 25, 1967. (Photo: [Frank Wolfe/Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



David Rockefeller (left), President of Chase Manhattan Bank, and his daughter Neva Rockefeller (second from left) greet Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (right) at the Kremlin in Moscow, Soviet Union on July 29, 1964. **David Rockefeller attended the March 1964 Bilderberg Meetings held in Williamsburg, Virginia, U.S.A.**  
(Photo: *Memoirs* by David Rockefeller/Wide World Photos)





Soviet dictator Leonid Brezhnev whispers into the ears of President Richard M. Nixon.  
(Photo: <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=139403>)



President Richard Nixon toasts with Leonid Brezhnev and Henry Kissinger during the Kremlin seven-day summit conference with the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow, Soviet Russia on July 3, 1974. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

# Vietnam War & Special Interest: Council on Foreign Relations



Council on Foreign Relations is located in New York City at the Harold Pratt House, a building on the southwest corner of Park Avenue and 68<sup>th</sup> Street in midtown Manhattan, one block west of the 68<sup>th</sup> Street and Hunter College subway station.

## Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations during the Vietnam War

Name	College Degree	Year of Directorship	Primary Occupation During the Vietnam War
Whitney H. Shepardson	B.A. Oxford 1913	1921-1966	
Allen W. Dulles	A.B. Princeton 1914	1927-1969	Of Counsel of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1962-1969)
Hamilton Fish Armstrong	A.B. Princeton 1916	1928-1972	Editor of <i>Foreign Affairs</i> magazine (1928-1972)
Frank Altschul	B.A. Yale 1908	1934-1972	Secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations (1944-1972)
Thomas K. Finletter	A.B. U. Penn. 1915	1944-1967	U.S. Representative to NATO (1961-1965)
William A.M. Burden	A.B. Harvard 1927	1945-1974	U.S. Ambassador to Belgium (1959-1961)
Walter H. Mallory		1945-1968	Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1927-1959)
Philip D. Reed	LL.B. Fordham 1924	1945-1969	Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1960-1965)
David Rockefeller	B.S. Harvard 1936; Ph.D. Univ. Chicago 1940	1949-1985	Chairman and CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank (1969-1981) Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1970-1985)
W. Averell Harriman	B.A. Yale 1913	1950-1955	Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1963-1965)
Joseph E. Johnson	Ph.D. Harvard 1943	1950-1974	President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1950-1971)
Grayson L. Kirk	Ph.D. Wisconsin 1930	1950-1973	President of Columbia University (1953-1968)
Elliott V. Bell	B.A. Columbia 1925	1953-1966	Treasurer of the Council on Foreign Relations (1952-1964)
John J. McCloy	LL.B. Harvard 1921	1953-1972	Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1953-1970)
Arthur H. Dean	B.A. Cornell 1921	1955-1972	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1929-1976)
Charles M. Spofford	B.A. Yale 1924	1955-1972	Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell [law firm] (1940-50, 1952-1973)
William C. Foster		1959-1972	Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-1969)
Caryl P. Haskins	Ph.D. Harvard 1935	1961-1975	President of Carnegie Institution of Washington (1956-1971)
James A. Perkins	Ph.D. Princeton 1937	1963-1979	President of Cornell University (1963-1969)
William P. Bundy	B.A. Yale 1939	1964-1974	Asst. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1964-69)
Gabriel Hauge	Ph.D. Harvard 1947	1964-1981	President of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (1963-1971)
Carroll L. Wilson	B.S. MIT 1932	1964-1979	Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
C. Douglas Dillon	B.A. Harvard 1931	1965-1978	Secretary of the Treasury (1961-1965); Chairman of the Brookings Institution (1970-1976)
Henry R. Labouisse	A.B. Princeton 1926	1965-1974	Executive Director of UNICEF (1965-1979)
Robert V. Roosa	Ph.D. Michigan 1942	1966-1981	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1965-1993)
Lucian W. Pye	Ph.D. Yale 1951	1966-1982	Professor of Political Science at MIT
Alfred C. Neal	Ph.D. Brown 1941	1967-1976	First Vice President of Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1951-1956)
Bill Moyers	B.A. Univ. of Texas 1956	1967-1974	Publisher of Newsday; White House Press Secretary
Cyrus R. Vance	B.A. Yale 1939	1968-1976, 1981-1987	Secretary of the Army (1962-1964); Deputy Secretary of Defense (1964-1967)
Hedley Donovan	B.A. Oxford 1936	1969-1979	Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1964-1979)
Bayless Manning	B.A. Yale 1943	1971-1977	Dean of Stanford Law School (1964-1971)
Zbigniew Brzezinski	Ph.D. Harvard 1953	1972-1977	Director of Research Institute for International Change (1962-1977)




# Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations during the Vietnam War



C. Douglas Dillon



David Rockefeller



John J. McCloy



Allen W. Dulles



Philip D. Reed



Joseph E. Johnson



Gabriel Hauge



William P. Bundy



Arthur H. Dean



Charles M. Spofford



Grayson L. Kirk



James A. Perkins




Cyrus R. Vance



Robert V. Roosa



William C. Foster



Frank Altschul



Thomas K. Finletter



Hedley Donovan



Bill Moyers



Caryl P. Haskins



Hamilton Fish Armstrong



Elliott V. Bell



William A.M. Burden



Whitney H. Shepardson



Walter H. Mallory



# War Profiteers or Damn Yankees?

## Council on Foreign Relations Members and Their Occupation during the Vietnam War



Walt W. Rostow  
B.A. Yale 1936  
National Security Advisor  
(1966-1969)



Stanley R. Resor  
B.A. Yale 1939  
Secretary of the Army  
(1965-1971)



Ellsworth Bunker  
B.A. Yale 1916  
U.S. Ambassador to  
South Vietnam  
(1967-1973)



William McC. Martin Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1928  
Chairman of the Federal  
Reserve (1951-1970)




McGeorge Bundy  
B.A. Yale 1940  
National Security Advisor  
(1961-1966)



Kingman Brewster Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1941  
President of Yale  
University (1963-1977)




Alfred Hayes  
B.A. Yale 1930  
President of the Federal  
Reserve Bank of New  
York (1956-1975)



W. Averell Harriman  
B.A. Yale 1913  
U.S. Negotiator at the  
Paris Peace Conference  
on Vietnam (1968-1969)



E. Roland Harriman  
B.A. Yale 1917  
Chairman of American  
Red Cross (1954-1973)




Henry R. Luce  
B.A. Yale 1920  
Editor-in-Chief of *Time*  
magazine (1923-1964)



John Sherman Cooper  
B.A. Yale 1923  
U.S. Senator  
(R-Kentucky, 1946-1949,  
1952-1955, 1956-1973)




Eugene V. Rostow  
B.A. Yale 1933  
Under Secretary of State  
for Political Affairs  
(1966-1969)



Townsend W. Hoopes  
B.A. Yale 1944  
Under Secretary of the Air  
Force (1967-1969)



Knight Woolley  
B.A. Yale 1917  
Partner of Brown Brothers  
Harriman & Co.  
(1931-1982)



Henry John Heinz II  
B.A. Yale 1931  
Chairman of the board of  
H.J. Heinz Company  
(1959-1987)



Philip L. Geyelin  
B.A. Yale 1944  
Editorial Page Editor of  
*The Washington Post*  
(1968-1979)




Richard M. Bissell Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1932  
Deputy CIA Director for  
Plans (1959-1962)



Cord Meyer Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1943  
Assistant Deputy CIA  
Director of Plans  
(1967-1973)



Chester Bowles  
B.A. Yale 1924  
U.S. Ambassador to India  
(1951-1953, 1963-1969)



John K. Jessup  
B.A. Yale 1928  
Chief Editorial Writer of  
*Life* magazine  
(1951-1969)






John V. Lindsay  
B.A. Yale 1944  
Mayor of New York City  
(1966-1973)



Juan Terry Trippe  
Ph.B. Yale 1921  
Chairman and CEO of  
Pan American World  
Airways, Inc. (1964-1968)



Dean G. Acheson  
B.A. Yale 1915  
Member of Covington &  
Burling [law firm]  
(1953-1971)




Roswell L. Gilpatric  
B.A. Yale 1928  
Partner of Cravath,  
Swaine & Moore [law firm]  
(1931-1951, 1953-1961,  
1964-1977)




J. Irwin Miller  
B.A. Yale 1931  
Chairman of the board of  
Cummins Engine Co.  
(1951-1977)



George S. Moore  
B.S. Yale 1927  
Chairman of the board of  
First National City Bank of  
New York (1967-1970)



W. Stuart Symington  
B.A. Yale 1923  
U.S. Senator  
(D-Missouri, 1953-1976)



George H.W. Bush  
B.A. Yale 1948  
U.S. Congressman  
(R-Texas, 1967-1971)



Jonathan B. Bingham  
B.A. Yale 1936  
U.S. Congressman  
(D-New York, 1965-1983)



J. Richardson Dilworth  
B.A. Yale 1938  
Chairman of the board of  
Rockefeller Center, Inc.  
(1966-1982)



Melvin Laird  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
(1969-1973)



Harold Brown  
Secretary of the Air Force  
(1965-1969)



Henry Kissinger  
National Security Advisor  
(1969-1975);  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1973-1977)



Glenn T. Seaborg  
Chairman of Atomic  
Energy Commission  
(1961-1971)



Joseph J. Sisco  
Asst. Sec. of State for  
International Organization  
Affairs (1965-1969)



William E. Colby  
Chief of Far East Division  
of CIA (1962-1967)



Ray S. Cline  
Deputy Director of CIA for  
Intelligence (1962-1966)



John Alex McCone  
Director of Central  
Intelligence Agency  
(1961-1965)



Richard Helms  
Director of Central  
Intelligence Agency  
(1966-1973)



Maj. Gen. Edward  
Lansdale  
CIA agent



Government Officials in the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration:



Paul H. Nitze  
Secretary of the Navy  
(1963-1967); Deputy  
Secretary of Defense  
(1967-1969)



Dean Rusk  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1961-1969)



Robert S. McNamara  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
(1961-1968)



Henry H. Fowler  
Secretary of the Treasury  
(1965-1968)




Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.  
U.S. Ambassador to  
South Vietnam (1963-  
1964, 1965-1967)




Gen. Charles H.  
Bonesteel III  
Commander of U.S. 8th  
Army [Korea] (1966-1969)




Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  
Staff (1962-1964); U.S.  
Ambassador to South  
Vietnam (1964-1965)



Gen. William C.  
Westmoreland  
Commander, U.S. Military  
Assistance Command,  
Vietnam (1964-1968);  
U.S. Army Chief of Staff  
(1968-1972)



Gen. Harold K. Johnson  
U.S. Army Chief of Staff  
(1964-1968)



Gen. Donald V. Bennett  
Superintendent of U.S.  
Military Academy (1966-  
1968); Commanding  
General, VII Corps (1968-  
1969)



David K.E. Bruce  
U.S. Ambassador to  
Great Britain (1961-1969)




Charles E. Bohlen  
U.S. Ambassador to  
France (1962-1968)



Arthur J. Goldberg  
U.S. Representative to  
the United Nations  
(1965-1968)



Llewellyn E. Thompson  
U.S. Ambassador to the  
Soviet Union  
(1957-1962, 1966-1969)



Henry A. Byroade  
U.S. Ambassador to  
Burma (1963-1968)



Harlan B. Cleveland  
U.S. Representative to  
NATO (1965-1969)



George W. Ball  
Under Secretary of State  
(1961-1966);  
U.S. Representative to  
the United Nations (1968)



Hubert H. Humphrey  
Vice President of the  
United States  
(1965-1969)



Nicholas deB Katzenbach  
U.S. Attorney General  
(1965-1966);  
Under Secretary of State  
(1966-1969)



George C. McGhee  
U.S. Ambassador to West  
Germany (1963-1968)



Businessmen, Organization Executives, and Miscellaneous:



Thomas S. Gates Jr.  
Chairman of Morgan  
Guaranty Trust Co. of  
New York (1965-1970)



Frederick M. Warburg  
Partner of Kuhn, Loeb &  
Co. (1931-1973)



Walter B. Wriston  
Chairman of Citibank  
(1970-1984)



George Champion  
Chairman of the board of  
Chase Manhattan Bank  
(1961-1969)




Charles E. Saltzman  
Partner of Goldman,  
Sachs & Co. (1956-1973)



John T. Connor Sr.  
Chairman of Allied  
Chemical Corp. (1969-  
1979); U.S. Secretary of  
Commerce (1965-1967)



Roger M. Blough  
Chairman and CEO of  
United States Steel Corp.  
(1955-1969)



Thomas J. Watson Jr.  
Chairman of International  
Business Machines Corp.  
(1961-1971)



Albert Lindsay Nickerson  
Chairman and CEO of  
Socony-Mobil Oil Co.  
(1963-1969); Chairman of  
the Federal Reserve Bank  
of New York (1969-1972)



Fred J. Borch  
Chairman and CEO of  
General Electric Co.  
(1967-1972)




Kermit Gordon  
President of The  
Brookings Institution  
(1967-1977)



Thomas L. Hughes  
President of Carnegie  
Endowment for  
International Peace  
(1971-1991)



John D. Rockefeller III  
Chairman of The  
Rockefeller Foundation  
(1952-1971)




Edwin O. Reischauer  
U.S. Ambassador to  
Japan (1961-1966)



Dwight D. Eisenhower  
President of the U.S.  
(1953-1961)



Nelson A. Rockefeller  
Governor of New York  
(1959-1973)



Ralph J. Bunche  
Under Secretary of the  
United Nations for Special  
Political Affairs  
(1958-1967)



Philip C. Jessup Sr.  
Judge of the International  
Court of Justice  
(1961-1970)



Jacob K. Javits  
U.S. Senator  
(Republican-New York,  
1957-1981)



Clifford P. Case  
U.S. Senator  
(Republican-New Jersey,  
1955-1979)

Corporate Media and College Presidents:




Daniel L. Schorr  
Washington, D.C.  
Correspondent for CBS  
(1966-1976)



Frederick S. Beebe  
Chairman of the board of  
The Washington Post Co.  
(1961-1973)



William S. Paley  
Chairman of the board of  
Columbia Broadcasting  
System (1946-1983)



Arthur Hays Sulzberger  
Chairman of the board of  
The New York Times Co.  
(1957-1968)



Harding F. Bancroft  
Executive Vice President  
of The New York Times  
Co. (1963-1974)



Robert F. Goheen  
President of Princeton  
University (1957-1972)



Nathan M. Pusey  
President of Harvard  
University (1953-1971)



Grayson L. Kirk  
President of Columbia  
University (1953-1968)



Andrew W. Cordier  
President of Columbia  
University (1968-1970)



John Sloan Dickey  
President of Dartmouth  
College (1945-1970)



James A. Perkins  
President of Cornell  
University (1963-1969)



Lincoln Gordon  
President of Johns  
Hopkins University  
(1967-1971)



Charles J. Hitch  
President of University of  
California at Berkeley  
(1967-1975)



Clark Kerr  
President of University of  
California at Berkeley  
(1958-1967)



J. E. Wallace Sterling  
President of Stanford  
University (1949-1968)



John E. Sawyer  
President of Williams  
College (1961-1973)



Calvin H. Plimpton  
President of Amherst  
College (1960-1971)



Julius A. Stratton  
President of  
Massachusetts Institute of  
Technology (1959-1966)



James M. Hester  
President of New York  
University (1962-1975)



John B. Oakes  
Editorial Page Editor of  
*The New York Times*  
(1961-1977)



## Council on Foreign Relations Members and Their Occupation during the Vietnam War (1964-1973)

Name	CFR Membership (Year)	Primary Occupation
<b>Government Officials:</b>		
Ellsworth Bunker	1942-1984	U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (April 28, 1967-May 11, 1973)
Stanley R. Resor	1966-present	Secretary of the Army (July 2, 1965-June 30, 1971)
McGeorge Bundy	1947-1995	National Security Advisor (January 20, 1961–February 28, 1966) President of Ford Foundation (1966-1979)
William P. Bundy	1960-2000	Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (March 16, 1964-May 4, 1969) Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1964-1974)
W. Averell Harriman	1923-1986	U.S. Negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam (1968-1969) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (April 4, 1963-March 17, 1965)
Cyrus R. Vance	1968-2001	U.S. Negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam (1968-1969) Deputy Secretary of Defense (January 28, 1964–June 30, 1967) Secretary of the Army (July 5, 1962–January 21, 1964) Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1970-1977, 1980-1981)
Walt W. Rostow	1955-2002	National Security Advisor (April 1, 1966–January 20, 1969)
Eugene V. Rostow	1955-1997	Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (October 14, 1966-January 20, 1969)
John Alex McCone	1958-1977	Director of Central Intelligence Agency (November 29, 1961-April 28, 1965)
Richard Helms	1973-2002	Director of Central Intelligence Agency (June 30, 1966-February 2, 1973)
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.	1961-1981	U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (1 <sup>st</sup> time, August 26, 1963-June 28, 1964) U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (2 <sup>nd</sup> time, August 25, 1965-April 25, 1967) U.S. Ambassador to West Germany (May 27, 1968-January 14, 1969) Personal Representative to the Holy See [Vatican City] (June 5, 1970-July 6, 1977)
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	1946-1985	U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (July 14, 1964–July 30, 1965) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 1, 1962-July 1, 1964)
George W. Ball	1949-1993	U.S. Representative to the United Nations (June 26, 1968-September 25, 1968) Under U.S. Secretary of State (December 4, 1961-September 30, 1966) Senior Partner of Lehman Brothers [bank in New York City] (1969-1982) Of Counsel of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton [law firm] (1966-1968, 1969-1994)
Robert S. McNamara	1968-2009	U.S. Secretary of Defense (January 21, 1961–February 29, 1968); President of The World Bank (1968-1981)
Dean Rusk	1952-1994	U.S. Secretary of State (January 21, 1961–January 20, 1969)
Henry A. Kissinger	1956-2009	National Security Advisor (January 20, 1969–November 3, 1975) U.S. Secretary of State (September 22, 1973–January 20, 1977) Professor of Government at Harvard University (1962-1969)
Joseph J. Sisco	1966-2004	Asst. Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (1965-1969) Asst. Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1969-1974)
John M. Leddy	1961-1993	Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (1965-1969)
Anthony M. Solomon	1966-2007	Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (1965-1969)
J. Wayne Fredericks	1959-2004	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1961-1967)
Walter M. Kotschnig	1959-1981	Deputy Asst. Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (1965-1971)
Ernest K. Lindley	1961-1979	Member of State Department Policy Planning Council (1961-1969)
Robert R. Bowie	1947-2008	Counselor of the State Department (September 21, 1966-April 1, 1968)
Paul H. Nitze	1949-2004	Secretary of the Navy (November 29, 1963-June 30, 1967) Deputy Secretary of Defense (July 1, 1967-January 20, 1969) Member of U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (1969-1974)
Norman S. Paul	1957-1978	Under Secretary of the Air Force (1965-1967)
Townsend W. Hoopes	1951-2004	Under Secretary of the Air Force (1967-1969)
Llewellyn E. Thompson Jr.	1963-1971	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1957-1962, Jan. 23, 1967-Jan. 14, 1969) Ambassador at Large (1962-1966)
Foy D. Kohler	1950-1990	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (September 27, 1962-November 14, 1966)
Jacob D. Beam	1962-1991	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (April 18, 1969-January 24, 1973) U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (August 31, 1966-March 5, 1969)
David K.E. Bruce	1946-1977	U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain (March 17, 1961-March 20, 1969)
Charles E. Bohlen	1953-1973	U.S. Ambassador to France (October 27, 1962-February 9, 1968)
William R. Tyler	1936-49, 1963-72	U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands (June 23, 1965-June 20, 1969)
George C. McGhee	1954-1995	U.S. Ambassador to West Germany (May 18, 1963-May 21, 1968)
Philip K. Crowe	1956-1976	U.S. Ambassador to Norway (June 23, 1969-August 31, 1973) U.S. Ambassador to Denmark (September 13, 1973-September 27, 1975)
G. Frederick Reinhardt	1959-1970	U.S. Ambassador to Italy (May 17, 1961-March 3, 1968)
Phillips Talbot	1951-2010	U.S. Ambassador to Greece (October 11, 1965-January 20, 1969) President of the Asia Society (1970-1981)
Angier Biddle Duke	1953-1994	U.S. Ambassador to Spain (April 1, 1965-March 30, 1968) U.S. Ambassador to Denmark (October 3, 1968-May 1, 1969)
Edwin M. Martin	1961-1996	U.S. Ambassador to Argentina (June 11, 1964-January 5, 1968)
John W. Tuthill	1967-1996	U.S. Ambassador to Brazil (June 30, 1966-January 9, 1969)
Robert M. McClintock	1958-1976	U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela (July 7, 1970-March 14, 1975)
Viron P. Vaky	1971-2012	U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica (October 17, 1972-February 9, 1974)

		U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (April 5, 1974-June 23, 1976)
Nathaniel Davis	1969-2010	U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala (November 21, 1968-August 21, 1971) U.S. Ambassador to Chile (October 20, 1971-November 1, 1973)
Edward M. Korry	1962-2002	U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia (April 20, 1963-September 22, 1967) U.S. Ambassador to Chile (October 16, 1967-October 12, 1971)
Joseph C. Satterthwaite	1959-1971	U.S. Ambassador to South Africa (May 22, 1961- November 17, 1965)
Chester Bowles	1954-1983	U.S. Ambassador to India (1951-1953, July 19, 1963-April 21, 1969)
Henry A. Byroade	1953-1977	U.S. Ambassador to Burma (October 7, 1963-June 11, 1968) U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines (August 29, 1969-May 25, 1973)
Emory C. Swank	1979-2009	U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia (September 15, 1970-September 5, 1973)
William R. Kintner	1959-1996	U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (November 29, 1973-March 15, 1975)
Leonard Unger	1981-2001	U.S. Ambassador to Laos (July 25, 1962-December 1, 1964) U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (October 4, 1967-November 19, 1973) U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China [Taiwan] (May 25, 1974-Jan. 19, 1979)
Charles S. Whitehouse	1977-2001	Deputy U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (1972-1973) U.S. Ambassador to Laos (September 20, 1973-April 12, 1975) U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (May 30, 1975-June 19, 1978)
Edwin O. Reischauer	1958-1975	U.S. Ambassador to Japan (April 27, 1961-August 19, 1966)
Douglas MacArthur II	1954-1994	Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (1965-1967) U.S. Ambassador to Austria (May 24, 1967-September 16, 1969) U.S. Ambassador to Iran (October 13, 1969-February 17, 1972)
Harold F. Linder	1947-1980	Chairman and President of Export-Import Bank of the United States (1961-1968) U.S. Ambassador to Canada (September 10, 1968-July 9, 1969)
Adolph W. Schmidt	1955-1976	U.S. Ambassador to Canada (1969-1974)
Thomas K. Finletter	1935-1979	U.S. Representative to NATO (March 2, 1961-September 2, 1965)
Harlan B. Cleveland	1953-2007	Asst. Sec. of State for International Organization Affairs (Feb. 23, 1961-Sept. 8, 1965) U.S. Representative to NATO (September 8, 1965-June 11, 1969)
Arthur J. Goldberg	1961-1962, 1966-1989	U.S. Representative to the United Nations (July 28, 1965-June 24, 1968) Partner of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison [law firm] (1968-1971)
Charles W. Yost	1957-1980	U.S. Representative to the United Nations (January 23, 1969-February 25, 1971)
George H.W. Bush	1971-1978	U.S. Representative to United Nations (March 1, 1971-January 18, 1973); U.S. Congressman (Republican-Texas, January 3, 1967-January 3, 1971)
Hubert H. Humphrey	1959-1977	Vice President of the United States (January 20, 1965-January 20, 1969); U.S. Senator (Democrat-Minnesota, 1949-1964, 1971-1978)
Clifford P. Case	1954-1981	U.S. Senator (Republican-New Jersey, 1955-1979)
W. Stuart Symington	1959-1988	U.S. Senator (Democrat-Missouri, 1953-1976)
Jacob K. Javits	1960-1985	U.S. Senator (Republican-New York, 1957-1981)
Frank F. Church	1963-1973	U.S. Senator (Democrat-Idaho, 1957-1981)
Ogden R. Reid	1956-present	U.S. Congressman (Democrat-New York, 1963-1975)
Jonathan B. Bingham	1952-1986	U.S. Congressman (Democrat-New York, 1965-1983)
Henry S. Reuss	1966-1973	U.S. Congressman (Democrat-Wisconsin, 1955-1983)
John V. Lindsay	1961-1995	Mayor of New York City (January 1, 1966-December 31, 1973) U.S. Congressman (Republican-New York, January 3, 1959-December 31, 1965)
C. Douglas Dillon	1940-2002	U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (January 21, 1961-April 1, 1965) Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1960, 1965-1974)
Henry H. Fowler	1950-1997	U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (April 1, 1965-December 20, 1968); Partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co. (1969-1981)
Alexander B. Trowbridge	1954-2004	U.S. Secretary of Commerce (1967-1968)
John W. Gardner	1947-1972	U.S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1965-1968)
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach	1967-1994	Under U.S. Secretary of State (1966-1969); U.S. Attorney General (1965-1966)
Elliot L. Richardson	1969-1999	U.S. Attorney General (May 25, 1973-October 20, 1973) U.S. Secretary of Defense (January 30, 1973-May 24, 1973) U.S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (June 24, 1970-January 29, 1973) Under Secretary of State (January 23, 1969-June 23, 1970) Attorney General of Massachusetts (1967-1969)
Kenneth Rush	1960-1994	President of Union Carbide Corp. (1966-1969); U.S. Ambassador to West Germany (1969-1972); Deputy Sec. of Defense (1972-1973)
William C. Foster	1954-1984	Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-1969)
Adrian S. Fisher	1949-1951, 1967-1982	Deputy Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-1969)
William S. Gaud	1948-1977	Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development (1966-1969)
Glenn T. Seaborg	1965-1998	Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission (1961-1971)
Cord Meyer Jr.	1947-2000	Assistant Deputy CIA Director of Plans (1967-1973)
Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale	1959-1978	CIA agent; retired U.S. Air Force officer
Nelson A. Rockefeller	1938-1978	Governor of New York (January 1, 1959-December 18, 1973) Vice President of the United States (December 19, 1974-January 20, 1977)
Allen S. Whiting	1963-1992	Deputy U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong (1966-1968)
Howland H. Sargeant	1955-1983	President of Radio Liberty (1954-1975)
John Richardson Jr.	1957-2010	President of Radio Free Europe (1961-1968) Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (1969-1977)



<b>Military Officers:</b>		
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer	1946-1987	Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (1963-1969); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1960-1962)
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster	1956-2004	Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (1969-1974); Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-1966)
Gen. Harold K. Johnson	1967-1983	U.S. Army Chief of Staff (July 3, 1964- July 2, 1968)
Gen. William C. Westmoreland	1961-1973	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1964-1968); U.S. Army Chief of Staff (July 3, 1968- June 30, 1972)
Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III	1960-1977	Director of Special Studies, Office of the Army Chief of Staff (1963-1966); Commander of U.S. 8th Army [Korea] (1966-1969)
Gen. Richard G. Stilwell	1956-1991	Commanding General, U.S. Military Assistance Command (Thailand) (1965-1967); Commanding General, XXIV Corps (Vietnam) (1968-1969); Commanding General, First Armored Division (1967-1968)
Gen. Donald V. Bennett	1967-1994	Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy (West Point) (1966-1968); Commanding General, VII Corps (1968-1969); Director of Defense Intelligence Agency (1969-1972); Commanding General of U.S. 8th Army (Korea) (1972-1973); Commander-in-Chief of Army Forces in Pacific (1973-1974)
Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert	1966-1978	Superintendent of U.S. Military Academy (1963-1966); High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands [Okinawa] (1968-1972)
Brig. Gen. DeWitt C. Armstrong III	1966-1993	Deputy Chief of Army Intelligence (1969-1970); Advisor to Army of the Republic of Vietnam III Corps Commander (1970-1971); Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces, Military Region 2 [Cam Rahn Bay/Nha Trang], South Vietnam (1971-1972); Commanding General of Fort Devens, Massachusetts (1972-1973)
Brig. Gen Michael J.L. Greene	1969-1976	Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1967-1968); Deputy Commandant of Army War College (1968-1970); Assistant Commander, 25 <sup>th</sup> Division, South Vietnam (1970-1971); Commanding General, Army Headquarters Area Command, South Vietnam (1971)
Brig. Gen. Edwin F. Black	1949-1984	Commanding General, U.S. Army Support (Thailand) (1967-1969); Assistant Commander of 25th Infantry Division in South Vietnam (1969); Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Pacific [Honolulu] (1970); retired in 1970
Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln	1947-1974	Head of the Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy (1954-1969)
Gen. David A. Burchinal, USAF	1962-1973	Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command (1966-1973)
<b>Corporate Media:</b>		
Arthur Hays Sulzberger	1927-1968	Chairman of the board of The New York Times Co. (1957-1968)
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger	1966-1971	Chairman and CEO of The New York Times Co. (1963-1997)
Frederick S. Beebe	1956-1972	Chairman of the board of The Washington Post Co. (1961-1973)
William S. Paley	1936-1989	Chairman of the board of Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) (1946-1983)
David Sarnoff	1947-1969	Chairman of the board of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) (1947-1966)
Hedley Donovan	1949-1990	Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1964-1979)
Henry R. Luce	1934-1966	Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1923-1964)
Katharine Graham	1970-2000	Publisher of <i>The Washington Post</i> (1969-1979)
Philip L. Geyelin	1973-2003	Editorial Page Editor of <i>The Washington Post</i> (1968-1979)
John B. Oakes	1949-2000	Editorial Page Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1961-1977)
Emanuel R. Freedman	1950-1970	Assistant Managing Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1964-1971)
Harding F. Bancroft	1957-1984	Executive Vice President of The New York Times Co. (1963-1974)
Sig Mickelson	1957-1996	Vice President of Time-Life Broadcast, Inc. (1961-1970)
John K. Jessup	1946-1979	Chief Editorial Writer of <i>Life</i> magazine (1951-1969); Editorial Broadcaster for CBS Radio (1971-1976)
Otto Fuerbringer	1953-1994	Managing Editor of <i>Time</i> mag. (1960-1968); Vice President of Time, Inc. (1968-1975)
Frank Stanton	1965-2006	President of CBS (1946-1971); Vice Chairman of CBS (1971-1973)
Charles C. Collingwood	1954-1985	Chief Foreign Correspondent for CBS (1966-1975)
Daniel L. Schorr	1960-2010	Washington Correspondent for CBS (1966-1976)
Harry Schwartz	1956-1992	Member of the Editorial Board of <i>The New York Times</i> (1951-1979)
Max Frankel	1966-1992	Chief Washington Correspondent for <i>The New York Times</i> (1968-1973)
James B. Reston	1944-1989	Chief Washington Correspondent for <i>The New York Times</i> (1953-1964); Associate Editor (1964-1968) & Executive Editor (1968-1969) of <i>The New York Times</i> Vice President of The New York Times Co. (1969-1974)
Abraham Michael Rosenthal	1963-2006	Assistant Managing Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1967-1968); Associate Managing Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1968-1969) Managing Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1969-1977)
Harrison E. Salisbury	1967-1992	Assistant Managing Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1964-1972) Associate Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1972-1974); Editor of the Op-Ed Page of <i>The New York Times</i> (1970-1973)
Robert H. Estabrook	1959-present	United Nations and Canada Correspondent for <i>The Washington Post</i> (1966-1971)
Joseph Kraft	1959-1985	Syndicated Columnist for <i>The Washington Post</i> (1963-1986)
Marquis W. Childs	1947-1989	Chief Washington Correspondent for <i>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</i> (1962-1968)
Joseph C. Harsch	1946-1997	Foreign Affairs Columnist for <i>Christian Science Monitor</i> (1952-1971); Chief Editorial Writer for <i>Christian Science Monitor</i> (1971-1974);

		Commentator for ABC (1967-1971)
David Lawrence	1931-1970	Chairman of the board and Editor of <i>U.S. News &amp; World Report</i> (1959-1973)
<b>Bankers:</b>		
William McChesney Martin Jr.	1947-1995	Chairman of the Federal Reserve (April 2, 1951-January 31, 1970)
Arthur F. Burns	1960-1986	Chairman of the Federal Reserve (February 1, 1970-January 31, 1978) President of National Bureau of Economic Research (1957-1967)
Andrew F. Brimmer	1969-2012	Member of the Federal Reserve Board (March 9, 1966-August 31, 1974)
Alfred Hayes	1948-1985	President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (August 1, 1956-August 1, 1975) Chairman of The Economic Club of New York (1965-1966)
Frederick L. Deming	1953-1992	President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1957-1965); Under U.S. Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (1965-1969); General Partner of Lazard Freres & Co. (1969-1971)
David Rockefeller	1942-present	Chairman of the board of Chase Manhattan Bank (1969-1981) President of Chase Manhattan Bank (1961-1969) Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1970-1985)
George Champion	1961-1968	Chairman of the board of Chase Manhattan Bank (1961-1969)
George S. Moore	1958-1974	Chairman of the board of Citibank (1967-1970); President of Citibank (1959-1967)
Walter B. Wriston	1955-1990	Chairman of the board of Citibank (1970-1984); President of Citibank (1967-1970)
Thomas S. Gates Jr.	1961-1982	Chairman and CEO of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (1965-1970)
Gabriel Hauge	1951-1981	Chairman (1971-1979) and President (1963-1971) of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
E. Roland Harriman	1933-1969	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1978); Chairman of American Red Cross (1954-1973)
Knight Woolley	1948-1977	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1982)
Thomas McCance	1949-1978	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1945-1979)
Robert V. Roosa	1957-1993	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1965-1993) Chairman of The Economic Club of New York (1970-1971) Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1967-1982)
Arthur G. Altschul	1946-2001	Partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co. (1959-1977)
Charles E. Saltzman	1947-1953, 1961-1990	Partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co. (1956-1973)
Frederick M. Warburg	1933-1970	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1931-1973)
John M. Schiff	1938-1986	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1931-1977)
Benjamin J. Buttenwieser	1942-1991	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1932-1977)
Nathaniel Samuels	1954-1998	Partner (1960-1966, 1972-1977) and Managing Partner (1966-69) of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. Deputy Under U.S. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (1969-1972)
Sidney Homer	1947-1982	Partner of Salomon Brothers (1961-1971)
Samuel B. Payne	1960-1990	Partner of Morgan Stanley & Co. (1947-1972)
Robert H.B. Baldwin	1968-1993	Partner of Morgan Stanley & Co. (1958-1965, 1967-1975)
C. Sterling Bunnell	1953-1987	Senior Vice President of First National City Bank of New York (1958-c.1974)
John Exter	1955-1993	Senior Vice President of First National City Bank of New York (1959-1972)
John L. Loeb Sr.	1949-1996	Senior Partner of Loeb, Rhoades & Co. [brokerage firm] (1955-1977)
<b>Businessmen:</b>		
Albert Lindsay Nickerson	1952-1969	Chairman and CEO of Socony-Mobil Oil Co. (later Mobil Oil Corp.) (1963-1969); Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1969-1972)
John T. Connor Sr.	1962-1992	Chairman of Allied Chemical Corp. (1969-1979); Sec. of Commerce (1965-1967)
Thomas J. Watson Jr.	1961-1993	Chairman and CEO of International Business Machines Corp. [IBM] (1961-1971) Trustee of The Rockefeller Foundation (1963-1971)
J. Irwin Miller	1962-2004	Chairman of the board of Cummins Engine Co. (1951-1977)
Roger Lewis	1957-1970	Chairman of the board of General Dynamics Corp. (1962-1970)
Thomas V. Jones	1963-2007	Chairman of the board (1963-c.1990) and CEO (1960-1989) of Northrop Corp.
Lammot du Pont Copeland	1942-1983	Chairman of the board of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1967-1971)
Fred J. Borch	1968-1972	Chairman and CEO of General Electric Co. (1967-1972)
Roger M. Blough	1956-1975	Chairman and CEO of United States Steel Corp. (1955-1969)
George R. Vila	1966-1974	Chairman and CEO of Uniroyal, Inc. (1965-1975)
Juan T. Trippe	1933-1976	Chairman and CEO of Pan American Airways (1964-1968)
Walker L. Cisler	1955-1994	Chairman of the board of Detroit Edison Co. (1964-1975)
Byron K. Elliott	1944-1992	Chairman of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. [Boston] (1963-1969)
John R. Kimberly	1959-1974	Chairman of the board (1967-1970) and President (1953-1967) of Kimberly-Clark Corp. Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1953-1968)
James C. Donnell II	1959-1981	President of Marathon Oil Co. (1948-1972)
Joseph Peter Grace, Jr.	1951-1992	President and CEO of W.R. Grace & Co. (1945-1981)
Stanley Marcus	1958-1969	President of Neiman Marcus [department store in Dallas, Texas] (1950-1972)
Harold S. Geneen	1961-1979	President of International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. (1959-1973)
Emilio G. Collado	1948-1992	Executive Vice President of Exxon Corp. (1966-1975)
Richard M. Bissell Jr.	1953-1993	Director of Marketing and Economic Planning, United Aircraft Corp. (1964-1974)
Oscar S. Straus II	1951-2009	Partner of Guggenheim Brothers (1959-1983)
Broderick Haskell	1946-1981	Vice President of Bache & Co., Inc. (1965-1971)
<b>Lawyers:</b>		
Allen W. Dulles	1927-1969	Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm in New York City] (1926-1951, 1962-1969)



Eustace Seligman	1926-1976	Member of Sullivan & Cromwell (1923-1976)
Arthur H. Dean	1938-1987	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1929-1976)
George C. Sharp	1946-1972	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1929-1971)
Norris Darrell	1946-1983	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1934-1976)
George A. Brownell	1947-1977	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell [law firm in New York City] (1930-1972)
Frederick A.O. Schwarz	1955-1971	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1935-1974)
Ralph M. Carson	1938-1969	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1935-1977)
Charles M. Spofford	1947-1990	Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1940-1950, 1952-1973)
S. Hazard Gillespie Jr.	1946-1985	Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1948-2011)
Taggart Whipple	1951-1992	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1950-1992)
Peter O. A. Solbert	1961-2001	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1957-1963, 1965-1989)
Whitney North Seymour	1955-1982	Partner of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett [law firm] (1929-1931, 1933-1983)
Fowler Hamilton	1952-1983	Partner of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton [law firm] (1946-1961, 1963-1984)
Maurice T. Moore	1954-1985	Member of Cravath, Swaine & Moore [law firm] (1926-1980)
William Eldred Jackson	1947-1999	Partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy [law firm] (1954-1999)
Eli Whitney Debevoise	1935-1989	Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton [law firm] (1931-1990)
Robert B. von Mehren	1954-present	Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton [law firm] (1957-1993)
Roswell B. Perkins	1956-present	Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton [law firm] (1957-1996)
Alfred Ogden	1947-2002	Partner of Alexander & Green [law firm] (1955-1975)
Michael V. Forrestal	1961-1988	Partner of Shearman & Sterling [law firm] (1960-1989); Senior staff member of the National Security Council (1962-1965)
George Roberts	1932-1967	Partner of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm] (1914-1968)
Morris B. Abram	1965-2000	Partner of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (1962-1968, 1970-1989)
John N. Irwin II	1952-1999	Partner of Patterson, Belknap & Webb [law firm] (1950-1957, 1961-1970, 1974-1977)
Robert Sturgis Potter	1957-1988	Partner of Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler [law firm] (1962-1988)
Robert M. Pennoyer	1962-1992	Partner of Patterson, Belknap & Webb [law firm] (1962-1995)
Paul G. Pennoyer	1960-1969	Partner of White & Case [law firm in New York City] (1928-1971)
Bethuel M. Webster	1954-1988	Member of Webster & Sheffield [law firm in New York City] (1934-1984)
Dillon Anderson	1959-1973	Partner of Baker Botts [law firm in Houston, Texas] (1940-1974)
Dean G. Acheson	1948-1953, 1960-1971	Member of Covington & Burling [law firm in Washington, D.C.] (1953-1971)
Edwin J. Putzell, Jr.	1966-1976	Vice President and General Counsel of Monsanto Co. (1963-1977)
Tom Killefer	1971-1981	General Counsel of Chrysler Corp. (1966-1975)
<b>Organization Executives:</b>		
Joseph E. Johnson	1948-1990	President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1950-1971)
Thomas L. Hughes	1967-present	President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1971-1991)
J. George Harrar	1961-1977	President of The Rockefeller Foundation (1961-1972)
John D. Rockefeller III	1931-1978	Chairman of The Rockefeller Foundation (1952-1971)
John J. McCloy	1940-1989	Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1953-1970)
Everett N. Case	1940-1981	President of Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1962-1968); Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1966-1968)
Alan Pifer	1956-1995	President of Carnegie Corporation of New York (1965-1982)
Kermit Gordon	1967-1975	President of The Brookings Institution (1967-1977)
Samuel P. Hayes	1954-1993	President of Foreign Policy Association (1962-1974)
Max F. Millikan	1954-1969	President of World Peace Foundation (1956-1969)
Francis T.P. Plimpton	1933-1983	President of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association [TIAA] (1951-1975)
J. Quigg Newton Jr.	1956-2002	President of The Commonwealth Fund (1963-1975)
Caryl P. Haskins	1944-1999	President of Carnegie Institution of Washington (1956-1971)
Paul M. Herzog	1958-1986	President of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies (1965-1971)
Waldemar A. Nielsen	1958-2002	President of African-American Institute (1961-1970)
C. Dale Fuller	1953-1971	Executive Vice President of Foreign Policy Association (1959-1972)
<b>College Professors:</b>		
Kingman Brewster Jr.	1956-1987	President of Yale University (1963-1977)
Nathan M. Pusey	1954-2001	President of Harvard University (1953-1971) President of Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (1971-1975)
Robert F. Goheen	1959-2007	President of Princeton University (1957-1972); Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1963-1975)
James A. Perkins	1951-1998	President of Cornell University (1963-1969)
Grayson L. Kirk	1942-1997	President of Columbia University (1953-1968)
Andrew W. Cordier	1956-1974	President of Columbia University (1968-1970) Dean, School of Int'l and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ. (1962-1968, 1970-1972)
Clark Kerr	1961-1969	President of University of California at Berkeley (1958-1967) Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1960-1975)
Charles J. Hitch	1957-1979	President of University of California at Berkeley (1967-1975); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Comptroller (1961-1965)
J.E. Wallace Sterling	1946-1978	President of Stanford University (1949-1968)
Lincoln Gordon	1954-2008	President of Johns Hopkins University (1967-1971)
John Sloan Dickey	1946-1983	President, Dartmouth College (1945-1970); Trustee, Rockefeller Foundation (1947-72)
Calvin H. Plimpton	1962-2006	President of Amherst College (1960-1971)

John E. Sawyer	1953-1994	President of Williams College (1961-1973)
Howard W. Johnson	1966-2009	President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1966-1971)
Julius A. Stratton	1965-1993	President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1959-1966); Chairman of Ford Foundation (1966-1971)
Frederick L. Hovde	1954-1973	President of Purdue University (1946-1971)
James M. Hester	1962-1996	President of New York University (1962-1975)
Walter Consuelo Langsam	1947-1973	President of University of Cincinnati (1955-1971)
Theodore M. Hesburgh	1966-present	President of University of Notre Dame (1952-1987); Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1961-1981)
Jerome B. Wiesner	1960-1994	Provost of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1966-1971)
Dale R. Corson	1966-1979	Provost of Cornell University (1963-1969); President of Cornell University (1969-1977)
Edward W. Barrett	1949-1987	Dean of Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University (1956-1968)
Courtney C. Brown	1955-1976	Dean of Columbia Business School (1954-1969)
Edmund A. Gullion	1955-1997	Dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (1965-1979)
Francis O. Wilcox	1961-1985	Dean of School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ. (1961-1973)
Don K. Price Jr.	1954-1977	Dean of Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard University (1958-1977)
Bayless Manning	1961-1998	Dean of Stanford Law School (1964-1971); President of the Council on Foreign Relations (1971-1977)
Abram Bergson	1950-1970	Professor of Economics at Harvard University (1956-1984)
Crane Brinton	1952-1967	Professor of History at Harvard University (1942-c.1967)
John King Fairbank	1947-1985	Professor of History at Harvard University (1959-1972)
Rupert Emerson	1951-1976	Professor of International Relations at Harvard University (1946-1970)
John Kenneth Galbraith	1947-1970	Professor of Economics at Harvard University (1949-1960, 1963-1975)
Myres S. McDougal	1954-1997	Professor of Law at Yale University (1939-1975)
Henry C. Wallich	1952-1988	Professor of Economics at Yale University (1951-1974)
Lloyd G. Reynolds	1962-1987	Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University (1952-1981)
Harold D. Lasswell	1955-1977	Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale Univ. (1961-1971)
Frederick C. Barghoorn	1949-1990	Professor of Political Science at Yale University (1957-c.1976)
Geroid T. Robinson	1942-1969	Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University (1950-1971)
John N. Hazard	1942-1994	Professor of Public Law at Columbia University (1946-1977)
A. Arthur Schiller	1961-1976	Professor of Law at Columbia University (1949-1971)
Rene Albrecht-Carrie	1942-1978	Professor of History at Columbia University (1953-1969)
Henry L. Roberts	1951-1972	Professor of History at Columbia University (1956-1967)
Marshall D. Shulman	1956-2006	Professor of Government at Columbia University (1967-1974)
Arthur Doak Barnett	1957-1998	Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (1961-1969)
Henry P. de Vries	1942-1944, 1947-1986	Professor of Law at Columbia University (1952-1981); Partner of Baker & McKenzie [law firm in New York City] (1960-1986)
Joseph R. Strayer	1960-1986	Professor of History at Princeton University (1942-1973)
Oskar Morgenstern	1955-1976	Professor of Economics at Princeton University (1944-1970)
Hans J. Morgenthau	1958-1973	Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago (1949-1968)
Carl B. Spaeth	1963-1971	William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Stanford University (1962-1972)
Richard L. Park	1960-1980	Professor of Political Science at University of Michigan (1966-1980)
<b>Miscellaneous:</b>		
Daniel Ellsberg	1969-present	Pentagon Paper leaker
Harold Brown	1969-present	Secretary of the Air Force (1965-1969); President of California Institute of Technology (1969-1977)
J. Richardson Dilworth	1954-1992	Senior financial adviser to the Rockefeller family (1958-1981)
Henry J. Friendly	1942-1985	Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 2nd Circuit [New York City] (1959-1974)
Dudley B. Bonsal	1946-1994	Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (1962-1976)
Charles E. Wyzanski Jr.	1959-1978	Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (1941-1971)
Philip C. Jessup Sr.	1928-1981	Judge of the International Court of Justice (1961-1970)
Ralph J. Bunche	1949-1967	Under Secretary of the United Nations for Special Political Affairs (1958-1967) Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation (1955-1970)
Frank A. Southard Jr.	1951-1986	Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (1962-1974)
Dwight D. Eisenhower	1949-1968	President of the United States (1953-1961)
James B. Conant	1934-1976	President of Harvard University (1933-1953)
Winthrop W. Aldrich	1927-1973	Chairman of the board of Chase National Bank (1934-1953) Son of U.S. Senator Nelson Aldrich; Uncle of David Rockefeller and Nelson Rockefeller
Henry S. Morgan	1928-1981	Co-Founder of Morgan, Stanley & Co. (1935-?); Director of General Electric Co. (1934-1982); Grandson of Wall Street banker John Pierpont Morgan

Note: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred on August 2, 1964.

Note: Six Day War in Israel occurred from June 5–10, 1967.

Note: The 1967 Newark Race Riot occurred from July 12-17, 1967.

Note: The 1967 Detroit Race Riot occurred from July 23-27, 1967.

Note: Tet Offensive occurred in Saigon and other cities in South Vietnam in February 1968.

Note: Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated by a "lone gunman" in Memphis, Tennessee on April 4, 1968.

Note: U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated by a "lone gunman" in Los Angeles on June 5, 1968; Kennedy died the next day.

Note: Kent State Massacre occurred at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, U.S.A. on May 4, 1970.

Note: The Watergate Scandal occurred in Washington, D.C. on June 17, 1972.

Note: Salvador Allende, the President of Chile, was assassinated during a coup d'etat on September 11, 1973.



[illegible]

May 12, 1973 edition of the New York Times

# Pentagon Papers Charges Are Dismissed; Judge Byrne Frees Ellsberg and Russo, Assails 'Improper Government Conduct'

New Trial Barred  
But Decision Does Not Solve Constitutional Issues in Case

**By Martin Arnold**  
**Special to The New York Times**

Los Angeles, May 11 -- Citing what he called "improper Government conduct shielded so long from public view," the judge in the Pentagon papers trial dismissed today all charges against Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr.

And he made it clear in his ruling that the two men would not be tried again on charges of stealing and copying the Pentagon papers.

"The conduct of the Government has placed the case in such a posture that it precludes the fair, dispassionate resolution of these issues by a jury," he said.

David R. Nissen, the chief prosecutor, said, "It appears that the posture is such that no appeal will be possible."

## **Defendants Not Vindicated**

But the decision by United States District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. did not vindicate the defendants; it chastised the Government. Nor did it resolve the important constitutional issues that the case had raised.

The end of the trial, on its 89th day, was dramatic. The courtroom was jammed, the jury box was filled with news reporters; defense workers in the Ellsberg-Russo cause, mostly young people, sat in chairs lining the courtroom wall.

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo, surrounded by their lawyers, stared intently as Judge Byrne quickly read his ruling.

The Government's action in this case, he said, "offended a sense of justice," and so "I have decided to declare a mistrial and grant the motion for dismissal." The time was 2:07 P.M.

The courtroom erupted in loud cheering and clapping. The judge, barely hiding a smile, quickly strode out the door behind his bench.

Tension had been building for two days, since the sudden disclosure by the Government yesterday that telephone conversations of Dr. Ellsberg were picked up by wiretapping in late 1969 and early 1970, and that all records and logs of those conversations had disappeared from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

When this morning the Government was still unable to produce either the records or a legal authorization for the taps, it was evident that the case had ended.

The jury was not present when the judge read his decision. It had been sent home until Monday morning.

Before rendering his decision, the judge offered the defendants the opportunity to go to the jury for a verdict. He said that he would withhold his ruling on their motion to dismiss if they wanted. He indicated that if they did decide to go to the jury, he would probably dismiss some of the counts -- six for espionage, six for theft and one for conspiracy.

He said that he believed enough of the case was left to litigate before the jury, if the defendants so desired. They did not, and then he read his ruling.

"A judgment of acquittal goes to all the facts," he said, but he added that if he ruled on that defense motion, "it would not dispose of all the issues." That, he said, "can only be done by going to the jury."

He did say, however, that his ruling was based not only on the wiretap disclosures, "or based solely on the break-in" of the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist on Sept. 3, 1971, by agents in the employ of the White House.

## **Ellsberg May Sue Nixon**

But Judge Byrne said that "on April 26 the Government made an extraordinary disclosure" -- that of the break-in -- and that was followed by disclosures that the break-in was done by a "special unit" reporting to the White House.



He said that the special unit "apparently operated with the approval of the F.B.I." and that the C.I.A. also became involved in the prosecution of this case at the "request of the White House."

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo were jubilant, and members of their families were in tears as the long ordeal, which started with Dr. Ellsberg's arrest on June 25, 1971 ended.

Dr. Ellsberg said that he would file a civil action against former and present high ranking officials of the Government, even perhaps against President Nixon.

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo contended that they had taken the papers and copied them to give them to Congress, which, they hoped, would bring pressure to end the war in Vietnam.

So in reality they were arguing in court not only constitutional issues, but their belief that the greater good required them to break some regulations to make the papers public.

This, too, was an issue that the jury would have decided.

"I am convinced by the record of the last couple weeks, particularly the last couple of days," that the trial should not go on, the judge said.

"Governmental agencies have taken an unprecedented series of actions against these defendants" he said. He cited the special White House "plumbers" unit, which "apparently operated with the approval of the F.B.I."

"We may have been given only a glimpse of what this special unit did," the judge said. "The latest series of actions compound a record already pervaded by instances which threatened the defendants' rights to a fair trial."

"It was of greatest significance," he said, that the wire-tap occurred during the period of conspiracy.

"Continued Government investigation is no solution," he added, "because delays tend to compromise the defendants' rights."

He precluded another trial against Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo by including in his ruling this sentence:

"Under all the circumstances, I believe that the defendants should not have to run the risk, present under existing authorities, that they might be tried again before a different jury."

Dr. Ellsberg was asked if he was disappointed that the case had not gone to the jury and he replied, "I think that an American jury would have come to a judgment that is good for this country."

"Tony and I think we know we did something right," he added.

He was asked if he would disclose the Pentagon papers again, and he answered, "I would do it tomorrow, if I could do it."

Leonard B. Boudin, a defense attorney, said,

"I think that the court's ruling was appropriate, necessary, eloquent, justified and dispositive. The judgment was made not on the narrow issue of wiretapping, but on the totality of Government misconduct."

Dr. Ellsberg then added that "the trial isn't over until that bombing is over in Cambodia.

"Don't we have the right not to be tried under Nazi law," he asked. "This Administration has been very straight about where it is. It is up to us to tell them what it means to be an American.

"If facts prove to be what they appear to be, the President has led a conspiracy, not only against Tony and me, but against the American public."

Later today, the Judge's clerk notified the jurors by telephone that the case had ended and a quick poll this evening showed that at least half of them would have voted to acquit the defendants.

Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0511.html>

Washington Inquirer  
May 8, 1995

McNamara's Wall  
By Michael Bengé

Rather than absolving him of his sins, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's pseudo-me-a culpa, "In Retrospect: Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam," is a self-indictment. His lesser crime is self-indulgence. His arrogance and duplicity during the Vietnam conflict is echoed throughout his book as he recounts his mismanagement of the war.

If as he admits, ignorance was his guiding light, then, it has grown to be a beacon today, proving that he has learned little about Vietnamese communism in the almost three decades that it took him to write his book. Besides the war, another tragedy is that McNamara seems to have lost his memory, and has difficulty distinguishing between facts and fantasy.

Nowhere in his book does McNamara mention his asinine idea of building a "technological" wall to keep the North Vietnamese out of the South in order to reduce the need to bomb North Vietnam. (Perhaps he was going to build the wall out of surplus Edsels, a car designed and built while he was CEO of Ford Motor Company that was a total failure.) McNamara didn't succeed in keeping the North Vietnamese out of the South, but the wall was built; not on the 17th parallel as he planned; rather, it can be found just off Constitution Avenue in Washington, DC. It's called the Vietnam Memorial; built with the names of 58,000 dead Americans.

McNamara is flat wrong in his claim that "Our government lacked experts for us to consult to compensate for our ignorance about Southeast Asia." Rather than accepting advice, McNamara and the other "Whiz Kids" arrogantly and deliberately chose to ignore the experts. In fact, McNamara claims there were no experts.

The fact was there were several experts, including the well known French journalist and author Bernard Fall. It wasn't that Fall had been "painted as a suspect communist sympathizer" as claimed in the book, it was because McNamara and his coterie were running the war and were to arrogant to consult with a damn "Frog." They felt that the French couldn't be trusted because the Vichy French had collaborated with the Axis during World War II, and their colonial administrators in Indochina had been treated as allies by the Japanese. And the US had never lost a war, and the French had already lost in Indochina; therefore, McNamara and his cohort wouldn't be caught dead consulting with a bunch of colonials and losers.

And what memory lapse would cause McNamara to forget another expert for whom President John F. Kennedy had great respect for, General Edward Geary Lansdale? Lansdale had been a personal advisor and confidant to Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay, and had been instrumental in the defeat of the communist movement there. Lansdale's expertise wasn't limited to the Philippines, for he was extremely knowledgeable about the entire situation across Southeast Asia.

Lansdale had been in North Vietnam during the two year grace period accorded by the Geneva agreements of 1954. He assisted the anti-communist Vietnamese to go south while Ho Chi Min solidified power in the North. He was also a personal advisor and close friend to South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem.

On January 28, 1961, President Kennedy read a report by General Lansdale about his recent trip to Vietnam. The following Saturday morning, Kennedy had his chief political advisor call Lansdale at his home and asked him to come immediately to the White House. When he arrived, President Kennedy interrupted a briefing on foreign policy and introduced Lansdale to the group as his next ambassador to Vietnam.

On March 1, 1961, a cable was sent to the American Embassy in Saigon from JFK's staff ordering the desk-bound Embassy and its top field officers to read Lansdale's January report, absorb its concepts, and apply them as a new priority in reaching the people in the provinces and villages of Vietnam. However, Lansdale's counterinsurgency and pacification efforts were undermined by ambitious people in the State Department and the over-achievers in the Pentagon, who knew that the only way to gain promotion, get their "stars" and win medals was to expand the Vietnam conflict militarily in the conventional way.

In his book, McNamara belittles General Lansdale by stating, "I knew of only one Pentagon officer with counterinsurgency experience in the region, ...but Lansdale was a relative junior officer who lacked broad geopolitical expertise." Geo-political thinking from 18th Century Europe wasn't needed in Vietnam, rather Lansdale's ideo-and ethno-political expertise is what would have carried the day. McNamara didn't even know that General Lansdale was on his staff until President Kennedy pointed him out. And when did a General become a junior officer?

McNamara also wrongly compares Ho Chi Minh, as a Vietnamese nationalist, to Yugoslavia's Marshall Tito. Ho was as much of a nationalist as McNamara is a historian.

Ho Chi Minh was an international communist, who co-founded the French communist party in 1920. He was trained at the Lenin Institute in Moscow in 1925; he was a nationalized Soviet citizen; and he took a Russian name, Linov. He was assigned as a Russian citizen in the Soviet Consulate in Canton, China, under the renowned Machiavellian Russian Consul, Bordin, when fighting broke out between Chiang Kai Shek and Mao Tse Tung. Joseph Stalin supported Chiang and Mao never forgave, nor trusted, Moscow after that.

Ho was then sent to Thailand in 1928 under Moscow's orders, where he shaved his head and become a Buddhist monk and awaited further orders. They came in 1930, when he was sent by Moscow to Hong Kong to found a new communist party, which Ho named "The Indochina Communist party." Only a French communist would use that term, for a true Vietnamese nationalist would never have used the colonialist term Indochina. Ho was more of a Stalin than a Tito, and arranged the betrayal and annihilation of all opposition including: nationalists, such as Phan Boi Chau (1926); the murder of South Vietnamese Trotskyite communists (1945), who had been an enemy of Stalin's policies since the 1920s; and the selective elimination of the non-communist Viet Minh leaders (1954-56), who had greatly contributed to the defeat of the French.



McNamara is even rebuked today by Hanoi's communist party theoretical journal, which stated that Ho was not a nationalist but was an "internationalist," loyal to Moscow's Comintern policies to the end of his days. Robert McNamara, please call your publisher.

The Vietnam conflict was neither a "peoples' war" nor a civil war, as McNamara claims. Rather, it was a proxy war between superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States, and the wannabee superpower, China. Vietnam was never one country, but had always been divided into three distinct political entities, North, Central, and South Vietnam, and each region had its own distinct political faction and dialect. Both the Central and Southern Vietnamese disliked the arrogant and aggressive North Vietnamese, and the communists fighting in the South were primarily directed by the North.

In turn, the North Vietnamese communists distrusted the Central and Southern communists, and in 1954 and again in 1968, the North Vietnamese communists used their comrades as cannon fodder in order to purge the party ranks of untrustworthy Central and Southern communist brethren, as well as to gain total control of the communist movement in Vietnam. The North's invasion of the South is comparable to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

McNamara is also dead wrong in saying that our goal of stopping the communist take over of Indochina was unworthy. This is an insult to the 58,000 Americans and the hundreds of thousands of people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia whom he sent to be killed in an attempt to stop the dominoes from falling and to help win freedom for the people of the region. Because of McNamara, and in spite of those deaths, some of the dominoes fell when the US pulled out.

And McNamara has the gall to say that it was unworthy to try to prevent the slaughter of the almost two million Cambodians who were murdered by the Vietnamese-inspired, trained, and armed Khmer Rouge (who were supported by Vietnamese artillery and troops). And unworthy to try to prevent the pain and hardship suffered by the tens of thousands of people thrown into the concentration camps ("re-education camps") in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

McNamara's statement that President Eisenhower's domino theory was wrong reflects his total ignorance of Ho Chi Minh's Southeast Asian "time bombs" of the 1930s when Ho, as a Moscow agent, organized the communist parties of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia (Indochinese Communist Party), as well as those in Thailand, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. It is highly unlikely that the Generals in Indonesia would have stood up to and defeated the communist movement there without the demonstration of American resolve in Vietnam in 1965. Furthermore, without the hundreds of millions of dollars and large amounts of military hardware pumped into the Thai economy, Thailand would have become the fourth domino to fall, after Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Without America's resolve and commitment, the Vietnamese communists would have continued to fuel the insurrection in Thailand until it too fell, invading it as they did Cambodia.

It isn't that the Vietnam conflict was unwinnable as he claims, rather McNamara ensured its loss by dictating "rules of engagement" and limited bombing. McNamara arrogantly micro-managed the war by remote, as if playing a board game and possessed by Dr. Strangelove, sending daily encoded messages to the Generals and Admirals in Vietnam on the specific targets he chose to bomb that day. He ordered planes to make multiple bombing runs on the same target on the same day because it was more cost-effective, but it provided a "duck shoot" for the North Vietnamese.

From the onset of the American involvement, the North Vietnamese communists had openly professed they would fight a protracted war and defeat the Americans, not on the battlefield, but politically at home as they had the French. When he voted against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse, an "expert" on international law, warned the White House and the Pentagon that the US must either declare and fight an all-out war against North Vietnam, or the war would be lost politically.

It wasn't a lack of experts to consult with, as he professes; the problem was that McNamara chose to ignore expert advice. McNamara's failed policies of the 1960s turned the American people totally against even a minor involvement in Vietnam, thus ensuring the fulfillment of Hanoi's prophecy and guaranteeing the communist victory.

If "we were wrong; terribly wrong," as McNamara claims, and he realized it in the mid-sixties and never resigned, then he's ultimately responsible for sending thousands of America's "best and brightest" to their deaths. McNamara's cop-out is, "You shouldn't use your power that you've accumulated in a sense as the President's appointee... to attack and subvert the policies of the elected representative of the people." However, the standards set at Nuremberg defeat McNamara's logic.

Some draft evaders say that McNamara's book vindicates them for their actions, but when do two wrongs make a right? Rather than donating his book earnings to help heal the Vietnam veterans he helped wound, McNamara plans to use them to increase communications with the draconian dictatorship in Hanoi; the second time he has handed the Hanoi communists a victory.

Source: <http://www.wintersoldier.com/staticpages/index.php?page=McNamara>

# Council on Foreign Relations & Red Vietnam



**National Socialism in Hanoi:** Defense Minister of Red Vietnam Lt. Gen. Pham Van Tra and U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen review the Red Vietnamese Army in Hanoi on March 13, 2000. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)



Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld shakes hands with Red Vietnam's Minister of Defense Gen. Pham Van Tra (left) in Hanoi, Red Vietnam on June 5, 2006. Donald H. Rumsfeld was a Member of the United States House of Representatives (Republican Party-Illinois) from 1963 to 1969. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)





U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (left) and Defense Minister of Red Vietnam General Pham Van Tra salute together. (Photo: AFP/Getty Images)



Defense Minister of Red Vietnam General Pham Van Tra (left) and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (right) review the Red Vietnamese military marching band in Hanoi. (Photo: AFP/Getty Images)



Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld receives a bouquet of flowers from an unidentified Communist Party official in Hanoi. (Photo: AFP/Getty Images)





U.S. President Bill Clinton sits with Red Vietnam's President Tran Duc Luong in front of a statue of Moscow-trained Vietnamese communist Ho Chi Minh before a bilateral meeting in the Presidential Palace in Hanoi November 17, 2000. (REUTERS/CORBIS/Larry Downing)



U.S. President Bill Clinton reviews a guard of honor accompanied by Red Vietnam's President Tran Duc Luong during his official arrival ceremony in Hanoi, Red Vietnam on November 17, 2000. President Clinton is the first serving U.S. president to visit Vietnam since the late Richard Nixon went to South Vietnam in July 1969. (REUTERS/Gary Hershorn)





Former U.S. President Bill Clinton (R) meets with Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung during the Clinton Global Initiative in New York City on September 27, 2007. (REUTERS/Daniel Acker/Pool)



U.S. President Bill Clinton (C) poses with Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Phan Van Khai (right) and Thailand's Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (left) during the family photo of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperative summit (APEC) at the Auckland Museum in Auckland, New Zealand on September 13, 1999. (Photo by POOL REUTERS)





Conferring with Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong under the portrait of the late Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, January 1976.

United States Senator George McGovern (left) visits Red Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong in Hanoi in January 1976.



Phan Hien (center, back row), Communist Vietnam's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, meets with Richard Holbrooke (left), U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, during U.S.-Vietnamese talks on normalizing relations between the countries in Saigon, Communist Vietnam on December 19, 1977. (Getty Images)



Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Red Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap (wearing a military uniform), who was North Vietnam's communist army Commander-in-Chief during the Vietnam War, are surrounded by journalists as they leave their meeting room in Hanoi, Red Vietnam on November 9, 1995. McNamara is a member of a U.S. delegation led by the Council on Foreign Relations currently on a four-day visit in Hanoi to discuss a proposed conference on the Vietnam War to take place sometime in 1996. (Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP/Getty Images)





Vietnam's Acting Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co (left) meets with David Rockefeller (center) and Council on Foreign Relations Chairman Peter G. Peterson during a fact-finding mission in Hanoi, Red Vietnam on October 6, 1993. (Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP/Getty Images)




Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (L) shakes hands with Red Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, who was North Vietnam's communist army Commander-in-Chief during the Vietnam War, in Hanoi, Red Vietnam on November 9, 1995. McNamara was a member of a U.S. delegation led by the Council on Foreign Relations currently on a four-day visit in Hanoi to discuss a proposed conference on the Vietnam War to take place sometime in 1996. Robert McNamara died in his sleep at his Washington, D.C. home on July 6, 2009. (Getty Images)





Hanoi Army Museum Director Colonel Nguyen Trong Dai (center) gives U.S. Senator John Kerry (left) the flying helmet of U.S. Senator John McCain in Hanoi, Red Vietnam some time in 1992. Senator John McCain is a retired U.S. Navy pilot who was shot down over Hanoi in 1967 during the Vietnam War and spent some time in North Vietnam as a prisoner-of-war. Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA issues, held talks on the fate of U.S. servicemen still listed as missing from the Vietnam War on November 18, 1992. (Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP/Getty Images)



Red Vietnam's Deputy Prime Minister (and later Prime Minister) Nguyen Tan Dung (left) meets with U.S. Senator John McCain on Capitol Hill in Washington D.C. on December 11, 2001. (Joyce Naltchayan/AFP/Getty Images)






Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen shakes hands with Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Phan Van Khai (left) in his Hanoi office on March 13, 2000. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)



President Bill Clinton stands in front of a statue of Ho Chi Minh (left) and bows to the Red Vietnamese flag (right).





Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates escorts Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (left) through an honor cordon and into the Pentagon on June 24, 2008. (Department of Defense photo by R.D. Ward)



Left photo: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte (left) shakes hands with Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at the Government Office in Hanoi September 11, 2008. ([Reuters](#))




Right photo: Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (left) listens to Le Mai, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Red Vietnam, at the Harold Pratt House on September 7, 1990. (Photo: Council on Foreign Relations Annual Report)






World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick listens to Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in Hanoi on August 6, 2007. (© The World Bank)




Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (left) meets with Prime Minister of Red Vietnam Phan Van Khai in front of a bust of Communist terrorist Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi on June 5, 2006. (Frank Zeller/AFP/Getty Images)





U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates walks with Vietnam's Minister of Defense General Phung Quang Thanh in Hanoi, Vietnam on October 11, 2010. Gates was in the region to attend a meeting of defense ministers from around the Asia-Pacific region. (Photo by Pool/Getty Images)



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, talks with Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at the prime minister's office in Hanoi, Vietnam on October 11, 2010. (U.S. Department of Defense photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison)





Lawrence H. Summers (left), President of Harvard University, shakes hands with Phan Van Khai, Prime Minister of Red Vietnam, after their meeting in Massachusetts Hall at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts on June 28, 2005.  
([Staff photo by Rose Lincoln/Harvard News Office, Harvard University](#))



# Vietnam War & Special Interest: Bilderberg Group

The Prince presides at the First Bilderberg Conference, Oosterbeek, 1954



Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands presides over the first Bilderberg Meetings in Oosterbeek, Netherlands in May 1954. The Bilderberg Meetings were held while the Geneva Conference on Indochina was in session.



David Rockefeller (left) and his daughter Neva Rockefeller greet Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the Kremlin in Moscow in 1964. This photograph was published in David Rockefeller's autobiography *Memoirs*.





President Dwight D. Eisenhower (right) and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands enjoy a laugh together before their luncheon meeting at the White House in Washington, D.C. on March 6, 1954. The Prince was in the United States on an industrial inspection tour. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands talks to President Richard Nixon.



President confers with foreign policy advisors. President John F. Kennedy (right) scheduled to make crucial cold war address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, confers with his top foreign policy advisors at the Carlyle Hotel in New York City on September 24, 1961. Seated left to right are: John J. McCloy, Chief U.S. Disarmament Negotiator; Arthur H. Dean, Head Nuclear Test Ban Negotiator; and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. McCloy, Dean, and Rusk were members of the Council on Foreign Relations and Bilderberg Meetings participants. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



George C. McGhee, new U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, calls on President John F. Kennedy at the White House on May 14, 1963 to pay a farewell call before reporting to his new post, and to discuss the President's forthcoming visit to Germany. George C. McGhee was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Bilderberg Meetings participant, and a Rhodes Scholar. (Bettmann/CORBIS)






Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson talks with diplomat Arthur H. Dean (left) in Geneva, Switzerland in April 1961. Arthur H. Dean was a regular Bilderberg Meetings participant. (Photo: Hank Walker/Time Life)

## Notable Bilderberg Meetings Participants during the Vietnam War

Meetings Attended	Name	Country	Occupation	Years Attended
50	David Rockefeller	U.S.A.	Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman, Trilateral Commission Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations	(1954-1955, 1957-1958, 1961-1972, 1974-1975, 1977-1985, 1987-2006, 2008-2009, 2011)
42	Otto Wolff von Amerongen	Germany	Chairman and CEO of Otto Wolff GmbH	(1955, 1957, 1960-1975, 1977-1980, 1982-2001)
38	George W. Ball	U.S.A.	U.S. Representative to United Nations; Under Secretary of State	(1954, 1955, 1957-1958, 1960-1975, 1977-1993)
37	Henry Kissinger	U.S.A.	Secretary of State National Security Advisor	(1957, 1964, 1971, 1977-1978, 1980-1992, 1994-2008, 2010-2013)
36	Sir Eric Roll (Lord Roll of Ipsden)	Great Britain	Chairman, S.G. Warburg & Co., Ltd.	(1964, 1966, 1967, 1969-1975, 1977-2002)
36	Giovanni Agnelli	Italy	Chairman, FIAT	(1957-1958, 1960, 1962-1970, 1972-1975, 1977-1979, 1981, 1984-1998, 2000)
33	Ernst H. van der Beugel	Netherlands	Professor of International Relations, Leiden University in the Netherlands	(1960-1975, 1977-1984, 1988-1994, 1997-1998)
31	Henry J. Heinz II	U.S.A.	Chairman, H.J. Heinz & Co.	(1954, 1955, 1957-1958, 1960-1975, 1977-1986)
27	Max Kohnstamm	International	President, European University in Florence, Italy	(1961-1964, 1967, 1969-1975, 1977, 1979-1980, 1982, 1984, 1986-1989, 1991-1992, 1994-1996, 1998)
24	Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands	Netherlands		(1954-1975)
23	Joseph E. Johnson	U.S.A.	President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	(1955, 1957-1958, 1960-1975, 1977, 1978, 1980)
23	Anthony G.S. Griffin	Canada	Chairman, Triarch Corporation Ltd.	(1963-1975, 1977-1978, 1980, 1983, 1986-1988, 1991, 1993, 1996)
22	M. Nuri Birgi	Turkey	Former Turkish Ambassador to NATO	(1957, 1958, 1961-1975, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1985)
21	Marcus Wallenberg (Jr.)	Sweden	Chairman, Federation of Swedish Industries	(1957-1958, 1960, 1962-1967, 1969-1975, 1977-1981)
20	Joseph M.A.H. Luns	Netherlands	NATO Secretary-General (1971-1984)	(1964-1975, 1977-1984)
19	Leif Hoegh	Norway	Shipowner	(1954, 1957, 1958, 1960-1974)
18	Emilio G. Collado	U.S.A.	Executive Vice President, Exxon Corp.	(1961-1975, 1977-1978, 1980)
17	Charles McC. Mathias Jr.	U.S.A.	U.S. Senator	(1967, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1981, 1984-1993)
16	Sir Frederic Bennett	Great Britain	Member of Parliament	(1962, 1965-1975, 1977-1980)
16	Wilfrid S. Baumgartner	France	President, Rhone-Poulenc S.A.	(1957, 1958, 1960, 1962-1974)
16	Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers	Belgium	Minister of Finance	(1960-1968, 1972-1975, 1977-1978, 1980)
15	Otto Grieg Tidemand	Norway	Minister of Defense	(1967-1975, 1977-1980, 1982, 1984)
15	Gabriel Hauge	U.S.A.	Chairman of the board of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.	(1955, 1957-1958, 1961-1964, 1966, 1968-1972, 1974, 1978)
15	Shepard Stone	U.S.A.	Director of International Affairs at Ford Foundation (1954-1968)	(1957, 1961, 1964-1975, 1980)
13	Arthur H. Dean	U.S.A.	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm]	(1957, 1963-1973, 1975)
10	George C. McGhee	U.S.A.	U.S. Ambassador to West Germany	(1954, 1955, 1957-1958, 1961, 1963-1967)
10	Robert D. Murphy	U.S.A.	U.S. Ambassador to Belgium (1949-52)	(1955, 1957, 1960, 1962-1964, 1966-1968, 1972)
10	James A. Perkins	U.S.A.	President of Cornell University	(1963, 1965, 1967-1968, 1971-1975, 1980)
10	William P. Bundy	U.S.A.	Editor, <i>Foreign Affairs</i> magazine Chancellor of West Germany (1974-1982)	(1973, 1977-1981, 1983-1985, 1990)
9	Helmut Schmidt	Germany		(1966-1967, 1969, 1973-1974, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986)
9	Edmond de Rothschild	France	International Financier	(1968-1975, 1977)
7	Paul H. Nitze	U.S.A.	Secretary of the Navy	(1954, 1955, 1957-1958, 1961, 1963)
7	Zbigniew Brzezinski	U.S.A.	Professor at Columbia University	(1966, 1968, 1972-1973, 1975, 1978, 1985)
6	Bill D. Moyers	U.S.A.	Special Assistant to the U.S. President	(1967-1971, 1973)
4	John J. McCloy	U.S.A.	Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations	(1958, 1964-1966)
4	Charles M. Spofford	U.S.A.	Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell	(1955, 1961, 1963, 1966)
3	Dean Rusk	U.S.A.	Secretary of State	(1955, 1957, 1969)
3	Robert S. McNamara	U.S.A.	President of the World Bank	(1968-1969, 1975)
3	McGeorge Bundy	U.S.A.	National Security Advisor	(1957, 1964, 1980)
2	Thomas L. Hughes	U.S.A.	President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	(1971-1972)



## Notable Bilderberg Meetings Participants during the Vietnam War



**John J. McCloy**  
[America]  
Chairman of the Council  
on Foreign Relations  
(1953-1970)




**David Rockefeller**  
[America]  
President of Chase  
Manhattan Bank  
(1961-1969)



**Prince Bernhard of The  
Netherlands**



**George W. Ball**  
Under U.S. Secretary of  
State (1961-1966)



**Arthur H. Dean**  
[America]  
Partner of Sullivan &  
Cromwell [law firm in New  
York City] (1929-1976)




**Walter Hallstein**  
President of the European  
Commission (1958-1967)




**Joseph M.A.H. Luns**  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the Netherlands (1956-  
1971); Secretary-General  
of NATO (1971-1984)



**Manlio Brosio**  
Secretary-General of  
NATO (1964-1971)



**Pierre-Paul Schweitzer**  
Managing Director of  
International Monetary  
Fund (1963-1973)



**George D. Woods**  
President of The World  
Bank (1963-1968)



**Otto Wolff von  
Amerongen**  
[West Germany]  
Chairman and CEO of  
Otto Wolff GmbH



**Giovanni Agnelli**  
[Italy]  
Chairman of Fiat  
[Italian car company]  
(1966-1996)




**Ernst H. van der Beugel**  
[Netherlands]  
Professor of International  
Relations at Leiden  
University



**Marcus Wallenberg Jr.**  
[Sweden]  
Chairman of Federation of  
Swedish Industries



**Wilfrid S. Baumgartner**  
Finance Minister of  
France (1960-1962);  
Governor, Banque de  
France (1949-1960)



**Thorkil Kristensen**  
Secretary-General of  
Organization for  
Economic Cooperation  
and Development  
(OECD) (1961-1969)



**Jonkheer Emile van  
Lennep**  
Secretary-General of  
Organization for  
Economic Cooperation  
and Development  
(1969-1984)



**Jelle Zijlstra**  
Chairman of the Board  
and President of the Bank  
for International  
Settlements (1967-1981)



**Edmond de Rothschild**  
[France]  
Jewish banker




**Lord (Eric) Roll of Ipsden**  
Chairman, S.G. Warburg  
& Co., Ltd. (1974-1983);  
director of the Bank of  
England (1968-1977)





Denis Healey  
[Great Britain]  
Secretary of State for  
Defence (1964-1970)



Michael Stewart  
(Lord Stewart of Fulham)  
[Great Britain]  
Foreign Secretary  
(1965-1966, 1968-1970)




Harold Wilson  
Prime Minister of  
Great Britain  
(1964-1970, 1974-1976)




James Callaghan  
Chancellor of the  
Exchequer (1964-1967)



Sir Edward R.G. Heath  
Prime Minister of Great  
Britain (1970-1974);  
Leader of the British  
Conservative Party  
(1965-1975)



Lester B. Pearson  
Prime Minister of Canada  
(1963-1968)



Bjarni Benediktsson  
Prime Minister of Iceland  
(1963-1970)



Gaston Defferre  
Mayor of Marseille,  
France  
(1944-1945, 1953-1986)



Jens Otto Krag  
Prime Minister of  
Denmark (1962-1968,  
1971-1972)



Tage F. Erlander  
Prime Minister of Sweden  
(1946-1969)



Ludwig Erhard  
Chancellor of West  
Germany (1963-1966)



Kurt Georg Kiesinger  
Chancellor of West  
Germany (1966-1969)



Gerhard Schröder  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
(1961-1966) and Defence  
Minister (1966-1969) of  
West Germany;  
**former Member of the  
Nazi Party**



Franz Josef Strauss  
Minister of Finance (1966-  
1969) and Minister of  
Defense (1956-1962) of  
West Germany



Hermann J. Abs  
[Germany]  
Former Chairman of the  
Supervisory Board of  
Deutsche Bank AG;  
**former Nazi collaborator**



Hubert Ansiaux  
Governor of the National  
Bank of Belgium  
(1957-1971)



Guido Carli  
Governor of Banca d'Italia  
(1960-1975)



Otto Grieg Tidemand  
Defense Minister of  
Norway (1965-1970)



Amintore Fanfani  
Foreign Minister of Italy  
(1958-1959, May 1962,  
1965, 1966-1968)



Sir Frank Kenyon Roberts  
British Ambassador to the  
Soviet Union (1960-1962);  
British Ambassador to  
West Germany  
(1963-1968)





Dean Rusk  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1961-1969)



Paul H. Nitze  
Secretary of the Navy  
(1963-1967); Deputy  
Secretary of Defense  
(1967-1969)



Robert S. McNamara  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
(1961-1968);  
President of The World  
Bank (1968-1981)



George C. McGhee  
U.S. Ambassador to West  
Germany (1963-1968)



David K.E. Bruce  
U.S. Ambassador to Great  
Britain (1961-1969)



James A. Perkins  
President of Cornell  
University (1963-1969)




Gabriel Hauge  
Chairman of the board of  
Manufacturers Hanover  
Trust Co. (1971-1979)



Joseph E. Johnson  
President of Carnegie  
Endowment for  
International Peace  
(1950-1971)



Emilio G. Collado  
[America]  
Executive Vice President  
of Exxon Corp. [oil  
company] (1966-1975)



H.J. Heinz II  
[America]  
Chairman of the board of  
H.J. Heinz Company  
(1959-1987)




Henry A. Kissinger  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1973-1977);  
National Security Advisor  
(1969-1975)




Zbigniew Brzezinski  
National Security Advisor  
(1977-1981); Director of  
Research Institute for  
International Change  
(1962-1977)



Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Supreme Allied  
Commander of Europe  
(1963-1969)



William P. Bundy  
Assistant Secretary of  
State for East Asian and  
Pacific Affairs  
(1964-1969)



Charles McC. Mathias Jr.  
U.S. Senator  
(Republican-Maryland,  
1969-1987)

# Vietnam War & Special Interest: American Rhodes Scholars



President Lyndon B. Johnson (foreground) meets with (left to right) Under Secretary of State **Nicholas Katzenbach**, National Security Advisor **Walt Rostow**, Secretary of Defense-designate Clark Clifford, and Secretary of State **Dean Rusk** at the White House on February 5, 1968.  
(Photo: [Frank Wolfe, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library](#))



U.S. Senator **J. William Fulbright** chats with U.S. Secretary of State **Dean Rusk** prior to Rusk's testimony before the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Fulbright, concerning America's involvement in South Vietnam on February 18, 1966.  
(Photo by Gene Forte/Pictorial Parade/Getty Images)



## Rhodes Scholars and Council on Foreign Relations Members



George C. McGhee  
U.S. Ambassador to West  
Germany (1963-1968)




Nicholas Katzenbach  
U.S. Attorney General  
(1964-1966)




Dean Rusk  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1961-1969)



Walt W. Rostow  
National Security Advisor  
(1966-1969)



Harlan B. Cleveland  
U.S. Representative to  
NATO (1965-1969)



Robert V. Roosa  
Partner of Brown Brothers  
Harriman & Co. [bank]  
(1965-1993)



Charles E. Saltzman  
Partner of Goldman,  
Sachs & Co. [bank]  
(1956-1973)



Alfred Hayes  
President of Federal  
Reserve Bank of New  
York (1956-1975)



Thomas L. Hughes  
President of Carnegie  
Endowment for  
International Peace  
(1971-1991)



Whitney H. Shepardson  
Director of Council on  
Foreign Relations  
(1921-1966)



Charles J. Hitch  
President of University of  
California at Berkeley  
(1967-1975)



Frederick L. Hovde  
President of Purdue  
University (1946-1971)



Lincoln Gordon  
President of Johns  
Hopkins University  
(1967-1971)



Kermit Gordon  
President of The  
Brookings Institution  
(1967-1977)



William E. Stevenson  
President of Aspen  
Institute [of Humanistic  
Studies] (1967-1970)



Myres S. McDougal  
Professor of Law at Yale  
University (1939-1975)



Charles C. Collingwood  
Chief Foreign  
Correspondent for CBS  
(1966-1975)



Hedley Donovan  
Editor-in-Chief of Time,  
Inc. (1964-1979)



John B. Oakes  
Editorial Page Editor of  
*The New York Times*  
(1961-1977)



Gen. Charles H.  
Bonesteel III  
Commander, U.S. 8th  
Army [Korea] (1966-1969)


## Other Prominent Rhodes Scholars



John Brademas  
U.S. Congressman  
(D-Indiana, 1959-1981)



Carl Albert  
Speaker of the House  
(1971-1977)



J. William Fulbright  
U.S. Senator  
(D-Arkansas, 1945-1974)



Byron R. White  
Justice of the U.S.  
Supreme Court  
(1962-1993)



John M. Harlan II  
Justice of the U.S.  
Supreme Court  
(1955-1971)



Howard K. Smith  
Co-Anchor of ABC  
Evening News  
(1969-1975)



Erwin D. Canham  
Editor-in-Chief of  
*Christian Science Monitor*  
(1964-1974)



Maj. Gen. Bernard W.  
Rogers  
Commanding General of  
5th Infantry Division [Ft.  
Carson] (1969-1970)



John T. McNaughton  
Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for International  
Security Affairs  
(1964-1967)



Morris B. Abram  
Partner of Paul, Weiss,  
Rifkind, Wharton &  
Garrison  
[law firm in New York City]  
(1962-1968, 1970-1989)



Courtney C. Smith  
President of Swarthmore  
College (1953-1969)



Elvis J. Stahr Jr.  
President of Indiana  
University (1962-1968)



James M. Hester  
President of New York  
University (1962-1975)




Wilson H. Elkins  
President of University of  
Maryland (1954-1978)



Edgar F. Shannon Jr.  
President of University of  
Virginia (1959-1974)



Robert H. Ebert  
Dean of Harvard Medical  
School (1965-1977)



Carleton B. Chapman  
Dean of Dartmouth  
Medical School  
(1966-1973)



Don K. Price Jr.  
Dean of Graduate School  
of Public Administration at  
Harvard University  
(1958-1977)



Samuel Hutchison Beer  
Professor of Government  
at Harvard University  
(1953-1982)



Daniel J. Boorstin  
Professor of American  
History at the University of  
Chicago (1956-1969)



## Rhodes Scholars & Vietnam War (1964-1973)

### Government Officials:

\*Dean Rusk – U.S. Secretary of State (1961-1969)  
\*Walt W. Rostow – National Security Advisor (1966-1969)  
\*George C. McGhee – Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1961-1963); U.S. Ambassador to West Germany (1963-1968)  
\*Harlan B. Cleveland – U.S. Representative to NATO (1965-1969)  
\*Philip M. Kaiser – Minister at U.S. Embassy in London (1964-69); Chairman of Encyclopedia Britannica International Ltd., London (1969-75)  
\*Nicholas de B. Katzenbach – Under U.S. Secretary of State (1966-1969); U.S. Attorney General (1965-1966)  
\*John T. McNaughton – Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1964-1967)  
J. William Fulbright – U.S. Senator (Democrat-Arkansas, 1945-1974)  
Carl B. Albert – Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Democrat-Oklahoma, 1947-1977); Speaker of the House (1971-1977)  
\*John Brademas – Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Democrat-Indiana, 1959-1981)  
John Marshall Harlan II – Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1955-1971)  
Byron R. White – Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1962-1993)  
Benjamin Cushing Duniway – Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [San Francisco] (1961-1976)  
Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III – Commanding General of U.S. 8th Army [Korea] (1966-1969)  
\*Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln – Head of the Department of Social Sciences at U.S. Military Academy (1954-1969)  
\*Brig. Gen. Amos A. Jordan – Head of the Department of Social Sciences at U.S. Military Academy (1969-1972)  
\*Maj. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers – Commanding General of 5th Infantry Division [Ft. Carson, Colorado] (1969-1970); Commandant of Cadets at U.S. Military Academy (1967-1969)

### Bankers and Businessmen:

\*Robert V. Roosa – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. [bank in New York City] (1965-1993)  
\*Charles E. Saltzman – Partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co. [bank in New York City] (1956-1973)  
\*Alfred Hayes – President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1956-1975)  
William S. Vaughn – Chairman of the board of Eastman Kodak Co. [camera] (1967-1970)  
\*Charles Finch Barber – Chairman and CEO (1971-1982) and President (1969-1971) of American Smelting and Refining Co.  
\*George Barber Munroe – President of Phelps Dodge Corp. [mining company] (1966-1975)  
James Ross Macdonald – Vice President for Corporate Research at Texas Instruments Inc. [calculators] (1968-1974)  
\*Tom Killefer – General Counsel of Chrysler Corp. [automobile] (1966-1975)

### Corporate Lawyers:

\*Morris B. Abram – Partner of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison [law firm in New York City] (1962-1968, 1970-1989); President of Brandeis University (1968-1970)  
John W. Dickey – Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm in New York City] (1963-1998)  
\*Fowler Hamilton – Partner of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton [law firm in New York City] (1946-1961, 1963-1984)  
\*Francis D. Logan – Partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy [law firm in New York City] (1965-1996)  
Jack Burton Justice – Partner of Drinker, Biddle & Reath [law firm in Philadelphia] (1962-1982)  
John L. Moore Jr. – Partner of Alston & Bird [law firm in Atlanta] (1956-1977)  
Homer Lindsey Bruce – Partner of Baker Botts [law firm in Houston] (1929-1979)  
\*Ewell E. Murphy Jr. – Partner of Baker Botts [law firm in Houston] (1964-1993)

### College Presidents, Deans, and Professors:

\*Charles J. Hitch – President of University of California at Berkeley (1967-1975)  
\*Lincoln Gordon – President of Johns Hopkins University (1967-1971)  
\*Frederick L. Hovde – President of Purdue University (1946-1971)  
\*James M. Hester – President of New York University (1962-1975)  
Elvis J. Stahr Jr. – President of Indiana University (1962-1968); Secretary of the Army (1961-1962)  
Edgar F. Shannon Jr. – President of University of Virginia (1959-1974)  
Wilson H. Elkins – President of University of Maryland (1954-1978); Class C Director of Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (1963-1971)  
Willard Deming Lewis – President of Lehigh University [Pennsylvania] (1964-1982)  
Courtney Craig Smith – President of Swarthmore College [Pennsylvania] (1953-1969)  
Thomas C. Mendenhall II – President of Smith College [women's college in Massachusetts] (1959-1975)  
Robert William MacVicar – Chancellor of Southern Illinois University (1968-1970)  
\*(Col.) Wesley W. Posvar – Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh (1967-1991)  
\*Don K. Price Jr. – Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard University (1958-1977)  
Robert H. Ebert – Dean of Harvard Medical School (1965-1977)  
Carleton B. Chapman – Dean of Dartmouth Medical School (1966-1973)  
Donald Wayne Taylor – Dean of Graduate School at Yale University (1969-c.1975)  
Nathaniel Bernard Blumberg – Dean of School of Journalism at University of Montana (1956-1968)  
\*Steven Muller – Provost of Johns Hopkins University (1971-1972); Vice President for Public Affairs at Cornell University (1966-1971)  
  
\*Samuel Hutchison Beer – Professor of Government at Harvard University (1953-1982)  
\*John King Fairbank – Professor of History at Harvard University (1959-1972)  
John Philip Dawson – Professor of Law at Harvard Law School (1957-1973)  
\*Myres S. McDougal – Professor of Law at Yale University (1939-1975)  
Robert Penn Warren – Professor of English at Yale University (1961-1973)  
A. Walton Litz – Professor of English Literature at Princeton University (1956-1993)  
Edward Dudley Hume Johnson – Professor of English at Princeton University (1961-1977)  
Robert P. Hamilton – Professor of Law at Columbia University (1937-1970)  
Harry Willmer Jones – Professor of Law and Jurisprudence at Columbia University (1947-1979)

\*Henry Lithgow Roberts – Professor of History at Columbia University (1956-1967); Professor of History at Dartmouth College (1967-1972)  
Penn T. Kimball II – Professor of Journalism at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism (1959-1985)  
Daniel J. Boorstin – Professor of American History at the University of Chicago (1956-1969)  
Chauncy Dennison Harris – Professor of Geography at University of Chicago (1947-1984)  
\*Gordon A. Craig – Professor of History at Stanford University (1961-2005)  
\*Carl B. Spaeth – William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Stanford University (1962-1972)  
Morris Frank Shaffer – Professor of Microbiology at Tulane University (1943-1973)  
Ferdinand Fairfax Stone – Professor of Law at Tulane University (1948-1979)  
Charles T. Davis – Professor of History at Tulane University (1964-1998)  
Thornton Leigh Page – Professor of Astronomy at Wesleyan University (1958-1971)  
George Clarence Kent – Professor of Plant Pathology at Cornell University (1945-1975)

Journalists:

\*Howland H. Sargeant – President of Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe (1954-1975)  
\*Charles C. Collingwood – Chief Foreign Correspondent for CBS (1966-1975)  
Howard K. Smith – Co-Anchor of ABC Evening News (1969-1975)  
\*Hedley Donovan – Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1964-1979)  
Willie Morris – Editor-in-Chief of *Harper's Magazine* (1967-1971)  
\*Erwin D. Canham – Editor-in-Chief of *Christian Science Monitor* (1964-1974)  
\*John B. Oakes – Editorial Page Editor of *The New York Times* (1961-1977)

Organization Executives:

\*Thomas L. Hughes – President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1971-1991); U.S. State Department Director of Intelligence and Research (1963-1969)  
\*Kermit Gordon – President of The Brookings Institution (1967-1977)  
\*William E. Stevenson – President of Aspen Institute [of Humanistic Studies] (1967-1970)  
\*Waldemar August Nielsen – President of African-American Institute (1961-1970)  
Karl Gottlieb Harr, Jr. – President of Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. (1963-1987)  
Robert Caldwell Bates – Secretary of Rockefeller Brothers Fund (1952-1973)  
\*Charles G. Bolte – Vice President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1966-1971)  
Larkin Hundley Farinholt – Vice President of Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1962-1970)  
\*Ralph Kirby Davidson – Deputy Director for Humanities and Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation (1964-1970)  
\*Richard Henry Nolte – Executive Director of Institute of Current World Affairs (1959-1978); U.S. Ambassador to Egypt (1967)

Note: \*=member of the Council on Foreign Relations




# Vietnam War & Special Interest: Skull & Bones



Congressman GEORGE H.W. BUSH (left) visits American military personnel on his trip to Southeast Asia [Vietnam], from December 26, 1967 through January 11, 1968, prior to the Tet Offensive. (Photo: George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)

(Note: CAPS = Member of Skull & Bones)



Former U.S. Navy Lieutenant JOHN FORBES KERRY testifies in front of the U.S. Senate on April 22, 1971. April 22 is the birthday of Vladimir Lenin, founder of the Soviet Union.



JOHN FORBES KERRY (center) appears with his fellow Navy officers in South Vietnam during the early years of the Vietnam War.





JOHN FORBES KERRY (rear, clenching his teeth) “protests” the Vietnam War with Hollywood actress Jane Fonda (front).



U.S. Congressman GEORGE H.W. BUSH (R-Texas) smiles proudly as he pins bars on his son GEORGE W. BUSH in 1968. The bars represented George W. Bush's entry as a Second Lieutenant into the Texas Air National Guard.



U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas, back to the camera), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, faces a jammed committee room as his group takes testimony on April 22, 1971 from JOHN KERRY, one of the leaders of a week-long anti-war demonstration being conducted by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Kerry, a three-time decorated former Navy Lieutenant (junior grade) and later U.S. Senator (D-MA) made a moving plea to end the war, asking every American to consider who would be the last chosen "to die for a mistake." Many of Kerry's Vietnam veteran comrades are behind him listening to his plea. (UPI) <http://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2009/04/page/2/>



Skull & Bones member JOHN KERRY is escorted by police officers after getting arrested during a protest against the Vietnam War in an undated photograph. JOHN KERRY is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.





DAVID H. THORNE (left) talks to JOHN KERRY at an anti-Vietnam War protest. DAVID H. THORNE is President Barack Obama's U.S. Ambassador to Italy; JOHN KERRY is a U.S. Senator.



Left photo: JOHN KERRY talks to U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy in Washington D.C. on April 21, 1971.



Right photo: JOHN KERRY and former Beatles singer John Lennon (right) participate in an anti-Vietnam War protest at New York City's Bryant Park in 1971.




*After a trip to Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara briefs President Lyndon B. Johnson and his senior advisors Averill Harriman, John McCone, Roger Hilsman and McGeorge Bundy visible, with Colby backing up McCone—the Oval Office, December 1963*

Left to right: AVERELL HARRIMAN (left), the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, President Lyndon B. Johnson, CIA Director John McCone, CIA agent William E. Colby (sitting behind McCone), National Security Advisor McGEORGE BUNDY (second from right in the rear), and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara meet in the Oval Office in December 1963.



Secretary of the Navy JOHN CHAFEE (center) is escorted by the Commander of Naval Forces Vietnam Vice Admiral Jerry King as they visit a U.S. Navy outpost in the Golden Triangle area of the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam on June 21, 1970.





Cardinal Francis Spellman (left) and Time Editor-in-Chief HENRY LUCE (right) stand beside South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem. (Photo: *Luce and His Empire* by W.A. Swanberg)



Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (left) watches Assistant Secretary of State WILLIAM P. BUNDY talk to South Vietnam's Premier Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky in Saigon in March 1967. (AP/Wide World Photos)



U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor watches National Security Advisor McGEORGE BUNDY shake hands with U.S. Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland while visiting South Vietnam in February 1965.



From left to right: Guy J. Pauker, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor McGEORGE BUNDY, Eric Sevareid, Hans Morgenthau, O. Edmund Clubb, and John D. Donoghue engage in a debate on Vietnam War on June 21, 1965.  
(AP/Wide World Photos)





BARRY ZORTHIAN (right), head of USIA Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, chats with U.S. Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland in Saigon, South Vietnam in 1966. (Photo: Co Rentmeester/Time Life)



Standing with three co-defendants, famed pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock (second from left) talks to news reporters on June 14, 1968 after they were convicted by a federal jury of conspiring to counsel young men to evade the draft. Left to right are: author Mitchell Goodman, Spock, Michael Ferber and Rev. William Sloane Coffin Jr., Chaplain of Yale University. A fifth defendant, Marcus Raskin, was acquitted. Benjamin Spock was a member of Scroll & Key; William Sloane Coffin Jr. was a member of Skull & Bones. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Ambassador-at-Large AVERELL HARRIMAN, Secretary of State Dean Rusk (left), South Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. Vu Van Thai, U.S. Senator Hiram Fong, and U. Alexis Johnson (leaning on table) talk secretly aboard Air Force One on February 5, 1966. (Photo: Yoichi R. Okamoto, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)




President Lyndon B. Johnson (left) meets with Council on Foreign Relations members Walt Rostow, WILLIAM P. BUNDY, Cyrus Vance, and former President Dwight Eisenhower aboard Air Force One on April 18, 1968. Walt Rostow, William P. Bundy, and Cyrus Vance were graduates of Yale University. (Photo: Yoichi R. Okamoto, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)





President Lyndon B. Johnson (third from right) walks in the Rose Garden on May 8, 1968 with his Vietnam War negotiators (from left to right) Philip Habib, Cyrus Vance, Gen. Andrew Goodpastor, AVERELL HARRIMAN, and William J. Jorden.



*January 23, 1973: With North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho, initialing the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, a masterly set of compromises and ambiguities that did not end the war but did provide an exit for the United States from a decade of military involvement in Vietnam. The initialing climaxed more than three years of secret negotiations between the two sides. At the Hotel Majestic, in Paris.*

American negotiators Heyward Isham, William H. Sullivan, Henry Kissinger, George Aldrich (standing), WINSTON LORD (on left side, sitting to the right of Aldrich), and John Negroponte sign the surrender papers in the presence of Le Duc Tho (seated on the right side, second man from the right) and other North Vietnamese Communist envoys.




Peter W. Rodman, Henry Kissinger, WINSTON LORD, Al Haig, William Sullivan (next to Haig), David Engel, and John Negroponte (seated) meet inside a hotel room in Paris in 1973 before negotiating with the North Vietnamese Commissars.



WINSTON LORD (the man on the far right scratching his head) makes his presence at the Paris Peace Conference on January 23, 1973 while Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signs the surrender papers in front of Le Duc Tho and North Vietnam's Commissars.





National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft (far left), U.S. Senator John McCain (2<sup>nd</sup> left), U.S. Senator JOHN KERRY (2<sup>nd</sup> right), and U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (right, rear) listen to President GEORGE H.W. BUSH as he makes a prisoner-of-war announcement on October 23, 1992 in the Rose Garden. President Bush announced that the Red Vietnamese government agreed to hand over all material on American prisoners of war.



Senator JOHN F. KERRY watches President Bill Clinton celebrate with Senator John McCain on July 11, 1995, following the ceremony where Bill Clinton extended diplomatic recognition to Red Vietnam.







President GEORGE W. BUSH meets with Red Vietnam's President Nguyen Minh Triet in the former palace of the French governor general of Indochina in Hanoi on November 17, 2006. ([Kham/Reuters](#))

**(Bush: "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh, Viet Cong is gonna win. Hey, Hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?")**



Left photo: President GEORGE W. BUSH is seen smiling in front of a statue of Ho Chi Minh.



Right: President GEORGE W. BUSH and Red Vietnam's President Nguyen Minh Triet inspect their comrades in Hanoi. President GEORGE W. BUSH has been accused of going AWOL in the Texas Air National Guard during the Vietnam War.





President George W. Bush shakes hands with Red Vietnam's President Nguyen Minh Triet in Hanoi in November 2006.



# The Living Hell of Amerasians in Vietnam

By Michael Bengé

[FrontPageMagazine.com](http://FrontPageMagazine.com) | Tuesday, November 22, 2005

Shunned by much of society, denied access to land, forced to work in degrading conditions, treated as virtual slaves, and routinely abused at the hands of the police and of a privileged class who enjoy the state's protection, Amerasians (mixed-race) live deplorable lives under the communist regime in Vietnam.

Amerasians bore the brunt of the Vietnamese communists' hatred toward America after their take over of South Vietnam in 1975. Used and abused by the communist officials, beaten at will, debased, raped and forced into prostitution, Amerasians have suffered at the hands of Vietnamese communists. Many Amerasians were rounded up by the Vietnamese communists and sent to concentration camps, where they were forced to de-activate mines with nothing more than a knife. According to one internee, only two out of eight in his section survived, six were blown up one by one in the minefields. They were told that they had to harvest what their fathers had sown; however, many of the mines were those sown by the communists themselves.

When U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, an estimated 50,000 Amerasian children were left behind. Amerasians – My lai – are regarded as "bui doi" – dirt or dust of life – children of the enemy by the xenophobic Vietnamese communists. However, to be My lai den bui doi – half-black Amerasian – is the lowest of the low in the repressive Vietnamese communist society.

There is a Vietnamese saying that it is better to marry the village dog than a man from somewhere else. It was commonplace for the mothers of Amerasian children to tear up their children's birth certificate in an attempt to hide the ethnicity of their children out of fear of persecution by the communists; more so if their children were My lai den. At best, the mothers were ostracized – shunned – for bearing "half-breeds" because this meant that they had "collaborated" with the hated American enemy. Some mothers, fearing the new government's reaction, gave up their Amerasian children to relatives, childless couples, orphanages, or even abandoned them on [the streets](#).

As the new Communist government consolidated its power, the prejudice and discrimination Amerasians and their mothers had experienced before the War's end was institutionalized. Along with other "collaborators," Amerasians were denied educational and vocational opportunities and other social service amenities such as access to health care. Many, along with their families, were relocated to the New Economic Zones with little or no infrastructure and social services in desolate, remote, sparsely populated regions to which adherents of the former "puppet regime" were sent. Here they were given land and a little food and told to start their lives anew. But many of them became virtual slaves.

Outcast, despised, and openly discriminated against, many of the fatherless Amerasians and their mothers became part of "the dust of life" (bui doi), the poorest-of-the-poor and forced to live on the fringes of Vietnamese society. Local children chased the Amerasian children and pelted them with sticks and stones while shouting: "go back to America" or "bastard of American imperialists." Young Amerasian boys and girls were often raped and sold into prostitution.

Source: <http://www.topix.com/forum/world/vietnam/TEH8Q9PLDMRAPH5HG>



The Eternal Flame at the Kennedy grave at Arlington National Cemetery

# John McCain, Jane Fonda, & Friends



AMERICAN POWS INSIDE THEIR CELL AT THE "HANOI HILTON", IN 1973, DAYS BEFORE THEIR RELEASE ON 4/1/73. PHOTOGRAPHER DOAN CONG TINH, WHO WAS PROBABLY THE MOST FAMOUS COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER IN NORTH VIETNAM, WAS ONLY ALLOWED INTO THE PRISON ONCE. PHOTO: © DOAN CONG TINH

(Source: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091771831272828194>)




AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA WALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS IN NGHE AN PROVINCE IN 1972. PHOTOGRAPHER LE MINH DIEN RECALLS THAT SHE ASKED NOT TO BE TREATED ANY DIFFERENTLY THAN THE SOLDIERS SHE STAYED WITH, AND ATE THE SAME FOOD. PHOTO: © LE MINH DIEN

(Source: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091771620819430514>)





Hollywood actress Jane Fonda entertains the Viet Cong terrorists in North Vietnam in July 1972.



In this November 7, 1991, file photo Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz, is hugged by former North Vietnam Col. Bui Tin on Capitol Hill after a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW and MIA affairs. Tin oversaw the North Vietnamese military prison operation called the "Hanoi Hilton", where McCain was held prisoner during the Vietnam War. Prodded on the 2008 campaign trail to talk about his compelling personal story, McCain usually demurs. "I'm very reluctant to do so, as you know," he said. ([AP Photo by Dennis Cook](#))



American U.S. Air Force pilot Captain Charles Boyd is escorted by his captors in North Vietnam to a "prisoners' gathering point." His aircraft was down on a mission in April 1966. This photo, made by two East German photographers, is part of a cover story in the October 20th issue of *Life Magazine* showing the American prisoners of war and their lives in Communist hands, and is one of the first views published in America on our captured servicemen. Charles Boyd retired as a General and is currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

(Source: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091773068223410610>)



A Vietnamese woman in North Vietnam escorts an American airman to a prison camp during the Vietnam War.



(Source: <http://picasaweb.google.com/haphuchoan/VietNamWar#5091773038158639506>)



ABOVE: With his head bandaged and uniform in shreds Lt Colonel James Lindberg-Hughes is led to a press conference in Hanoi.

(Source: [http://www.pjsinnam.com/VN\\_History/SEA\\_Photo\\_Albums/Photos%20Misc%201.htm](http://www.pjsinnam.com/VN_History/SEA_Photo_Albums/Photos%20Misc%201.htm))





Left: Senator John McCain talks to Prime Minister of Red Vietnam Phan Van Khai.  
Right: Senator John McCain shakes hands with Red Vietnam's Commissar Dung.



Left Picture: Sen. John McCain (left) warmly greets Red Vietnam's Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet during a 1992 visit to Hanoi. Kiet was a ranking communist party member of the secret Central Committee of the former National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) and was part of the elite clique responsible for setting policies and directing the communist war waged against the pro-democracy Vietnamese as well as U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

Right Picture: Senator McCain embraces Mai Van On in Hanoi on November 13, 1996. Mai Van On identified himself as one of the Vietnamese who pulled McCain from Hanoi's Truc Bach Lake, where McCain parachuted in 1967 after his bomber was shot down. McCain has said, many times, that, after pulling him from the lake, the Vietnamese brutally beat him and stabbed him with a bayonet.



Commissar Fernando Barral, a Spanish psychiatrist residing in Cuba, interviewed POW John McCain in an office of the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations in Hanoi.



# SOUTHEAST ASIA


Source: C.I.A 2003



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Students at Harvard University protest against William P. Bundy, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, for “crimes against the people” outside William P. Bundy’s home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. William P. Bundy was a member of Skull & Bones and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Photo: Bill Brett, Boston Globe)



South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem (left) was assassinated in Saigon on November 2, 1963, and America’s President John F. Kennedy (right) was assassinated in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963. U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in Los Angeles, California on June 5, 1968 and died the next day. The Kennedy brothers opposed America’s military expedition in South Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Diem was “eliminated” in a coup d’etat with the approval of rogue individuals in the Kennedy administration.





Exiled former Prime Minister of South Vietnam Nguyen Cao Ky (left) and his wife Le Kim pray to Huong pagoda monk Thich Minh Hien (right) at the Chan Tinh tower garden of the pagoda in Hatay province, 60 km (38 miles) southwest of Hanoi, on January 28, 2004. The 74-year-old former head of the U.S.-backed Saigon government returned to his hometown to make peace with himself and the victors of war. (Image: © KHAM/Reuters/Corbis)



Nguyen Cao Ky (left), former air force general of South Vietnam and Prime Minister of South Vietnam, greets President of Vietnam Nguyen Minh Triet at a banquet in Hanoi, Vietnam on June 22, 2007. Nguyen Cao Ky died on July 23, 2011. (Photo: <http://www.viettribune.com/vt/index.php?id=1121>)






Left: Ngo Dinh Diem appears on the front cover of the April 4, 1955 edition of *Time* magazine.



Right: Madame Nhu appears on the front cover of the August 9, 1963 edition of *Time* magazine.



Left: Vietnam's Emperor Bao Dai appears on the front cover of the May 29, 1950 edition of *Time* magazine.




Right: Thich Tri Quang appears on the front cover of the April 22, 1966 edition of *Time* magazine.






South Vietnam's Premier General Nguyen Cao Ky (left, February 18, 1966 edition) and South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu (right, September 15, 1967 edition) appear on the front cover of *Time* magazine.



South Vietnam's Premier Major General Nguyen Khanh (right, Aug. 7, 1964 edition) and General Duong Van Minh (left, November 8, 1963) appear on the front cover of *Time* magazine.





Vietnamese Communist Ho Chi Minh appears on the front cover of the November 22, 1954 (left) and May 12, 1975 (right) editions of *Time* magazine.





North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap appears on the front cover of the June 17, 1966 (left) and February 9, 1968 (right) editions of *Time* magazine.





U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (left, February 4, 1966) and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (right, July 8, 1966) appear on the front cover of *Time* magazine. Dean Rusk was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1966.




Cambodia's Prince (later King) Norodom Sihanouk (left, April 3, 1964 edition) and U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson (right, August 6, 1965 edition) appear on the front cover of *Time* magazine.






Left: U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. appears on the front cover of the May 15, 1964 edition of *Time* magazine. Right: National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy appears on the front cover of the June 25, 1965 edition of *Time* magazine.




**Council on Foreign Relations** members Henry Kissinger (left, February 14, 1969) and Daniel Ellsberg (right, July 5, 1971) appear on the front cover of *Time* magazine.





Left: Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appear on the front cover of the February 5, 1965 edition of *Time* magazine.

Right: U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson appears on the front cover of the December 10, 1965 edition of *Time* magazine.



Left: U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland, the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam [MACV], appears on the front cover of the February 19, 1965 (left) and May 5, 1967 (right) editions of *Time* magazine.





Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.





Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A. Over 58,000 American soldiers perished in Vietnam during the Vietnam War. May their souls rest in peace.





The Eternal Flame at the Kennedy grave at Arlington National Cemetery





Tomb of the Unknown Soldier